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This thesis develops a theory to determine the best execution time to conduct a 
hostage rescue attempt.  It does so by explaining the phenomenon of a hostage crisis 
biorhythm and proposing four principles essential for success.  The principles of hostage 
rescue operations presented in this thesis and used in the biorhythm model—surprise, 
intelligence, operator’s skill, and deception—are derived from looking at numerous 
planning models from special operations, from personal experience, and the thorough 
analysis of six historical cases.  The historical cases show that in every instance any one 
of these four principles was overlooked, the operation was doomed.  These principles 
have been determined to be the most critical factors that change as the crisis develops 
throughout the hostage ordeal.  A thorough understanding of this biorhythm will provide 
planning guidelines to assess the best windows of opportunity for a proposed rescue 
attempt.   
One main focus of this work will be an in-depth case study of the hostage rescue 
operation “CHAVIN DE HUANTAR”.  This case study will present compelling evidence 
to reinforce my hypothesis, and serves as a template model for successful rescue 
operations.  The analysis of this single case will provide a wealth of information on the 
success of this remarkable operation.  Another main focus of this thesis will be strategic 
thinking of a hostage crisis using game theory analysis.   
The findings of this thesis will enable decision-makers to plan and organize 
hostage rescue forces to act at the appropriate time (window of opportunity), maximizing 
their chances of success.  Additionally, it will provide a useful planning model that can 
be implemented effectively and accurately, presenting a clear picture of possible 
outcomes throughout a hostage crisis.  Furthermore, this thesis will help the reader 
become a better strategist during the planning, preparation, and execution of a hostage 
rescue operation.  It will provide a thorough understanding of how these operations work, 
how to solve them successfully, and how to predict possible outcomes at different stages 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
We sleep safe in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to 
visit violence on those who would do us harm—George Orwell 
At any given day there are approximately ten to twelve American citizens 
(AMCITS) held hostage somewhere around the world1.  Some of these hostages have 
dual citizenship; others have retired from a lifetime of government service.  I have 
personally been involved with tracking some of these AMCITS and trying to recover 
them.  I have seen the intelligence and data concerning their precise locations and have 
been ready to go and rescue them.   On every instance policymakers turned down the 
rescue option. 
Ever since the ill-fated rescue attempt in Iran, the United States has been reluctant 
to commit military forces for hostage rescue operations.  This reluctance is attributed in 
part to a risk adverse senior military leadership, stemming from disasters at DESERT 
ONE in 1980 and at Mogadishu in 1993, and to the uncertainty levels in a hostage crisis2 
environment that result during a hostage ordeal.  National-level interest in this area has 
been limited, resulting in pusillanimous policy made by U.S. Government officials to 
deal with hostage incidents worldwide.  If U.S. military forces and their policy makers 
are going to be successful in the conduct of these high-risk operations, a clear and concise 
U.S. policy must be developed with a thorough understanding of the principles for 
hostage rescue operations and their metamorphosis throughout the hostage crisis 
biorhythm.  
This thesis develops a model for hostage rescue operations, by defining the four 
principles required for their success and explaining the phenomenon of a hostage crisis 
biorhythm using personal experiences, case studies, and mathematical models.  A 
thorough understanding of this biorhythm will provide planning guidelines to assess the 
                                                 
1 Information gathered from conversations with Peter Gustaitis, Colonel, U.S. Army Special Forces, 
retired; former Deputy for Special Operations, Joint Staff. 
2  A crisis is defined as an incident or situation involving a threat to the U.S., its territories, citizens, 
military forces and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such 
diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and 
resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives (FM 100-25, 1999, Glossary-7) 
2 
best windows of opportunity for a proposed rescue attempt.  Furthermore, this thesis will 
help the reader become a better strategist during the planning, preparation, and execution 
of a hostage rescue operation.  It will provide a thorough understanding of what makes 
these operations work, how to solve them successfully, and how to predict possible 
outcomes at different stages of the operation applying the principles of game theory.  
The thesis follows four methodological steps.  First, I will define some critical 
operational and doctrinal terms for hostage rescue operations.  From here, I will extract 
and provide the four principles for success during hostage rescue operations and establish 
definitions for what I consider the biorhythm phenomenon of a hostage crisis.  I will also 
conduct a thorough description of all the phases of a military hostage rescue operation, 
reviewing current and proposed U.S. policy on hostage rescue operations.  Second, I 
intend to use a single compelling case study (Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR) to 
illustrate the legitimacy of my hypothesis.  This in-depth analysis will be structured 
following all phases of the rescue operation, outlining the critical factors that made the 
operation a total success and identifying the biorhythm of the operation.  Third, I intend 
to describe the biorhythm of a hostage crisis using game theory principles, identifying the 
critical factors for a successful rescue attempt.  These factors will be represented 
graphically to show that, throughout the course of a hostage crisis, they benefit the rescue 
force or the hostage takers differently, depending on the moment in time in the 
biorhythm. This model will present compelling evidence to reinforce my hypothesis and 
answer my research question.  Fourth, I will introduce five more hostage rescue 






Figure 1.   Author’s Principles for Hostage Rescue Operations 
3 
The findings of this thesis will enable decision-makers to better plan and organize 
hostage rescue forces to act at the appropriate time (window of opportunity), maximizing 
their chances of success.  Additionally, it will also enable decision-makers to comprehend 
the hostage crisis environment by providing a useful planning model that can be 
implemented effectively and accurately, presenting a clear picture of possible outcomes 
throughout a hostage crisis. 
A. THE ISSUE OF TIMING  
Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force 
(Joint Pub. 3-0, 2001, p. III-15) 
The question of when to send in a rescue force to resolve a hostage crisis is one 
that has troubled most military strategists and politicians throughout time.  History has 
shown that, for the most part, the best moment for the execution of a hostage rescue 
attempt is later in the life of the crisis.  Waiting to conduct an operation later allows for 
critical information and intelligence to surface, planning and preparation of the rescue 
force to be refined, and negotiations to try to achieve a peaceful resolution.  Executing 
the operation later will also allow for the natural degradation of the will and readiness of 
the captors (Nordberg, 1999, p. 8).  The biorhythm hypothesis states that there are 
different moments in time that present themselves throughout a hostage crisis, not just 
one.  Furthermore, it also contends that at different points later in the crisis, the roles are 
turned, benefiting the hostage takers or the terrorists in different ways.  The key is to plan 
for the most effective window of opportunity, and conduct the rescue maximizing the 
element of surprise, the intelligence gathered, and the operator’s3 state of readiness.   
Timing also requires being able to know the enemy’s culmination point4.  In 
hostage rescue operations, the terrorist’s culminating point could be reached when he no 
longer has the logistical means to support his operation, when the hostages’ health 
                                                 
3 Most references erroneously use the term operator to designate anyone that “pulls a trigger” in SOF.  
In a counterterrorist unit, the term operator is given to those members of the unit that have served and have 
experience in all operational areas of that organization:  the assault force, the sniper-observer force, and the 
technical support element.   
4 The culminating point is that point in time and space where the attacker’s effective combat power no 
longer exceeds the defender’s or the attacker’s momentum is no longer sustainable, or both.  Beyond the 
culminating point, attackers risk counterattack and catastrophic defeat and continue the offense at great 
peril.  Defending forces reach their culminating point when they can no longer defend successfully or 
counterattack to restore the cohesion of the defense.  The defensive culminating point marks that instant at 
which the defender must withdraw to preserve the force.   
4 
condition has become critical and medical assistance is required, or when the 
psychological and physical stresses of the siege overwhelm the captors.  For the rescue 
force, the culminating point could be reached because of the psychological and physical 
stresses of a prolonged wait, a lack of intelligence, training or rehearsing excessively, or 
the loss of the element of surprise.      
An operational commander might have the best-trained and equipped rescue force 
and all the necessary logistical supporting assets at his disposal, but if he does not 
understand and track the crisis biorhythm and cannot pinpoint the best execution time, the 
rescue will fail.  By drawing out the negotiations process as long as possible, the 
terrorists will tire and the authorities will have the appropriate time to prepare a tactical 
response.    
B. OPERATIONAL TERMS DEFINED 
Each branch of the Armed Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) gives 
operational terms a different spin.  There are several definitions for the operational terms 
used throughout this research, specifically those used for the proposed principles.  To 
reduce the amount of redundancy and discrepancy between service definitions, the 
operational terms used in this thesis are, for the most part, definitions taken from the Joint 
Publication Series for Joint Doctrine, which establishes the overarching doctrine5 for all 
services.     
This thesis focuses specifically on the military response to a hostage crisis against 
a barricaded enemy.  It does not cover, but it is applicable to, other types of hostage 
situations such as those that fall under the responsibility of Department of State (DOS), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of Transportation (DOT), or other local law 
enforcement agencies6.  Some of these examples include hostage situations in detention 
facilities, non-barricaded situations, lone criminals or suicidal individuals, and 
kidnappings. 
                                                 
5 Doctrine defines who we are and why we exist in the military; it sets capabilities and limitations, 
guides mission selection and assignment, and sets command and control arrangements.  Doctrine is neither 
policy nor strategy; it is authoritative but not directive.    
6 Depending on the location of the incident and type, one of these agencies will be responsible for the 
operation.  DOS is the lead agency for incidents that take place outside the U.S., DOT is the lead agency 
for incidents aboard aircraft “in flight” within the special jurisdiction of the U.S.  The Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs resolves any uncertainty on the designation of lead agency or 
responsibilities (Joint Pub 3-07, 1995, p. III-3). 
5 
1. Hostage Rescue 
Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, Publication 3-05, defines hostage rescue 
operations as:   
Recovery of hostages or sensitive material from terrorist organization [are] 
operations conducted to secure hostages and/or sensitive materiel from 
terrorist control, requiring speed, shock, surprise, and violent action.  The 
safety of the hostages and preventing destruction of the sensitive material 
is an essential mission requirement (Joint Pub 3-05, 1999, p. II-8). 
A hostage rescue is a special operations mission under the umbrella of combating 
terrorism7 (CBT).  It is a specified mission for “…selected units within special operations 
that operate under the direct control of the National Command Authority (NCA) or under 
a combatant command arrangement” (FM 3-0, 2001, 9-12).  Counterterrorism is also one 
of the nine special operations core tasks:  Direct Action (DA), Counterterrorism (CT), 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Special Reconnaissance 
(SR), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Civil Affairs Operations (CAO), Information 
Operations (IO), and Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CP).  
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are specifically organized to accomplish these nine 
tasks.   The following diagram represents the full spectrum of military operations and 
shows where CT operations occur (hostage rescue operations are offensive measures and 
therefore a subset of CT).  
                                                 
7 Joint Pub 3-07.02, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, defines Combating 
Terrorism as “…actions (including antiterrorism and counterterrorism) taken to oppose terrorism 
throughout the entire threat spectrum.  Antiterrorism (AT) involves defensive measures used to reduce the 
vulnerability to terrorists acts, as opposed to counterterrorism (CT) which consists of offensive measures 
taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism” (Joint Pub 3-07.02, 1998, p. vii).   
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Figure 2.   Range of Military Operations.  (From Joint Pub 3-0, 2001, p. I-2). 
 
The myriad of direct action or commando style missions within the CT umbrella 
are characterized by the fundamentals of surprise, speed, violence of action, security, 
flexibility, accurate and selective fires, and by planning at the lowest levels.  In addition, 
they also encompass some of the elements of offensive operations such as concentration 
and audacity (FM 3-0, 2001, p. 7-3).  Several models are available that provide planning 
templates for success during these high-risk offensive operations.  In Spec Ops, William 
McRaven provides six principles for Special Operations Forces (SOF) to achieve relative 
superiority while conducting direct action operations:  speed, surprise, purpose, security, 
repetition, and simplicity.  Other models for these types of operations provide similar 
frameworks to achieve success, but as the McRaven model, they focus only on the 
tactical portion of the operation (once the assault begins), leaving little guidance for the 
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strategic and operational planning process8.  Furthermore, none of these frameworks or 
models can accurately represent the intricacies of a hostage rescue operation. 
The principles of hostage rescue operations presented in this thesis and used in the 
biorhythm model—surprise, intelligence, operator’s skill, and deception, are derived 
from looking at numerous planning models from special operations in direct action 
missions, from personal experience, and the thorough analysis of four historical cases.  
The historical cases show that in every instance any one of these four principles was 
overlooked, the operation was doomed.  These principles have been determined to be the 






















































Figure 3.   Author’s Representation of the Effects of Time on Principles 
 
The uniqueness of a hostage siege can be summarized via these four principles 
from operational warfare that transform throughout the life of the hostage ordeal.  The 
principles of surprise, intelligence, operator’s skill, and deception, when represented on a 
simple graphical diagram, will follow a specific pattern in the shape of a human 
                                                 
8 Strategic Level of war as defined by Joint Pub 3-0, is that level of war at which a nation, often as a 
member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security 
objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.  The 
Operational Level of war links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.  The focus at this 
level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, 
organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.  The Tactical 
Level of war is the employment of units in combat.  It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of 
units in relation to each other and /or to the adversary in order to use their full potential (Joint Pub 3-0, 
2001, pp. II-2, II-3).  
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biorhythm.  A close look at this graphical representation of the hostage crisis biorhythm9 
will define the critical factors for a successful rescue attempt.  These factors show that, 
throughout the course of the hostage crisis biorhythm, they will benefit the rescue force 
or the hostage takers differently, depending on the specific moment in time.  A thorough 
understanding of this biorhythm will provide planning guidelines to assess the best 
windows of opportunity for a proposed rescue attempt.   
On page #22, Figure 5 shows an example of the hostage crisis biorhythm model, 
demonstrating how the principles change as a function of time and depicting the best 
execution point for a rescue attempt.  The graph is not an exact analytical tool that can 
predict precisely a moment in time; it is only an estimate to aid in the decision process.  
A more analytical approach later on in this thesis assigns values to different factors for all 
parties involved and plotting instances throughout a specified time line.  This is done by 
applying utilities from decision-making models and principles of Game Theory10, but it is 
only a subjective estimate based on the planner’s assigned utilities. 
2. Kidnapping vs. Hostage Taking 
Kidnapping is the surreptitious taking and holding of a person or persons 
for the purpose of achieving some personal or organizational gain (Bolz, 
Dudonis, & Schulz, 2002, p. 112). 
A kidnapping differs from a hostage siege in several ways, to include the tactics, 
techniques, and procedures required to solve the crisis.  First, in a kidnapping scenario, 
the main goal of the criminals is to gain a ransom; the hostage taker, on the other hand, 
                                                 
9 The American Heritage College Dictionary defines biorhythm as an innate, cyclical biological 
process or function.  Also known as the “…biological rhythm, it is a cyclic pattern of changes in 
physiology or in activity of living organisms, often synchronized with daily, monthly, or yearly 
environmental changes. Rhythms that vary according to the time of day (circadian rhythms), in part a 
response to daylight or dark, include the opening and closing of flowers and the nighttime increase in 
activity of nocturnal animals. Circadian rhythms also include activities that occur often during a 24-hour 
period, such as blood pressure changes and urine production. Annual cycles, called cirannual rhythms, 
respond to changes in the relative length of periods of daylight and include such activities as migration and 
animal mating. Marine organisms are affected by tide cycles. Although the exact nature of the internal 
mechanism is not known, various external stimuli—including light, temperature, and gravity—influence 
the organism's internal clock; in the absence of external cues, the internal rhythms gradually drift out of 
phase with the environment… physiological rhythms are also present in the activity of individual organs, 
e.g., the beating of heart muscle and the activity of electrical waves of the brain.” 
(http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/b1/biorhyth.asp, last accessed on 7 December 2003). 
10 Game theory is the branch of social science that studies strategic decision-making (Dixit & 
Nalebuff, 1991, p. 2).   
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seeks power11 in addition to and above all other demands, which usually include an 
exorbitant amount of money.  Second, a hostage crisis usually occurs at a known 
location, with the terrorists already surrounded inside a structure; in a kidnapping, the 
security of the criminals rests solely on the clandestine12 nature of their location.  Except 
for the ransom or telephone call, no one has any idea who or where the perpetrators are 
located (p. 112).  Third, a hostage crisis will usually last anywhere from one to two 
weeks, depending on the logistical or physical constraints of the terrorists.  Kidnapping 
situations can go on for months or even years.  Finally, hostage takers are historically 
more brutal in their treatment of hostages, torturing or killing them at random to establish 
political shock and/or credibility.  In contrast, the kidnapper’s success depends on 
safeguarding his victim.  A trained negotiator will know this and understands he/she has 
more time to develop the scenario; in a hostage siege, the negotiator must buy time.     
3. Barricade vs. Non-Barricade Hostage Situation 
Barricaded hostage situations are those where the hostage takers have barricaded 
themselves in with the hostages, fortifying their location and blocking its access from any 
outside contact.  The terrorists cannot leave the site and neither can they receive 
reinforcements; they also have a weapon or weapons that can harm others, and are 
threatening to use them (McMains & Mullins, 2001, p. 39).  Barricades include explosive 
booby traps, alarms, use of furniture to block entrances, chains and locks, and any other 
equipment that will aid the terrorists in securing themselves from any outside 
intervention.  For obvious reasons, the special equipment requirements for an assault 
force to breach an entrance into these target areas vastly differs from those not fortified.  
A non-barricaded hostage situation involves any type of hostage scenario that does not 
require an effective breach to enter the target area.  An example of a non-barricade 
hostage scenario is a terrorist holding someone hostage at gun point out in an open area. 
                                                 
11 In 1974, Dr. Brian Jenkins from the Rand Corporation in California coined the term “the theater of 
terror”, to describe the shock value created from a hostage incident, and how terrorists will take full 
advantage of the attention gained.  The perpetrator is the star of the production, that is, the leading actor 
(Bolz, Dudonis, & Schulz, 2002, p. 156). 
12  The term clandestine is given to an operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments 
or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.  A clandestine operation differs from a 
covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of 
identity of sponsor.  In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus 
equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities (Joint Pub 1-02, 2003, p. 89).    
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4. Detention Facility Scenarios 
Not all prison and jail incidents are hostage situations.  The riot may not even be 
violent.  The prisoners may take over the section of the facility peacefully (p. 39).  
Detention facility scenarios are fairly simple to control in that the siege usually develops 
inside a secured and controlled environment (the prison itself); from the onset of the 
crisis, the designated rescue force controls the target area and has almost all the 
intelligence required while conducting the assault.  Such operations favor the use of 
chemical agents and/or the use of less than lethal ammunition.  They usually lack 
negotiations and end up in a forced entry to subdue the hostage takers quickly.  Standard 
operating procedures for these types of situations vary from state to state or from one 
prison to another.  The tactics and techniques for detention facility hostage scenarios have 
been perfected over the last twenty years due to their high frequency and because of the 
advent of less than lethal ammunition.   
5. Criminals or Suicidal Individuals 
These types of operations usually involve criminals or individuals with 
psychological or mental problems threatening to end their lives if their demands are not 
met.  These subjects act in emotional, senseless, and often self-destructive ways.  They 
also have no substantive or very realistic demands.  The greatest danger in such 
operations is to the actual criminal, or to any bystander that might be caught in the 
crossfire.  These operations are characterized by the incremental use of force, coupled 
with firm negotiations with the ultimate goal of having the individual surrender.  
Negotiators during these operations try to demonstrate patience and understanding; 
giving a little without getting anything in return, they provide nonviolent resolution 
options, and apply active listening skills to lower emotion, defuse anger, and establish 
rapport13. 
6. Close Quarter Battle 
Close quarter battle (CQB) is intrinsic to hostage rescue operations.  FM 100-25, 
Doctrine for Special Operations, defines CQB as sustained combative tactics, techniques, 
                                                 
13 Information gathered on 20 March 2004 during phone interview with Patrol Officer Petras from the 
Tactical Negotiations Team, Policy and Procedures, Mt. Lebanon Police Department, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. 
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and procedures employed by small, highly trained SOF units using special purpose 
weapons, munitions, and demolitions to recover specified personnel, equipment, or 
material.  Characteristics of CQB include surprise, speed, and violence of action, and the 
application of precise discriminatory engagement of targets to gain specific, short-term 
objectives.  This type of operation requires highly advanced detailed planning, 
synchronization, and integrated assault skills, including advanced marksmanship, 
explosive entry techniques, and special tactics and procedures to gain surprise.  CQB may 
be conducted in peacetime operations in highly sensitive environments.  Prevention of 
collateral damage is a critical consideration (FM 100-25, 1999, p. Glossary-7).    
C. FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
1. Intelligence 
[Intelligence is] the product resulting from the collection, processing, 
integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation or available 
information concerning foreign countries or areas.  It is information and 
knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, 
investigation, analysis, or understanding (Joint Pub 1-02, 2003, p. 261). 
The principle of intelligence as factor in the biorhythm model is defined as the 
timely, detailed, tailored, integrated, prioritized, rapidly updated, and focused intelligence 
vital to hostage rescue force targeting and mission planning process (Joint Pub 3-05.5, 
1993, p. II-12).  The specific intelligence requirements for a hostage crisis are very 
specific and often very different from conventional or SOF missions.  The target 
intelligence details such as the specifics of possible breaching points, blueprints and 
diagrams of the structure, exact location of the hostages and terrorists, established 
routines, all demand very accurate and real time intelligence that uniquely serve the 
operator on the assault force.  To attain this level of detail, technical and human 
intelligence collection assets must take priority during the siege in order to answer the 
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR)14.   
 
 
                                                 
14 CCIR are a comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being 
critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision-making process that affects 
successful mission accomplishment (Joint Pub 3-0, 2001, p. III-26) 
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The collection of intelligence by human agents, known as human 
intelligence or HUMINT, can fill in many of the gaps in the knowledge 
gained by technical collection.  The U.S., however, traditionally has been 
weaker at HUMINT than at technical intelligence (TECHINT) gathering 
(Vandenbroucke, 1993, p. 153).   
Technical intelligence collection during the hostage siege focuses but it is not 
limited to audio and video surveillance devices, which can collect and provide real time 
information on what is happening inside the target.  The issue at hand is being able to 
plant these devices inside the target location in order to receive accurate data on the 
hostages, the terrorists, and the target area configuration.  To bridge the intelligence gap 
when these devices cannot be used, it is essential to employ HUMINT15 assets in and 
around the target area, to collect and report the details not answered through TECHINT16 
means.  Both collection means must be monitored constantly to pick up any changes 
inside the crisis site such as movement of hostages from one location to another and the 
condition, weapons, strength, and capabilities of the terrorists. 
Sniper-observer teams provide another excellent means of reconnaissance and 
surveillance of the target area, and can serve as the emergency assault element in case 
any triggers17 are set off during the initial stages of the siege.  These teams are force 
multipliers around the target area, in that they can provide expert advice on the tactical 
situation by technical and human surveillance means; at the same time, they give the 
commander an additional course of action for an emergency assault option.  Above all, 
sniper-observer teams are operators first; the information gathered by them is 
immediately considered processed intelligence by any competent counterterrorist task 
force. 
                                                 
15  HUMINT is the collection by a trained HUMINT collector of foreign information from people and 
multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, 
personnel, and capabilities.  It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both 
passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements and 
cross-cue other intelligence disciplines (FM 2-0, 2004, p. 6-1). 
16 TECHINT is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of threat and foreign military 
equipment and associated material. 
17 Triggers during a hostage crisis are established by the Counter Terrorist Task Force (CTJTF) 
commander to set off actions according to the approved plan.  These can be the moving of hostages to a 
different location, a fire on the target area, or the actual killing of a hostage or hostages.  
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Operational security (OPSEC18) is another critical aspect of the intelligence 
principle in hostage rescue operations that is closely tied to deception and surprise.  The 
commander of the rescue force, as well as the government and all other agencies 
involved, must constantly be thinking about operational security measures to protect the 
force and the plan from being compromised.  Strict OPSEC is a force multiplier for 
hostage rescue forces and cannot be overlooked.  Operational security measures were 
very sloppy during the failed attempt to rescue the Israeli athletes during the Munich 
Olympics of 1972.  There was no control over media or any security cordon of the area, 
causing the German police forces to expose their plan on national television as they were 
attempting to conduct a hasty assault against the Black September terrorists.  On the 
contrary, a perfect example of strict OPSEC is Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR in 
Lima, Peru.  Throughout the 126 days of planning and preparation prior to the assault, the 
rescue force and the tunnel diggers were kept in an undisclosed location in total secrecy, 
while rehearsing and preparing for the daring assault, on a full size replica of the target 
area (see Chapter III for detailed case study).      
2. Surprise 
Rescue operations are the only type of military operation in which 
complete surprise is a precondition….The critical element is always the 
feasibility of a surprise assault, for the key to success in any rescue 
operation is the ability to achieve complete surprise (Gazit, 1980, pp. 118, 
122).   
SOF must achieve surprise to the extent that the enemy cannot react effectively 
prior to mission accomplishment (Joint Pub 3-05, 1998, p. I-5).  The principle of surprise 
as a factor in the biorhythm is defined as exploiting indirect approaches and doing the 
unexpected.  It often requires bold, imaginative, and audacious actions, particularly when 
applying combat power directly and with surgical precision (FM 31-20, 1990, p. 1-9).  
When coupled with deceptive measures, the effects of surprise can be maximized when 
the hostile forces do not know the means of the disruption and cannot implement 
effective countermeasures.                                                  
18 OPSEC is the process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly 
actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:  (a) identify those actions that can be 
observed by adversary intelligence systems, and (b) to determine indicators hostile intelligence systems 
might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful 
to adversaries, and (c) to select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the 
vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation (Joint Pub 3-07.2, 1998, p. GL-4). 
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Surprise means being able to use creativity and agility, not just violence and 
explosiveness.  Take for example Operation WINTER HARVEST—the rescue of 
Brigadier General James Dozier19 in January of 1982.  After nearly a month of captivity, 
a U.S. surveillance team reported the exact location and guard patterns of the Red 
Brigade terrorists that were guarding the General to Italian authorities.  A team of ten 
men from the Italian Carabinieri was on alert, waiting for the right opportunity to enter 
the apartment and conduct a rescue.  When there were only two guards from the Red 
Brigade guarding the General, the Italians simply walked up to the apartment and 
knocked on the front door.  As soon as one of the guards opened the door, ten Carabinieri 
stormed the room, subduing the two terrorists and safely rescuing General Dozier 
(Harclerode, 2001, p. 432).     
In The Principles of War for the Information Age, Bob Leonard divides the 
element of surprise into technical and tactical, and describes any force at war as 
perpetually unready to fight (p. 193).  This concept directly applies to the hostage rescue 
crisis; the rescue force must take full advantage of the technical and tactical means to 
achieve complete surprise prior to the assault.  In a hostage rescue situation, a few 
seconds can mean the difference between success and failure; a terrorist can shoot a 
hostage or can detonate an explosive device inside the target area.  Absolute surprise is 
necessary to allow the assault force those critical seconds to neutralize the threat.  The 
loss of surprise will almost automatically mean aborting the plan.  Rescue forces must 
rely heavily on the element of surprise to gain relative superiority20.  The element of 
surprise is closely dependent on a good deception plan, excellent timing, and exploiting 
the enemy’s weaknesses.   
3. Operator’s Skills 
SO [Special Operations] are characterized by certain attributes that 
cumulatively distinguish them from conventional operations.  SO can be 
designed and conducted to influence the will of foreign leadership to 
create conditions favorable to U.S. strategic objectives.  This may involve 
                                                 
19 General Dozier was the Deputy Chief of Staff (Logistics & Administration) at the NATO 
headquarters in Verona, in Northern Italy.  He was the highest-ranking U.S. NATO officer in Italy at the 
time of his kidnapping by terrorists from the Red Brigades.  He was eventually rescued in Padua by an elite 
Italian anti-terrorist police unit, which also conducted the arrests of five of his captors. 
20 In SpecOps, William McRaven describes relative superiority as “…a condition that exists when an 
attacking force, generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended enemy” (p.4).  
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a long-term commitment to achieve the desired result.  Alternatively, SO 
may be principally offensive, usually of high physical and political risk, 
and directed at high-value, critical, and often time-sensitive targets (Joint 
Publication 3-05, 1998, p. I-4).    
A hostage rescue is a mission specifically tailored for SOF.  However, the unique 
skills required to be successful in hostage rescue operations require a higher degree of 
expertise not found in regular SOF units.  The principle of operator’s skills as a factor in 
the biorhythm is defined as those unique skills and attributes required by the hostage 
rescue force to successfully dominate and eliminate the threat on a target area, while at 
the same time safely rescuing a hostage/s.  Hostage rescue operations are the most 
difficult type of special operations missions.  They require absolute precision and demand 
a specific type of force with attributes and capabilities that distinguish them from 
conventional forces or even regular SOF.   The special skills required by a rescue force 
are even more technical and sophisticated than those required of regular SOF units.  
Specialized shooting techniques, breaching, technical and tactical surveillance, and close 
quarter battle, are all special skills specific for hostage rescue.  A competent rescue force 
takes months to create and requires resources and capabilities not encountered in a 
regular unit.  The Joint Pub 3-05 defines these qualities and attributes as the SOF 
“truths”:   
(1) Humans are more important than hardware; (2) Quality is better than 
quantity; (3) SOF cannot be mass-produced; and (4) Competent SOF 
cannot be created after emergencies arise (p. II-3).   
The most important part of a rescue operation is the physical act of actually 
saving the hostage.  In order to do this, the skill level of the rescue force must be high.  
Hostage operations involve the use of surgical precision fires from snipers as well as 
from every operator and breacher in the assault force.  An error while taking a shot or 
calculating a charge to blow a door21 is not an option.  This can lead to disaster for the 
                                                 
21 An anemic explosive charge will not help achieve entry and gives terrorists time to murder their 
hostages and defend themselves. This was the case when Israel's Sayeret Matkal tried to rescue a kidnapped 
Golani infantry brigade soldier, Nachshon Vaxman, in 1994. The charges used were too small and failed to 
open the door of the apartment forcing the team to set new charges. By this time the terrorists had already 
executed Vaxman and were waiting when SM finally charged through the door. They managed to kill the 
assault team leader before being killed themselves (Information retrieved from 
specwarnet.net/world/ct.htm, international CT units site on 20 January 2004). 
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entire operation.  Assaulters are required to be able to shoot at a terrorist with exact 
precision, while moving through obstacles, and be able to discriminate between the 
terrorist and the hostage being held at gunpoint.  Each rescue member must be able to 
engage a terrorist with killing shots on his very first try, with two rounds to the chest 
(known as the “double tap”) followed by one to the head, if required (usually if the 
terrorist is wearing body armor).  If the rescuer misses, the terrorist will have time to 
either shoot back or, even worse, kill the hostage, causing the operation to fail.  
Another dimension to the operator’s skill that is specific to close quarter battle 
(CQB) operations is the operator’s state and presence of mind.  Not only is the operator 
required to maximize violence of action, use accurate and selective fires, be flexible, and 
in tremendous physical condition, but his mental state of mind must carry him through 
the impossible; he must believe he is indestructible inside kit22.  Once the assault begins, 
he must show no fear and continue to his designated point of domination in each specific 
room on the target, regardless of what happens in his sector.  The rescue force must be 
comfortable working with one another, knowing exactly how each member of the force is 
going to react during any given situation, depending on each other for their lives.   
We were isolated in an undisclosed location for almost four months.  
During that time, we rehearsed and trained on a full size replica of the 
Japanese Ambassador’s residence for most of the day, everyday.  I got to 
the point were I could walk the whole assault blindfolded.  I knew exactly 
who would be to my left and right, how many steps I had to take to a door, 
and how many seconds it would take me to walk from one room to the 
next (Personal interview with Major Felix Diaz23, Army Special Forces, 
Peru, 19 September 2003). 
                                                 
 
22 The term “kit” refers to all equipment, to include body armor and weapon, carried by an operator or 
a regular soldier.  The term has been adopted from the British. 
23  Major Felix Diaz gave me a personal tour of the mock up site while in Peru.  During the actual 
assault, a full size brick wall crumbled on top of him; a breaching charge was placed on a door that was 
booby trapped by the MRTA with a large amount of explosives causing a tremendous explosion, knocking 
down the entire brick wall.  The explosion sent Major Diaz flying approximately 30 feet and covered him 
in bricks, but he was able to regain his composure and continue the assault. 
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The very nature of the CQB fight takes combatives24 to a new level, making the 
operator’s psyche critical for his survival.  If the operator has any second thoughts as he 
enters a room or a structure during the assault, he will second-guess himself allowing the 
enemy just enough time to fire a shot back at him or at the hostage.  He might even stop 
the flow of the assault force, creating chaos and confusion inside the target area, allowing 
the terrorists to regain their initiative.  When an operator dons his protective body armor 
and special equipment, a “switch is turned on” in his mind—he must believe that he is 
indestructible and can face any odds.     
4. Deception 
Military deception assists a commander in attaining surprise, security, 
mass, and economy of force.  Military deception supports military 
operations by causing adversaries to misallocate resources in time, place, 
quantity or effectiveness (Joint Pub 3-58, 1996, p. I-2).   
Hostage rescue operations require a very different type of approach to help the 
rescue element reach the entry without being compromised.  Deception affords the rescue 
force the much-needed element of surprise.  When used properly, it can direct the 
terrorist’s attention from the assault, or delay their reaction long enough for surprise to be 
gained at the crucial moment.  During the famous Israeli rescue at Entebbe in July of 
1976, the Israeli assault force disguised their approach to the target by riding across the 
airfield in Mercedes sedans (typically used by Ugandan dignitaries), successfully 
delaying the initial actions of the Ugandan guards.    
The deception plan must be considered at the strategic and operational levels of 
the operation.  At the strategic level, the negotiations must maintain the focus of freeing 
the hostages by diplomatic means at all cost, even in the face of a mounting rescue 
attempt.  On the operational level, the deception plan might give the impression to the 
hostage takers that the military preparations have nothing to do with the rescue of the 
hostages. 
                                                 
24 Combatives is the term used to designate hand-to-hand combat.  The term has evolved with the 
advent of urban warfare and close quarter battle.  It incorporates the elements of survival, martial arts, 
wrestling, and grappling, with the overall goal of subduing or killing the enemy at close range.  
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Because hostage rescue operations are inherently very complex missions that 
require a mastery of the operational art25, the deception plan is a crucial principle.  In 
SpecOps, McRaven mentions the element of simplicity as being crucial in special 
operations (p. 13).  This principle does not apply to hostage rescue operations.  A simple 
plan is a graceful plan, but hostage rescue operations by default, are very complex 
endeavors and far from being simple.  The volatility of the situation, the political 
implications, the media coverage, and the national test of will, all provide a degree of 
complexity that must be tampered by any means possible.  It is therefore critical to 
introduce the deception plan at the strategic, operational, and tactical level of the rescue 
operation.  The deception plan can, on one hand, hide military preparations and rehearsals 
from the negotiations process or the media, or, on the other hand, it can help promote the 
fact that the country is steadfast in its resolve not to negotiate and rescue the hostages.  
More importantly, the deception plan can be used to catch the enemy completely off 
guard, distracting their attention during the initial few seconds of the approach and 
assault on the target.  A drawn out negotiations process can also be a great deception tool 
to masque an impending assault.  The analogy of the frog in a boiling pot applies here; if 
a frog is thrown in a boiling pot, he will immediately jump right out of it.  However, if he 
is slowly brought up to a boil, he will die before he knows it.  The terrorists will not 
know if things are slowly heating up because of a good deception plan.   
There are five categories of deception plans.  First, strategic deception is planned 
and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary 
military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, 
policies, and operations.  Second, operational deception is planned and executed by and 
in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are 
favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations.  It is planned and conducted in a 
theater of war to support campaigns and major operations.  Third, tactical deception is 
planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary 
actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations.  It is planned and 
                                                 
25 Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives 
through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and 
battles.  Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design and, 
ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war (Joint Pub 3-0, 2001, p. II-2). 
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conducted to support battles and engagements.  Fourth, service deception is planned and 
executed by the services that pertain to service support to joint operations; service 
military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of service 
forces and systems.  Fifth, deception in support of operational security (OPSEC) is 
planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the 
prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities, capabilities, 
or intentions; deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence 
away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. 
There are also four major types of deception plans:  feint, ruse, display, and 
demonstration.  The feint is an offensive action involving contact with the adversary in 
order to deceive the enemy as to the location and/or time of the actual main offensive 
action26.  The ruse is a trick of war usually involving the deliberate exposure of false 
information to the enemy intelligence collection system.  The display is a static portrayal 
of an activity, force, or equipment usually to deceive visual observation.  The 
demonstration is a diversionary attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not 
sought (similar to feint, but no actual contact with adversary intended)27. 
D. THE BIORHYTHM MODEL 
The following section will introduce some of the theory on biorhythms and 
explain how it relates to hostage rescue operations.  Biorhythm theory states that our lives 
are influenced by physical, emotional, intellectual, and in some cases even intuitional 
cycles, which begin at birth.  At birth, all four states start and begin to rise to a positive 
peak; then they slowly decline to their low point. On a day where the cycle crosses the 
critical point, one’s abilities can vary wildly.  Many major corporations have biorhythm 
programs on their computers for use in planning important meetings and other events.  
Some airlines are also known to use biorhythm charts to plan pilot’s schedules 
(Information retrieved from www.mcuniverse.com on 5 August 2004).  
                                                 
26 One of the most impressive forms of a feint was displayed during the De Punt Train rescue in 
Holland in June of 1977, by Dutch Marines from the BBE (CT unit) against 13 South Moluccan terrorists.  
Dutch star-fighter aircrafts flew over the hijacked train and kicked in their afterburners right over it, 
creating a loud and thunderous diversion to cover the approach and assault of the rescue force onto the train 
(see case study Chapter IX).  
27 Information retrieved from the Joint Publication 3-58, 1998, and from Military Deception Course at 
the Naval Postgraduate School with Dr. Barton Whaley, 2003.  
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Standard biorhythm theory, which is very simple to understand, is viewed with 
skepticism throughout the medical community.  This skepticism is due mainly because it 
is almost impossible to assign a fixed number of days to its cycles and automatically 
assume that they will remain as such for the rest of someone’s life.  Most biorhythms 
concentrate on four standard cycles:  the physical cycle is 23 days long and it influences a 
broad range of physical factors such as resistance to disease, strength, co-ordination, 
speed, physiology, endurance, and the sensation of physical well-being.  The emotional 
cycle lasts 28 days and governs creativity, sensitivity, mental health, love, hate, 
optimism, pessimism, passion, coldness, depression, elation, mood, and perceptions of 
the world and ourselves.  The intellectual cycle, which takes place over a 33-day period, 
regulates memory, alertness, receptivity to knowledge, and the logical or analytical 
functions of the mind: reasoning ability, and accuracy of computations.  The intuitional 
cycle, which takes place over a 38-day period, affects our unconscious perception, 
hunches, and instincts; a sort of sixth sense28.  This cycle is the least portrayed in most 
biorhythm literature or commercial programs available through the Internet.  On the day 
of birth, each cycle starts at a neutral baseline or zero point and begins to rise in a 
positive phase, during which the energies and abilities are high.  A very simple computer 
program can run the equation for a sinusoidal wave divided by the days for the period of 
the cycle, to provide an output similar to the one on Figure 4.  
Another important term in the biorhythm is the critical phase.  This is the short 
period (usually one-two days depending on the rhythm), when a rhythm is crossing over 
to a different phase.  During this short time, there is a greater risk of error or accident.  In 
fact, studies have shown that there is a 30-60% greater risk of an accident during those 
few critical days that a person experiences every month.  Although there is no concrete 
scientific evidence that supports biorhythm theories, the analogy is useful for 
understanding the different efficiency cycles of the human body and how these relate to 
the hostage crisis model.  
The following chart, taken from the Internet, shows a typical biorhythm program 
that can calculate a person’s biorhythm simply by knowing the individual’s date of birth:   
                                                 




Figure 4.   Author’s Personal Biorhythm (www.krstarica.com, last accessed on 16 
August 2004) 29 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term biorhythm is strictly used to make the 
comparison between the cyclical changes in the biological state of human beings with the 
changes in the proposed hostage rescue operation’s principles:  intelligence, surprise, 
operator’s skill, and deception.  These imperatives behave in very similar manner to a 
human biorhythm, therefore the analogy for the model.  The term is specifically useful to 
understand the operator’s skill factor, when analyzing the biological changes in the 
human body throughout the crisis.  The factors of stress, boredom, time of day, lack of 
sleep, light, temperature, noise, etc., will oscillate throughout the life of a hostage crisis in 
the same form of a biorhythm plot.  It would be ideal if we could assign day cycles to 
each principle of hostage rescue with some degree of precision.  We could then run a 
computer simulation based on these values, starting with the initial date of the crisis and 
see the culmination points.  However, this approach, as with any biorhythm theory, is 
very subjective and almost impossible to prognosticate with precision from one scenario 
to another.   
                                                 
29 To see a one-month personal biorhythm chart, go to www.krstarica.com, last accessed on 16 August 
2004.  This site will plot a biorhythm based on your birth date; it will show physical, emotional, and 
intellectual cycles. 
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In the spirit of the biorhythm model, we can qualitatively represent the ebb and 
flow of the composite principles for successful hostage rescue operations.  This allows us 
to observe changes that are critical for the decision maker in trying to decide the best 
execution time.  It is a best-case approach that allows us to see graphically the best 
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Figure 5.   Author’s Representation of the Hostage Crisis Biorhythm Model 
 
The model describes how initially, the hostage rescue force is not prepared to 
conduct the operation and how the terrorists have the upper hand controlling the crisis 
area.  The rescue force has not developed a deliberate action plan or any accurate 
intelligence on the situation.  Furthermore, it has not conducted any rehearsals or 
gathered any special equipment requirements specific to the target area.  The terrorists, 
on the other hand, are taking advantage of the shock value of their most recent violent 
action, and are exploiting this window of opportunity to maintain their relative 
superiority over the hostages as well as any opposing force that might be in or around the 
target (police forces or security guards).  As time goes by, the readiness level of the 
rescue force increases as well as the intelligence picture and information on the target 
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area.  In contrast, the situation degrades for the terrorists.  They begin to feel fatigue due 
to their static posture while in a high stress environment and their knowledge of the target 
area has reached its limits.  They must now rely on outside information, most of the time 
provided by a negotiating team.  The security posture and readiness of the terrorists begin 
to degrade significantly; their close proximity to the hostages will weaken their will and 
make them second-guess their intended cause.  The only way for the terrorists to 
recapture some of their initiative, as portrayed on the graph, is by killing a hostage or by 
taking some other kind of drastic measure that will help them regain some relative 
superiority.  This will allow them to reestablish a new culminating point and increase 
their chances of success.  When this occurs, the biorhythm plot will describe a “switch 











Release of a Hostage
(new intelligence)
 
Figure 6.   Author’s Representation of the Hostage Crisis Biorhythm and Windows of 
Opportunity 
In similar fashion to the human biorhythm model, the hostage crisis model is 
broken down into three cycles based on the hostage rescue principles.  The deception 
cycle is pooled together with the principle of surprise due to their close dependency on 
each other as a function of time.  The surprise curve will represent both principles.  These 
are portrayed by three distinct sinusoidal waves that oscillate in synchronicity or against 
each other depending on the nature of the crisis.  Below are two examples representing 
each of the forces involved: 
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Figure 7.   Author’s Representation of the Hostage Takers’ Biorhythm Factors 
 
Figure 8.   Author’s Representation of the Rescue Force’s Biorhythm Factors 
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II. THE RESCUE OPERATION 
The rescue operation is the climax of a war, which must be resolved in a 
single military act…the success, or failure of such an operation means the 
victory or defeat in that war (Gazit, 1981, p.113).   
Hostage rescue operations are dominated by political motives, making them 
unique from conventional military operations in wartime.  They require tactics, 
techniques, and procedures not normally employed by military forces, and therefore not 
trained to execute.  Embarking on a rescue operation should be the last resort in trying to 
resolve a crisis.  Nevertheless, every attempt must be made to allow for the hostage crisis 
to develop and its intelligence picture to take shape, in order to facilitate the execution of 
a deliberate assault by the rescue force.  Otherwise, the rescue party will be limited to the 
conduct of an emergency assault in a vacuum of information, with the hostage takers 
having the upper hand. 
A. ANATOMY OF A RESCUE 
Strategic special operations present specific characteristics.  The highest 
civilian and military authorities in the White House and the Pentagon 
closely monitor the preparation and execution of such raids…. Strategic 
special operations, moreover, are usually joint endeavors involving several 
U.S. military services and civilian government agencies…. They are also 
high-risk ventures for they seek to achieve difficult objectives in a single 
bid, with deliberately limited means.  Because failure in such operations is 
typically both highly visible and dramatic, the ensuing damage to U.S. 
prestige tends to be great… (Vandenbroucke, 1993, p. 4). 
The most important consideration prior to the start of any rescue preparation is the 
question of operational feasibility:  Does the country responsible for handling the crisis 
have a dedicated unit capable of responding to such incidents?  Does the political 
environment allow for the use of military action to resolve the crisis? Are the rescue 
unit’s operational and/or tactical limitations too great, preventing them from executing 
the rescue? 
Most countries have a dedicated military or police hostage rescue unit.  These 
types of units are composed of combat seasoned individuals who are highly skilled and 
experienced in clandestine operations, operations that require creative thinking, 
flexibility, improvisation, and demand unusual requirements of the operator.  Their lines 
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of command are very narrow to bypass all bureaucratic channels that can slow reaction 
times.  To achieve this high level of professionalism and specific expertise takes time, 
resources, and equipment, not usually encountered in a standard military outfit.  
Furthermore, to combine such unique individuals into one cohesive unit that can operate 
as a whole on a specific mission takes great time and resources. 
The success criteria of any hostage rescue operation can vary depending on the 
operation and the uniqueness of the incident.  For our purposes, success for the hostage 
rescue operation is defined by these three specific conditions:   
(1) The safe rescue of all hostages alive  
(2) Minimal damage to the rescue force’s personnel or equipment (any casualties 
should be restricted to the terrorists)  
(3) The politico-military ramifications at the completion of the operation do not 
outweigh the risks involved in launching the rescue 
Due to the criticality and sensitivity of hostage rescue operations, whatever the 
situation might be, the overall responsibility for absolute command and control should 
rest with the political leadership from start to finish.  They must decide whether to go 
ahead and conduct the rescue.  They must dictate the constraints and limits for any 
military operations.  They must also approve the final and detailed plan for the 
operations.  They must decide the abort criteria in advance and any deviations from the 
plan.  Finally, they must be in constant contact with the task force, in case it needs to 
make timely interventions according to new developments (Gazit, 1981, pp. 133-134). 
Hostage rescue operations, for the most part, can be broken down into three major 
phases:  Phase I, the planning, preparation, and rehearsals; Phase II, the approach and 
assault; and Phase III, the post assault.  These phases vary depending on the type of 
hostage scenario; barricaded hostage takers, hostage takers out in an open area or in a 
hijacked plane, or a lone suicide terrorist, but essentially remain the same throughout.   
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1. Phase I:  Planning, Preparation, and Rehearsals 
If the best military generals were asked to plan a successful bank robbery, 
they would be helpless.  Complex rescue operations require the mentality 
and expertise of a bank robber, and not those of an Army commander who 
is used to moving 2000 tanks (Gazit, 1980, p. 132).  
A hostage rescue operation is the most dangerous and delicate of all special 
operations missions.  Shlomo Gazit30 describes in his article Risk, Glory, and the Rescue 
Operation, four planning principles that distinguish the rescue operation from a standard 
military operation.  First, the search for bright, original, and even crazy ideas.   Second, 
the importance of saving time in the planning and preparations.  Third, the early and 
continual involvement of the political decision-makers so that they will be able to 
evaluate the planning ideas as they arise.  Fourth, the inclusion of the rescue force 
commanders in the planning process from the earliest possible moment.   
Harvey Schlossberg and Frank Bolz from the New York City Police Department, 
developed tactics that led to the resolution of high-conflict incidents without the loss of 
life, from the lessons learned at the Munich Olympics in 1972.  These tactics are still 
being taught today at police departments across the country.  They noted three conditions 
paramount for their negotiators, applicable for military hostage rescues.  First, the 
importance of containing and negotiating with the hostage taker in a hostage incident.  
Second, the importance of understanding the hostage taker’s motivation and personality 
in a hostage situation.  Third, the importance of slowing down an incident so time can 
work for the negotiator (McMains & Mullins, 2001, pp. 2-3).   
As mentioned before, timing is crucial during the planning process.  During the 
first few minutes of the siege, the terrorists are uncertain if their operation will succeed 
and therefore at great risk of making fatal mistakes; they must get the hostages under 
control and down to a manageable size, establish security, and become aware of their 
operational space and their surroundings.  Through these initial moments, the terrorists 
are at their most vulnerable point.  However, the reality is that a hostage rescue unit is 
                                                 
30 Major General Shlomo Gazit (retired) served as Director of Military Intelligence of Israel from 
1974-1979.  In that post during the Israeli operation at Entebbe, Gazit participated in the planning of that 
rescue effort.  He was Coordinator of Government Operations in the Occupied Territories from  1967-1974 
(From introduction of Risk, Glory, and the Rescue Operation, Gazit, International Security, Volume 6, 
Issue 1, Summer, 1981, p. 111). 
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almost never going to be in close proximity to the hostage incident to respond that fast.  
These units are for the most part based in the capital city of most countries for this 
specific reason, but anything more than a few minutes distance to the target site, and it is 
already too late; the terrorists will establish control and gain the upper hand soon after 
their takeover.  After this brief window of opportunity closes, the terrorists will gain 
relative superiority and assume control of the crisis area.  The rescue force must wait for 
a new window of opportunity to develop.  It is then that timing becomes so critical.  
Waiting allows the situation to develop, intelligence to be gathered on the target area, and 
rehearsals to be conducted by the rescue force.  The longer the wait, the better prepared 
the rescue force will be to conduct the assault.  Along the same lines, the longer the wait, 
the better the chances are for a negotiating team to establish credibility and come up with 
a peaceful solution to the crisis.   
There are also several drawbacks for waiting though, one of them being the 
precarious condition of the hostages.  The hostages can develop Stockholm31 or 
transference32 syndrome, their health status worsens, and their chances of being killed 
increase.  In addition, the tensions and frustrations inside the crisis area increase with 
time, setting the stage for a possible violent confrontation between the hostages and the 
terrorists.  Overall, the benefits of waiting outweigh the risks.  If the situation at the crisis 
site is under control, and negotiations are established, the longer the wait the better the 
chances of success for a rescue attempt. 
At the onset of the hostage taking, the designated rescue force must be summoned 
at once, to start developing an emergency plan for action.  This plan is utilized if the 
hostage takers decide to start killing or moving the hostages.  From this initial plan, a 
                                                 
31 The Stockholm syndrome derives its name from the reaction of the victims during a 6-day siege in a 
bank vault in Stockholm, Sweden.  A lone gunman, trapped during a robbery attempt, herded a man and 
three women into the vault and then demanded and received the release of a former confederate who had 
been imprisoned.  Eventually, police drilled through the vault, shot tear gas into it, and forced everyone out.  
As they fled, however, the four hostages encircled their captors because, they said, they wanted to protect 
them from possible harm by the police.  Later, one of the women said she was in love with the bank robber 
and would wait for his release from prison to marry him.  Psychologically, the captor has had life-and-death 
control over the victim and has allowed the victim to survive, earning a sort of everlasting gratitude (Bolz, 
Dudonis, and Schulz, 2002, pp. 209-210).  
32 Transference is a term used by psychiatrists and psychologists to denote the identification by one 
person with another.  Transference can develop between the hostage-taker or kidnapper and his victims, 
too, as well as between the negotiator and perpetrator.  It is less likely that the perpetrator will kill a hostage 
when some degree of transference has developed (pp. 210-211). 
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further more refined deliberate plan of action is developed, to be conducted in the event 
negotiations fail.  This plan is never finalized; it is updated and refined continuously as 
new information and intelligence come in that can aid in the rescue.  A third option 
developed in the rescue planning sequence is the emergency-deliberate plan of action; 
this plan is a variation of the deliberate plan of action.  It is a contingency plan in the 
event that the terrorists detect the rescue force during their approach to the target, while 
conducting the intended deliberate plan of action.  For example, the rescue force can be 
moving to the target area surreptitiously and a terrorist might be out for a walk outside of 
the target area.  The rescue force can be compromised at this point and be forced to 
change their original plan and rush to the target.  The new plan now becomes the 
emergency-deliberate plan of action.  These three plans become the essence of the rescue 
order.  This is why it is so essential that the operators get intimately involved in the 
planning process, aware of all the changes and contingencies, able to execute it when the 
time comes. 
The keystone of SOF mission planning is that the operational element 
executing the mission must plan the mission (Joint Pub 3-05, 1998, p. IV-
6).    
Not only is it critical that planning occurs at the operator level, but the planning 
and rehearsals must fully integrate all participants involved with the rescue operation.  
This was a critical mistake during Operation EAGLE CLAW in 1980—the failed rescue 
attempt to recover the hostages in Iran.  Throughout the six-month preparation and 
rehearsal process, none of the individual operational elements planned or rehearsed their 
portion of the operation as one group.  Staff planners from JTF 1-79 isolated themselves 
from the operational element in a futile effort to preserve operational security, failing to 
disseminate the plan properly.  This caused mass confusion once the helicopters departed 
with the assault force, leading up to the disaster at the DESERT ONE (see Chapter VIII 
for case study).   
Any consideration to conduct a military rescue attempt must take into account the 
strategic, operational, and tactical, first and second order effects on all four instruments of 
national power—diplomatic, informational, military, economical (known as the DIME).  
The rescue option should be the last resort, after the diplomatic, informational, and 
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economical instruments of national power have been exhausted; nevertheless, it should be 
a synergistic approach from the onset of the crisis, and not one that moves incrementally, 
waiting to the last moment to stand up a rescue plan of action.   
The characteristics of the hostage takers are critical in determining when to 
conduct the rescue.  The intelligence operations require real time precision and ways to 
disseminate immediately to the rescue personnel as well as the negotiating party.  Fusion 
of all accurate and timely intelligence must focus on developing the most effective plan 
to rescue the hostages together with the operators in the decision making process. 
A valid rescue plan must meet five prerequisites of any military decision-making 
process.  The plan must be suitable—it can accomplish the mission and comply with the 
guidance given from the highest levels.  The plan must be feasible—it must be able to 
accomplish the mission within the established time, space, and resource constraints.  It 
must be acceptable—it must balance cost with advantage gained by executing a 
particular course of action.  It must be distinguishable—each course of action must be 
significantly different from the others.  Finally, it must be complete—it must incorporate 
major operations and tasks to be accomplished, to include forces required, concept for 
sustainment, deployment, employment, time estimates for reaching termination 
objectives, reserve force concept, and desired end state.        
2. Phase II:  Approach and Assault 
The safe rescue of all the hostages means success for the operation.  In order to 
accomplish this, each phase of the hostage rescue plan must be planned, rehearsed, and 
executed with surgical precision.  The approach and assault phase of a rescue operation 
are the most volatile parts of the rescue attempt because the assault force must remain 
undetected in order to maintain the element of surprise.  Once the assault begins, they 
must immediately neutralize the threat and control the hostages. 
During the approach, the rescue force must be ready to execute all contingency 
plans rehearsed as part of their emergency-deliberate plan of action, in case they become 
compromised.  Full synergy of all command and control elements is required during the 
approach, in order to positively control the flow of forces into the target and deconflict 
from those already there (such as sniper-observer teams).  The breach must be calculated 
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with exact precision to ensure the explosion will not hurt or kill any hostages inside, 
while at the same time allowing for a positive entry of the rescue force into the target.  
Once inside, the rescue force must be quick, precise, and deliberate in their use of 
accurate and discriminate fires, while at the same time safeguarding any hostages 
encountered.   
The rescue party must be ready to protect the hostages during the assault.  
Initially, the effects of breaching, explosions, and firing will shock hostages; they will not 
know how to react, and sometimes they might even want to help by attacking some of the 
terrorists.   Some hostages might be confused and want to stay behind in the comfort and 
security of what used to be their own “little world”.  Others might want to go and retrieve 
some of their own personnel belongings before leaving the target site.  All these factors 
complicate the mission of the assault force.  For these reasons, all personnel inside the 
crisis site must be considered dangerous until properly identified by other authorities 
during Phase III.     
3. Phase III:  Post Assault 
The rescue party should by no means yield to the whims of the hostages.  
It must be very firm with them, and use physical force to get them out if 
necessary (Gazit, 1981, p. 126). 
Upon the completion of the assault phase, the first immediate reaction of the 
hostages and the rescue force will be a state of overconfidence and euphoria.  The 
operation at this stage is far from over, and the rescue force must remain in complete 
control by focusing on returning the hostages to the proper authorities.  The first step 
should be to secure the target area from any outside intervention until it has been deemed 
safe by the assault force commander.  The sniper-observer element must be notified that 
the target is secured in order to minimize the chance of fratricide.  Only when the assault 
force commander has stated that he is in complete control of the crisis site can follow-on 
agencies enter to conduct a handover.   
All hostages must be carefully identified and accounted for properly.  If there are 
any leaders within the group of hostages, those must be singled out to aid in the process 
of further identifying the rest of the hostages.  The wounded and the dead should then be 
identified.  The rescue force must pay particular attention not to leave any of the hostages 
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behind during the exfiltration, or take a terrorist with them instead.  The terrorist can be 
hiding a grenade or some sort of explosive and set it off inside the exfiltration vehicle or 
aircraft, ruining the whole operation.  The decision to repair or leave behind broken 
equipment is also critical during these moments.  Contingency plans should address 
destruction procedures in the event something has to be left behind or repaired in place.   
If the rescue occurs in enemy territory, the main priority for the rescue force will 
be to treat the wounded, either while waiting for the exfiltration or during their transit.  If 
the operation takes place in friendly territory, then the duty to treat the injured lies with 
other agencies designated for this task; the assault force’s primary purpose is the safe 
handover of the hostages to other competent government agencies.  Regardless, no 
personnel should be allowed inside the target area until it has been deemed safe by the 
assault force commander.  The handover element must have capable forensics experts 
and legal personnel that will immediately take control of the site and treat it as a crime 
scene, not letting media or curious personnel enter the target area. Government officials 
must be ready to issue a public affairs statement to the press, in order to begin the process 
of quality control of information to protect the rescue force and enforce OPSEC 
measures.   
The following diagram is a graphical representation of all major phases of a 
hostage rescue crisis.  It includes the principles for successful hostage rescue operations 
to include the close monitoring of the hostage crisis biorhythm.  The timeline in days is 
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Figure 9.   Author’s Representation of a Hostage Crisis Diagram Incorporating the 
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III. OPERATION CHAVIN DE HUANTAR33 
A. BACKGROUND  
The Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA, trans. Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement) is a traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement 
formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian 
insurgent group active in the 1960s.  Its basic aims are to establish a Marxist regime and 
to rid Peru of all imperialist elements (primarily U.S. and Japanese influence).  In order to 
understand what catapulted the members of the MRTA to conduct such a desperate act of 
recognition, we must look back and understand the early beginnings of this organization 
and its patterns of violence throughout the last three decades in Peru. 
In early 1982, several leftist parties give birth to the Movimiento Revolucionario 
Túpac Amaru after a series of negotiations known as “the convergence” (McCormick, 
1993, p. 6).  On 31 May, they conduct their first unclaimed attack at the Banco de 
Crédito de Lima.  This action was not claimed by the MRTA until 1984 (Caretas, 
October 9, 1984, pp. 14-15).  The following year, the movement officially adopts the 
name Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru in November, and continues to develop 
and organize until the first part of 1984.  An MRTA squad attacks the U.S. Embassy 
Marine Guard residence in Lima.  By 1984, the first MRTA manifesto is made public, 
vindicating military actions countrywide.  This publication called on all leftist 
organizations, progressive elements within the church, and the Shining Path (Sendero 
Luminoso or SL), to join in a common armed struggle throughout the country.  In 
January, the first MRTA Central Committee is appointed and named Jorge Talledo Feria.  
On 22 January, the MRTA conducts an attack against the Villa El Salvador police station, 
marking this first overt political target of the organization.  In February, MRTA kidnaps 
newscast personnel from Radio Imperial radio station forcing them to broadcast MRTA 
                                                 
33 CHAVIN DE HUANTAR is the code name given by President Alberto Fujimori on the day of the 
operation.  During the previous four months, the operation was known as “Tenaz” (trans. “Tenacious”).  
The name CHAVIN DE HUANTAR was inspired from the ancient pre-Incan civilization of that name, 
dating 3000 B.C. and located 100 kilometers from the Huaraz capital, of the Ancash sector in the central 
region of Peru.  The CHAVIN DE HUANTAR civilization and culture are known for their spectacular 
architecture that stands out for its intricate tunnels and underground water irrigation systems that run 
throughout their entire city.  It is also believed that their warriors used these tunnels to fight and defend 
their city from attackers.          
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subversive messages that state their purpose and intentions in overthrowing the current 
regime.  This action is repeated several days later at the Radio Independencia station.  On 
8 October, MRTA burns an evangelical church run by American missionaries in the town 
of Ayacucho.    
By February of 1985, the second MRTA Central Committee is formed and named 
Carlos Sánchez Neyra.  In April, the first MRTA pamphlet is published under the title 
Venceremos (trans. We will win).  On 20 March, the local Kentucky Fried Chicken in 
Lima is firebombed.  Several other fast food restaurants are attacked and burnt down in 
the towns of San Isidro, Surco, and Miraflores.  In May, MRTA leadership outlines and 
releases a document that pretends to explain their existence and political expectations.  
On 30 March, they attack two armories, taking with them large quantities of weapons and 
ammunition.  By 16 June, MRTA intercepts Channel 5’s audio signal and transmits their 
first underground radio message titled 4 de Noviembre (trans. November 4th).  On 12 July, 
MRTA attacks seven police stations simultaneously.  On 25 July, they firebomb the 
Minister of Interior’s vehicle while it is in the parking lot.  On 4 November, a small 
MRTA team takes over La Nación newspaper, and hands out MRTA propaganda.  In 
December, MRTA sends several military teams to train with the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC34) in Colombia. 
In January of 1986, MRTA rebels take over five radio stations and force them to 
broadcast MRTA propaganda.  From 9 to 14 February, the third MRTA Central 
Committee is organized.  On 8 August, MRTA members attack the Palacio de Gobierno 
(Peruvian Congress).  During this year in June, the infamous prison riots35 take place, 
leaving 244 prisoners dead, many of them after they had surrendered, by members of the 
Peruvian armed forces.  On 21 April, MRTA detonates a car bomb carrying 60 kilos of 
                                                 
34 Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is 
Colombia’s oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped Marxist insurgency. The FARC is governed by 
a secretariat, led by septuagenarian Manuel Marulanda (a.k.a. “Tirofijo”) and six others, including senior 
military commander Jorge Briceno (a.k.a. “Mono Jojoy”). The FARC is organized along military lines and 
includes several urban fronts (information retrieved from the Dudley Knox Library home website, 
http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/farc.htm on 1 Nov 03). 
35 Incarcerated members of Shining Path staged coordinated uprisings at three Lima-Callao prisons:  
Lurigancho prison, Lima, Peru; El Frontón prison, Lima, Peru; and Santa Bárbara women's prison, Callao, 
Peru. The government reacted violently, declaring a war zone in the prisons and calling in the armed forces 
to quell the riots. 
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dynamite at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence; one civilian is killed and eight other 
people are injured.  Also in April, MRTA rebels bomb the Citibank offices in Lima and 
San Borja, the SEARS warehouse in San Luis, the IBM warehouse in Breña, the 
Binational Center in Lima and Chiclayo, and the Coca-Cola bottling facility in Trujillo.  
Other sites bombed during the month of April include the Chancery warehouse, the 
Dinner’s Club office in San Isidro, the Summer Institute of Linguistics in Lima, the ITT 
facility in San Isidro, the Citibank office in Miraflores, and the KODAK facility in San 
Luis.  In June, the Cayara massacre takes place; a Peruvian military patrol killed about 20 
peasants in order to avenge a senderista (Shining Path) attack nearby.  In December, the 
MRTA unites with the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, trans. 
Revolutionary Leftist Movement) at the First Central Committee. 
In 1987, the MRTA expands its operations to different regions around the 
country.  It creates the Northeastern Front in the Peruvian jungles.  In October, Lucero 
Cumpa, a Central Committee member, is arrested.  On 6 November, an MRTA squad 
takes over the town of Juanjui for five hours.  The second United Central Committee is 
created in 1988.  On 10 August, Generals Hector Jerí and Enrique Ferreyros from the 
police are kidnapped.  That same day, a car bomb goes off at the Centromin offices in 
Lima.  In September, MRTA members attack the Mining Society of Peru offices.  During 
the same year, MRTA launches two mortar attacks from Arenales Avenue into the U.S. 
Ambassador’s residence—one landed on the roof, the other hit the perimeter fence.   
On 13 March of 1989, an MRTA squad takes over the town of Pichanaki, in 
Chanchamayo district.  On 1 May, an MRTA squad attacks the police station at the 
Tablada de Lurín.  On 5 October, television director Héctor Delgado Parker is kidnapped.  
During this year, Victor Polay Campos, the MRTA’s founder and current leader, is 
captured for the first time and placed in the Canto Grande state prison in Lima.  
On 9 July of 1990, 47 MRTA members, including Victor Polay Campos, escape 
the Canto Grande penitentiary through a 332-meter underground tunnel built by the 
MRTA.  Following their escape, they conduct a mortar attack at the Joint Armed Forces 
Command.  Later on that year, MRTA assassinates Peruvian Army General Enrique 
López Albújar.  The MRTA bombs the U.S. Embassy warehouse, the Kentucky Fried 
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Chicken in Lima, the Binational Center in Trujillo, mortar attacks the U.S. Consulate, 
and fires at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence.  Alberto Fujimori, a university professor, 
assumes presidency for the first time in Peru.   
On 14 January of 1991, MRTA attacks the Ministry of Interior with a car bomb.  
On 5 February, a car bomb goes off in front of the U.S. Embassy.  On 11 March, an 
MRTA team frees Lucero Cumpa (a.k.a. Comandante "Liliana"); their getaway driver is 
killed during the rescue.  In May, MRTA kidnaps nine members of the PNP in Rioja.  In 
August, Law 25237, which establishes a peace council, is approved under the initiative of 
Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, then head of the cabinet.  This peace council was established 
to involve diverse sectors of civil society in drawing up a national peace plan (Arnson, 
1999, p. 212).  In November, the famous “November Decrees” are passed, strengthening 
an exclusively military response to the problem of violence in Peru.  More MRTA 
bombings continue during this year at the Binational Centers in Huancayo and Cuzco, the 
Kentucky-Pizza Hut in Lima, the Binational Center in Trujillo, the Mormon Church in 
Huaraz, the Kentucky Fried Chicken in San Isidro, and the Wackenhut contractor 
company where one guard was killed and two were injured.  In addition, a rocket-
propelled grenade (RPG) was launched against the Peruvian Chancery building; three 
separate mortar attacks on different occasions also hit the same building. 
In 1992, four Peruvian Army soldiers are killed during a traffic stop on Túpac 
Amaru Avenue.  On April 5, Fujimori conducts his famous auto-golpe, giving himself 
unlimited powers; he closes the Congress, takes control of the judiciary powers, puts an 
end to regional governments; he concentrates all government power in his person, and 
begins to govern by decree (Arnson, 1999, p. 213).  His total confidence in the armed 
forces and certain measures approved after the coup played a role in accelerating the 
defeat of armed insurgent organizations.  On 24 July, MRTA mortar attacks the army 
headquarters and on 9 August, they attack another army convoy in Miraflores.  On 11 
September, they kidnap businessperson David Ballón Vera.  On September 12, Abimail 
Guzmán is captured by General Antonio Ketín Vidal, head of Dirección Contra el 
Terrorismo (DINCOTE - National Directorate Against Terrorism).  On 10 October, a 
small squad of MRTA rebels launches three mortars at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence.   
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On 17 November, they bomb the Chancery warehouse damaging three cars belonging to 
the U.S. government.  On 15 December, they kidnap and assassinate businessperson 
Fernando Manrique Acevedo.   
On 16 January of 1993, the MRTA launches an RPG against the Binational 
Center in Miraflores.  On 22 January, they fire small arms (three shots) at an American 
Airlines aircraft as it is landing.  On 1 February, MRTA kidnaps businessperson Antonio 
Furukawa Obara.  On 22 April, they kidnap businessperson Pedro Miyasato Miyasato.  
On 7 June, they kidnap Luis Salcedo Marsano.  On 9 July, they kidnap Raúl Hiraoka 
Torres.  On 23 September, they kidnap businessperson Enrique Uribe Tasayco.  This 
same year, Victor Polay Campos and some of his most important lieutenants are 
recaptured at a Chinese restaurant in Lima; meanwhile Néstor Cerpa Cartolini is in 
Bolivia training and recruiting MRTA support, and is being eyed to be the new #1 man in 
the MRTA hierarchy.                 
In 1994, MRTA members firebomb the Wong, SAGA and Hiraoka stores and the 
Más supermarket in Lima.  On 21 April, an MRTA squad ambushes an Army truck, 
killing three soldiers and 15 civilians.  On 28 April, MRTA encircles and locks down the 
towns of Chanamayo and Oxapamapa.  The next day they intercept and burn four trucks 
on the Satipo highway.  On 1 July, they conduct a raid on the town of Alto Cuyani, and 
assassinate the town’s vice-mayor.  On 12 July, MRTA ambushes an Army truck killing 
two soldiers.  On 26 July, MRTA takes control of the town of Chanchamayo for three 
days.  On 22 October, they kidnap the Pichanaki town mayor Pedro Vargas.  President 
Fujimori vows to “crush” the MRTA by the end of the year.  Although he did not 
succeed, MRTA activity is dramatically reduced.  The “Repentance Law”, under which 
the government claims up to 5,000 guerrillas surrendered their weapons, is repealed. 
On 25 January 1995, MRTA members ambush a PNP patrol in Chanchamayo, 
freeing one of its MRTA members.  Alberto Fujimori is reelected.  On 12 May, MRTA 
hands out copies of their first edition of their pamphlet La Voz Rebelde (trans. The Rebel 
Voice) in the San Marcos and La Cantuta universities.  On 12 June, MRTA ambushes a 
military patrol in the Pichanaki and Chanchamayo districts.  On 9 July, a truck full of 
dynamite is set off in the center of the town of Chimbote.  In December, an MRTA group 
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is arrested as it is preparing to take over the Peruvian Congress; the PNP finds plans, 
maps, and sketches detailing the MRTA’s planned raid.  During 1995 however, the group 
does managed to secure a $1 million ransom for a kidnapped Bolivian businessperson.  
Among those arrested is Miguel Rincón Rincón, one of the few leaders not yet a prisoner 
and the current #2 man in the MRTA hierarchy; American Lori Berenson36; and Nancy 
Gilbonio, wife of Néstor Cerpa Cartolini.  Néstor Cerpa managed to escape and 
subsequently lead the takeover of the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in 1997. 
In 1996, the Peruvian authorities claim that the MRTA is a “spent force”.  Of the 
group’s leadership, only Néstor Cerpa is out of prison; his wife and brother are among the 
400 or more of the group’s members being detained and funds from criminal activities 
are running short.  On 20 January, MRTA conducts a demonstration in the town of 
Tarma.  On that same day, they attack the Army base of Oxapampa, in Pasco.  During the 
same month, Lori Berenson is sentenced to life imprisonment by a so-called “faceless 
judge” on a charge of treason for having acted in support of the MRTA.  In February, 
Cartolini sends a videotape to La República newspaper announcing the MRTA’s 
intention to continue with acts of violence and their planned intentions to release their 
jailed comrades.  On 20 March, the MRTA attacks the Pachacútec and Oxapampa Army 
bases.  On 3 April, they conduct a raid in the town of Sallique, in the Jaén sector.  On 28 
April, MRTA members confront the PNP in San José de Sisa in San Martín.  On 6 June, 
the PNP captures MRTA leader Néstor Cerpa in Piura.  On 16 June, MRTA conducts 
harassment operations on the San Juan de Cacazu base in Oxapampa.  On 9 July, they 
ambush an Army patrol from Pichinaki, in Chanchamayo, Junín.  On 10 July, an MRTA 
squad raids the landing zone at the Satipo oil field.  On 1 September, they raid the 
Pichinaki base known as Huantintín.  Also on that day, MRTA disseminates propaganda 
in Arequipa.  The following day they ambush an Army patrol in Junín.  On 18 
September, they raid the town of Oxapampa.  On 16 October, they disseminate 
propaganda in La Loma sector in Maynas, Loreto. 
                                                 
36 Lori Berenson, 31, is currently serving a 20-year prison sentence after a 1996 military verdict found her 
guilty of helping plan and attack Peru's Congress building with MRTA rebels during that same year.  She 
recently married a Peruvian citizen that aided the MRTA during the same congress attack.  They both fell 
in love while serving time in the Yanomamo prison in Peru.   
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In early October, Néstor Cerpa and several MRTA terrorists rent and occupy a 
house in close proximity to the Japanese Ambassador’s residence.  The house located on 
Marconi #225, is directly behind the northeast wall of the residence.  MRTA members 
continue to develop and refine a plan for a daring assault on the Japanese residence, 
unbeknownst to anyone in the area.  The new MRTA command planning the operation 
was named Edgar Sánchez and was composed of 14 members:  Néstor Cerpa Cartolini 
(“Comandante Huerta”) leader of the group, Rolly Rojas (“El Arabe”), Eduardo Cruz 
Sánchez (“Tito”), Salvador, Luz Meléndez Cueva Berta (“Melisa”), Giovanna Vilas 
Plascencia (“Gringa”), Rolando or Dante Córdoba (“El Cuzqueño”), Lucas (“Gato 
Seco”), Alex, “El Mejicano”, Marcos, Leo (“22”), Cone (“Palestino”), Leivi, and Victor 
Huáscar.  They secretly accumulated and stashed explosives, automatic weapons, RPGs, 
and disguised a vehicle to look like an ambulance, used as a ruse during their initial entry.   
In the meantime, members of the Servicio de Inteligencia (S.I.N. – Intelligence 
Service) had been studying several leads on a possible MRTA attack on one of three 
embassies:  Ecuador, U.S., or Japan.  They knew the MRTA was planning a big 
operation, but could not pinpoint the actual location.  Without any further indicators for 
an impending attack, the security dispatched for the Japanese Ambassador’s party was 
not reinforced.    
B. DETAILED CASE STUDY 
On 17 December 1996, members of the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac 
Amaru (MRTA) assaulted the Japanese Ambassador’s (Morihisa Aoki) residence in 
Lima, Peru, taking hostage over 700 of its guests.  On 22 April 1997, a rescue operation 
was launched by Peruvian counterterrorist forces killing all 14 MRTA terrorists including 
the group’s leader, Néstor Cerpa, and successfully rescuing 71 of the 72 hostages.  The 
operation effectively ended a 126-day siege, and it remains one of the most successful 
rescue operations ever staged, a template for future rescue attempts. 
The Japanese Ambassador to Peru, Morihisa Aoki, and his wife, had organized a 
party at their residence to commemorate Japanese Emperor Akihito’s 63rd birthday, with 
an expected attendance of over 1,000 of Peru’s most distinguished dignitaries and 
government officials.  By 1900 hours on 17 December 1996, the Japanese Ambassador 
began receiving invited guests and by 2000 hours, there were more than 700 people 
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inside the residence.  Meanwhile, 14 MRTA members hidden in an ambulance had 
entered the traffic security perimeter around the residence and claimed they were 
responding to an emergency call nearby.  Three PNP vehicles were parked at this 
intersection of Marconi Street and the Italian Clinic; one lets the ambulance go through 
without any proper checks.  The back of the ambulance was filled with explosives, 
weapons, and ammunition used during the initial entry and during the assault.  The 
MRTA members parked the ambulance at the German Service of Social-Technical 
Cooperation house, approximately 300 meters from the intersection.  At this house, two 
MRTA members talk to a guard and tell him they are responding to a call from someone 
inside the house.  The guard tells the MRTA that there was no emergency and that no one 
had called for an ambulance.  The MRTA member acknowledges and asks the guard to 
sign some paperwork to ensure that no one had called for an ambulance and that they had 
responded as standard procedure.  While the guard signed the fake documents, the 
MRTA members subdued him and occupied the house in preparation for their next 
planned phase.        
Security at the residence and the immediate areas was normal for an event of this 
type in Peru: eight traffic police officers from the PNP were located at the four 
corners/intersections to the residence, with the task of checking identification and 
matching personnel with a guest list.  Two PNP motorcycles were constantly circling the 
perimeter and a special purpose truck from the Unidad de Explosivos (UDEX - Peruvian 
explosives deactivation unit) was parked near the residence parking lot, checking 
vehicles.  Outside of the residence there were over 50 private bodyguards.  Eight security 
members for the Japanese Ambassador’s residence (Peruvian and Japanese) were at the 
main entrance checking guests and processing personnel through a magnetron (metal 
detector).  At approximately 1945 hours, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru—Dennis Jett—
and the Israeli Ambassador—Joel Salpak—depart the residence, each for a separate 
engagement, unaware of the planned MRTA attack about to occur.  
At 2023 hours, a loud explosion is heard behind the residence; everyone inside the 
residence believes it is a car bomb and runs for cover inside the residence.  In a 
counterproductive move, security personnel immediately lock all entrances to the 
residence, leaving cordon security and VIP bodyguards outside, and locking everyone 
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else inside with the assaulting terrorists.  The MRTA terrorists had blown a 5’ x 4’ hole 
in the back of the adjoining wall that divide the residence with the MRTA occupied 
home.  The breach site is about 25 yards from the front wall (northeast corner) along the 
east side common wall.  The MRTA terrorists immediately enter the residence grounds, 
firing their weapons into the air, shouting orders and MRTA slogans.  The guests assume 
erroneously that the terrorists are cops who had come to their aid.  This illusion quickly 
vanishes when they notice MRTA red and white handkerchiefs covering the MRTA 
terrorists’ faces, and their mixed uniforms and equipment.  The security personnel and 
guests now realize that the safest place for them is outside of the residence.  By 2030 
hours, members of the Sub-Unidad de Acciones Tácticas (SUAT - special tactics police), 
UDEX, and anti-riot units were mobilized, and immediately become engaged in a raging 
gun battle with the terrorists.  All the guests remained lying face down on the floor of the 
residence, trying to stay out of a hail of bullets.   
At the entrance of the residence, the Japanese residence Foreign Security Officer 
(FSN), Nicolás Tenya Hasegawa, was trapped inside a guard shack with seven other 
security members.  For the next 10 minutes or so, they were under constant machine gun 
fire from the terrorists inside the residence.  They remained inside this shack until 
approximately 0200 hours, when they finally escaped through a small window that led to 
the outside of the residence (phone interview with Nicolás Tenya Hasegawa, Foreign 
Security Officer for Japanese Residence, on 25 September 2003).  
At approximately 2100 hours, the order is given for the PNP to commence firing 
tear gas into the residence, hoping it would bring out the MRTA terrorists.  The MRTA 
immediately don their gas masks and try to control the chaos that ensues inside the 
residence with the panicking hostages.  More than 600 hostages try to cover their faces 
with whatever they can find.  The Japanese Ambassador, Morihisa Aoki, picked up a 
megaphone and tried to tell the police forces to stop shooting into the residence.  
Afterwards, Michel Minnig, International Red Cross representative, takes the megaphone 
from the Ambassador and begs the police to stop the erratic firing of tear gas and bullets, 
which were endangering everyone inside the residence.   
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PNP General Ketín Vidal and the Minister of Interior General Juan Briones 
Dávila show up at the security perimeter to try and take control of the situation and by 
2130 hours, the firing stops; 14 MRTA terrorists were now in full control of the 
residence.  Only one of the terrorists, Edgard Cruz Sánchez (a.k.a. “Tito”), was injured, 
struck by a bullet in his right leg from his own Kalashnikov (AKM) weapon.       
At 2135 hours, the first telephonic communication was established with the 
terrorist leader known as “Comandante Huertas” (Néstor Cerpa Cartolini).  He issues a 
series of demands directed at the government of Peru, to include the release of more than 
450 MRTA prisoners around the country.  Of his own accord, Michel Minnig 
immediately begins to negotiate with Néstor Cerpa for the release of all women and 
elderly people.  He proves to be instrumental in the development and resolution of the 
crisis as an official intermediary throughout the complete hostage crisis.   
At approximately 2145 hours, the first of two groups of female hostages are 
released.  Unbeknownst to the terrorists, the mother and the sister of President Alberto 
Fujimori walked out with these two groups.  This marked the MRTA’s first major 
blunder of many to follow throughout the crisis.  The son of President Fujimori, Pedro 
Fujimori, remained inside and would remain hostage until the end of the crisis.  The 
process of releasing the female and elderly hostages continues until midnight.  After the 
women and elderly were released, the MRTA terrorists decide to release all 20 waiters 
and staff helpers from the party.  The Peruvian Navy Commander Rodolfo Reátegui 
(President Fujimori’s Aide), wearing only underwear and covering himself with a curtain, 
tries to mix in with the waiters as they leave.  Several terrorists shoot at him, but no one 
is injured.  Néstor Cerpa threatens to kill anyone else that attempts a similar stunt.  
Afterwards, the terrorists begin to identify all remaining hostages and move them to 
specific rooms around the residence for ease of control.  The hostages are separated 
according to their jobs and duties:  150 hostages were placed on the first floor of the 
residence, and the remaining 231 on the second floor.  The most important hostages are 
placed on the second floor: congressional representatives, military leaders, state 
representatives, ambassadors, ministers, and Japanese businesspersons.  A lone camera 
operator from América Televisión (Juan Victor Sumarriva), is spotted inside the grounds 
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of the residence by Néstor Cerpa, and is permitted to stay there for the next 23 hours and 
capture the ensuing drama.  
In the early morning hours of 18 December, the second conversation between the 
terrorists and PNP personnel is established; Néstor Cerpa announces that the hostages are 
being considered “prisoners of war”.  By this time, the Operative Command of the 
Internal Front (military headquarters) is established and begins planning and preparing 
for a military emergency action plan to rescue the hostages.  At 0147 hours, the mayor of 
Miraflores Fernando Andrade Carmona escapes through a small window in one of the 
bathrooms inside the residence where he had been hiding.  He makes a barefoot dash 
through the residence grounds, hiding between bushes, vehicles, and anything he can find 
until he makes it to an open gate on the east side of the residence to freedom.  The lone 
camera operator captures the whole scene on live television.  A few hours later, 21 
members of the International Red Cross arrive on scene and begin to work providing aid 
in any possible way.  At 0220 hours, members of the SUAT occupy nearby homes and 
emplace temporary sniper positions on the rooftops.  Later that morning at 1130 hours, 
Cerpa announces to the PNP over the megaphone his first official threat:  he is going to 
execute the first hostage at noon if his demands are not met.  At 1145 hours, he repeats 
his threat, this time calling on President Fujimori to answer his demands, including that 
his first victim would be Minister of Foreign Relations Francisco Tudela (highest-ranking 
hostage inside the residence).  At noon, Cerpa extends the execution time to 1300 hours; 
he never carries out his threat and President Fujimori never answers his demands.  Later 
that evening, the MRTA terrorists collect all the phones and beepers from all the hostages 
and place them in a large trash bag.             
Michel Minnig continues to negotiate the release of several other hostages that 
needed medical attention, and by 1830 hours Juan Günther (president of the Lima 
Patrimonial), José de Cossío Ruiz de Somocurcio (Peruvian Ambassador in retirement), 
and Mr. Kotaro Kanashiro are released.  Mr. Kotaro Kanashiro had fainted during the 
initial explosions and remained unconscious behind some trees on the residence grounds 
throughout the day.  When he came to his senses, he did not know what had happened.  
The camera operator picked Mr. Kotaro up and explained to him what had transpired 
while he was unconscious. 
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The MRTA terrorists decide to designate several other ambassadors as 
spokespeople and main negotiators:  Anthony Vincent (Canada), Heribert Woeckel 
(Germany), Alcibíades Carokis (Greece), the French Counselor Hyancinthe D’Montera 
and the Peruvian Aide to the Counselor Armando Lecaros.  Once released, they read a 
statement given to them by the terrorists and immediately begin a commission to 
establish negotiations with the MRTA members.  Anthony Vincent would prove to be 
critical in providing the initial intelligence on the terrorists, thanks to his background as 
head of counterterrorism task force for the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Relations.  
President Fujimori, who had already assigned Education Minister Domingo Palermo as 
the main spokesperson on his behalf, quickly disbands this ad hoc commission assigned 
by the MRTA.  Later that evening, the PNP and the S.I.N. order all phone lines to the 
residence cut off as well as the cellular phone signal in a 400-meter radius to restrict 
communications in and out of the residence.       
On 19 December 1996, President Fujimori meets with the Japanese counselor 
Yukihiko Ikedo and at 1805 hours, three businesspersons are released—Juan 
Shimabukuro Yamashiro, Fidel Aray Aray, and Noka Seitoko Sueyoshu.  In addition, the 
president for Nissan Motors, Carlos Chiappori Cambana is evacuated for health reasons.  
Camera operator Juan Victor Sumarriva, from the local news agency who had been 
caught on the grounds of the residence during the siege, walks out with this group of 
people.  By this time, the PNP had shut off all power and water to the residence.  The 
hostages began to hang cardboard signs around the residence’s windows, requesting food 
and water.  United Nations representative Luis Thays sends five hundred rations to the 
residence.  The rations were divided into two groups of diets:  one specifically for the 
Japanese hostages and another for the rest of the hostages based on a standard Peruvian 
diet.  Meanwhile at the U.S. Embassy, members of a designated crisis reaction team from 
the Department of State (DOS) began to arrive and establish a crisis reaction center to 
monitor the status of the crisis, specifically the seven U.S. hostages37 that remained 
inside.  The crisis reaction element grows to over 50 personnel during the next several 
weeks. 
                                                 
37 The US hostages are Narcotics Assistant John Crow, AID Officer Andrew Maxey, Economy 
Counselor John Riddle, Political Counselor Jimmie Wagner, AID FSN Pedro Carrillo, Acting AID Director 
Donald Boyd, AID Deputy Executive Officer David Bayer, and AID Officer Kris Merschod.  
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At approximately 1930 hours, Cerpa addresses the hostages using the name of 
“Comandante Hermigidio Huerta”, in honor of his MRTA friend who had died in the 
Cromotex textile plant incident38.  In his speech, Cerpa explained the origins of his 
organization, its ideology, and differences from Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), 
previous conflicts with Abigael Guzmán Reynoso39, and war stories from encounters 
with the PNP and armed forces in the Peruvian jungles.  He mentioned that his outfit was 
designated Pelotón de Fuerzas Especiales (trans. Special Forces Platoon) Edgar Sánchez 
and that this operation was code-named “Operación Torre Condesú” with the codeword 
“Rompiendo el silencio, el pueblo los quiere libres” (trans. "breaking the silence, the 
people want you free”) (Chávez López, 1998, p. 51).          
During the early morning hours of 20 December 1996, several hostages hang 
cardboard from the second floor bathroom window that read:  “We have no food, water, 
power, or telephone.  Reconnect” (p. 55).  At approximately 1925 hours, Michel Minnig 
negotiates the release of 38 hostages.  Peruvian Congressman Javier Diez Canseco walks 
out in this group with two written demands:  one from the MRTA terrorists demanding 
the release of 400 of their prisoners from jails around the country, and another demand by 
the hostages requesting that the PNP not shut off the power, water, or cut the food 
supplies.  By now the MRTA has an official list of demands.  The following is the list of 
demands as reported by the U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Office (RSO: 
First, a commitment to change the course of the economic policy for one 
that seeks the well-being of the vast majorities.  Second, the release of all 
prisoners belonging to the MRTA and those accused of belonging to our 
organization.  Third, transferring the commando group that attacked the 
Japanese Ambassador’s residence along with the comrade trade prisoners 
of the MRTA to the central jungle area.  Several duly selected hostages 
would travel with the group as guarantors and be released once in MRTA 
guerrilla area.  Fourth, payment of a war tax (Department of State After 
Action Report:  Peru Hostage Taking Incident, dated December 30th, 
1996). 
                                                 
38 1979 labor dispute in which six union protesters were killed by PNP forces, while attempting to take 
over the plant.  Néstor Cerpa participated in the strike and was arrested and imprisoned for a year as a result 
of it.  The dispute was one of the catalysts that led to the formation of the MRTA movement. 
39 Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, leader of the terrorist movement Sendero Luminoso, was captured in 
1992 together with some of his most important lieutenants.   
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On 21 December 1996, President Fujimori breaks his silence and replies to the 
terrorists that he will not negotiate and for the terrorists to put down their weapons and 
release all the hostages unharmed.  In reply, Cerpa mentions that there would be more 
hostages released in the upcoming days.  Afterwards, the former counselor Francisco 
Tudela and the Japanese Ambassador Morihisa Aoki send a message requesting the 
Peruvian government to negotiate with the MRTA terrorists.   
Rumors are “leaked” to local news agencies that British, Israeli, and U.S. Special 
Forces units were sending their elite counterterrorist forces in country to resolve the 
hostage situation.  The Panamanian press reported that “there were elements of the U.S.’ 
SFOD-Delta in Panama preparing to launch a rescue mission”.  Several reports around 
Lima mentioned the planned use of nerve agents by different counterterrorist forces for a 
possible rescue attempt.  It is believed that this move was to prevent a response such as 
an international rescue force intervention, mainly from the U.S. or Great Britain.  Later 
on that evening, approximately 8,000 people gather at the Lima cathedral to pray for a 
peaceful resolution to the hostage crisis.    
On 22 December 1996, the MRTA terrorists hang signs from the residence’s 
windows painted on white sheets, requesting power, phone, and water to be restored.  At 
2140 hours, six groups of hostages totaling 225 without ties to the Peruvian government 
were liberated as a “Christmas Spirit” gesture.  All seven U.S. hostages were released 
with this group.  There were still four spouses (Peruvians or third country nationals) of 
Americans held hostage.  In a bold act of defiance, Jesuit priest Juan Julio Wicht decided 
to stay as a hostage of his own accord, and offered a mass inside the residence for 
everyone present.  One hundred and six hostages were left inside the residence.  One of 
the released hostages, former Labor Minister Sandro Fuentes, read a new statement given 
to him by the MRTA, requesting the release of the MRTA prisoners.     
The following morning, President Fujimori and Minister of Interior Juan Briones 
Dávila held a meeting with the regional armed forces commander, General Luis 
Malásquez Durand.  Representative Moisés Pantoja was in urgent need of medical 
attention.  From Europe, MRTA representative Isaac Velazco issued a statement and 
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warned President Fujimori that in the event of a military rescue attempt all hostages 
would die.   
Twelve hours before midnight on 24 December 1996, First Lady Keiko Sofia, 
daughter of President Fujimori, brought eight baked turkeys to the residence.  The 
terrorists did not let the hostages eat the turkeys, fearing that weapons or other artifacts 
were hidden inside of them.  That day, the government of Uruguay released two Peruvian 
MRTA terrorists from prison:  Luis Alberto Miguel Samaniego and Sylvia Soria Gora.  
At 1830 hours, Uruguay’s Ambassador to Peru Tabard Bocalandro Yapeyú, was released 
by the MRTA.  This action goes against President Fujimori’s intentions and efforts, and 
in retaliation against the government of Uruguay Fujimori removed the Peruvian 
Ambassador to that country.   
During the following days, the S.I.N. begins to infiltrate numerous electronic 
surveillance devices inside items such as thermoses, picture frames, brooms, and portable 
toilets.  Audio and video surveillance monitoring begins from across the main street from 
the residence while the terrorists remain completely unaware of it.   
On 25 December 1996, Archbishop Juan Luis Cipriani enters the residence for the 
first time, and remained there for close to seven hours, offering a Christmas mass with 
Father Wicht.  At 1720 hours, Cipriani walks out with the First Secretary to the 
diplomatic mission of Japan, Kenyi Hirota, who was released because of severe 
dehydration.  The same day, Russian President Boris Yeltsin offers to send a 
counterterrorist unit to intervene in the crisis.  President Fujimori turns down all 
international assistance with respect to counterterrorist aid.  There are 104 hostages still 
left inside the residence. 
On 26 December 1996 at 0147 hours, an explosion goes off at the residence, and 
all PNP forces go on full alert.  It was believed that a cat triggered one of the booby traps 
placed by the MRTA members on the residence grounds.  The MRTA had mined and 
booby-trapped the residence’s grounds to include the residence’s windows and doors.  At 
1445 hours, the MRTA releases the Ambassador of Guatemala, José María Argueta.  The 
same day, the Bolivian government vehemently rejects negotiating the release of five 
MRTA terrorists held in their country in exchange for their Ambassador Jorge Gumucio.     
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The following day, the Peruvian government declares a state of emergency in the 
Callao and Lima districts because of the siege.  Members of the International Red Cross 
indicate that the MRTA had placed mines on the residence grounds.  Also on that day, a 
woman was apprehended inside the security cordon for not having proper credentials and 
carrying diagrams and blueprints of the Japanese residence.  That same day, the S.I.N. 
begins to make arrangements in total secrecy to contract and transport 32 miners from the 
Cerro de Pasco area in La Oroya, to begin digging underground tunnels to reach the 
residence grounds.  The miners would work in eight-hour shifts under the orders of a 
Peruvian Army Corps of Engineers officer working for the S.I.N, and be paid double 
their normal rates.  The mining group grew to almost 60 by the end of January, with more 
groups being specifically flown in from the Cerro de Pasco on a special commission 
directed by President Fujimori himself. 
On 28 December 1996, government spokesperson Domingo Palermo and 
Archbishop Cipriani enter the residence and hold conversations with the terrorists.  They 
remain inside for over three hours and at 1600 hours, 20 more hostages are released, 
including the ambassadors from the Dominican Republic and Malaysia.  Domingo 
Palermo comments that the meeting with Néstor Cerpa was very productive.  Meanwhile, 
dirt retrieved from digging the tunnels is constantly being taken out of the perimeter area 
in the trunks of police vehicles, ambulances, and service vehicles.  In addition, a group of 
intelligence agents from the S.I.N. enters the residence dressed as gardeners and takes 
earth samples to analyze soil composition around the residence.  The results were later 
used by the Corps of Engineers in the construction of the tunnels.  There are 83 hostages 
still inside the residence at this time.  
On 29 December 1996, the International Red Cross and MRTA agree to let the 
hostages write letters to their relatives.  The Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto 
announced in Tokyo that measures taken by President Fujimori were working.  In the 
meantime, MRTA terrorists hang three signs from residence windows that read,  
The people want peace with social justice”, “Our prisoners do not receive 
humanitarian treatment”, and “The social fighters also deserve liberty 
(Chávez López, 1998, p. 87).          
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The next day, the first 83 letters from the hostages are received by the 
International Red Cross and forwarded to their relatives and/or loved ones.  All the letters 
were carefully checked and reviewed by the MRTA.  However, the hostages had already 
developed a system to send secret messages by writing on the trash that was taken out 
daily out of the residence by the International Red Cross.   
On 31 December 1996, several news crews were allowed inside the residence for 
an impromptu news conference with the MRTA terrorists.  Néstor Cerpa Cartolini was 
interviewed along with Francisco Tudela and Morihisa Aoki; the Japanese Ambassador 
took the opportunity to apologize publicly for the situation, blaming himself for the crisis.  
The S.I.N. took full advantage of this opportunity and planted several camera operators as 
reporters to gather intelligence.  Critical intelligence was collected depicting structural 
information on the residence, weapons and ammunition of the terrorists, as well as their 
strength and disposition.  At 1700 hours, the Ambassador of Honduras and the 
Argentinean Consul were released.  Eighty-one hostages are still left inside. 
On 1 January 1997, Monsignor Cipriani enters the residence to offer a New 
Year’s mass.  Michel Minnig and Monsignor Cipriani leave the residence at around 1700 
hours.  At 1725 hours, seven new hostages were released:  five Japanese businesspersons 
and two Peruvian government officials.  Seventy-four hostages remain at the Japanese 
Ambassador’s residence until 17 January and 26 January when the last two hostages are 
released; after 26 January no other hostages are released.  These two hostages were high-
ranking PNP officials who were released due to critical health conditions.     
On 2 January 1997, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru, Dennis Jett, completely 
supports Fujimori’s non-negotiating stance with the MRTA terrorists.  That same day the 
Japanese Emperor Akihito asked Fujimori for a peaceful resolution to the crisis.  In a 
reckless act by the press, the identity of Vice Admiral (ret.) Luis Giampietri is revealed, 
as the officer in charge of the FOEs (Fuerza de Operaciones Especiales or Peruvian Navy 
Special Forces) during the early 1980s.  As a result, Giampietri was interrogated and 
submitted to continuous harassment and mock executions by the MRTA terrorists during 
the next several days.  Giampietri maintains his calm, and vehemently denies any 
criminal involvement during the prison riots involving MRTA during his tenure.  Vice 
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Admiral (ret.) Luis Giampietri earns the respect of the MRTA terrorists, and they leave 
him alone for the rest of his captivity.   
On 3 January 1997, the Guatemalan government announced to the Peruvian 
government that they are willing to negotiate with the MRTA, upon President Fujimori’s 
consent.  S.I.N. personnel continue the tedious process of sorting out all trash that leaves 
the residence in search of messages from the hostages. 
On 4 January 1997, the MRTA terrorists hang three more signs from the rooftop 
of the residence, reiterating their demands to the Peruvian government and criticizing 
President Fujimori’s declarations.  The Japanese newspaper Mianichi Shimbun reported 
that the MRTA was demanding $30 million for the release of the Japanese hostages being 
held inside the residence.  The next day, Monsignor Cipriani enters the residence to drop 
off a guitar.  Cipriani did not know that this guitar had hidden electronic surveillance 
equipment for the hostages, specifically for Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri to 
communicate with the S.I.N. 
On 6 January 1997, the MRTA members fire two shots into the air from inside the 
residence.  Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri begins transmitting messages using the guitar 
given by the International Red Cross.  He receives information through a beeper that was 
hidden from the terrorists during the initial shakedown period, and responds by talking 
directly into the guitar to transmit.  Giampietri proceeds to send between 30-40 messages 
daily, detailing critical intelligence required to develop the rescue operation.  The 
following morning a reporter from the Japanese TV station Asahi (Mr. Tsuyoshi Hitomi), 
and his translator infiltrate the security perimeter of the residence undetected, and 
conduct a 10-minute interview with Cerpa; they were later apprehended by the 
DINCOTE. 
By 8 January 1997, the International Red Cross informs that the exchange of more 
than 800 letters between hostages and their families has been facilitated through their 
efforts.  President Fujimori again demands the release of all 74 hostages still left inside 
the residence, and reaffirms that there would be no negotiations.  Monsignor Cipriani 
returns to Ayacucho frustrated with the standoff.  The following day, the Peruvian 
government announces that Francisco Tudela would remain as the current counselor.  
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Later on that day, MRTA terrorists hang new signs stating, “Mr. Fujimori, don’t lie.  
Money does not matter to us; the demand is the freedom of our prisoners” (trans. from El 
Comercio, January 10, 1997, p. A-5). 
On 10 January 1997 at 0345 hours, the MRTA fires at PNP officers outside of the 
residence for being to close too the walls.  Fujimori announces that there will be no more 
negotiations between Domingo Palermo and Cerpa, because of Tsuyashi’s (Japanese 
reporter) presence inside the residence.  The next morning, Fujimori announces that 
several countries are willing to provide asylum for the terrorists.  He also states that he 
would not need any outside assistance from international counterterrorist forces.  At 1530 
hours, negotiations begin again with the MRTA and Monsignor Cipriani, together with a 
representative from the International Red Cross.  At 1930 hours, the DINCOTE releases 
the Japanese reporter.  
On 12 January 1997, the news media releases critical information on one of the 
negotiations between Cerpa and Cartolini, provoking a stop in further negotiations.  
President Fujimori announces that force would be used in the event that one of the 
hostages was harmed.  The following morning, the MRTA terrorists hang a new sign 
requesting América Televisión Channel 4 to come up to the residence to talk about their 
demands; Channel 4 is not allowed to see the terrorists.  At 1121 hours, 12 shots were 
fired sporadically from inside the residence.  By 0400 hours on 14 January, more shots 
are heard from inside the residence, and a new group of news personnel is stopped from 
trying to enter the residence.  In a press conference, the Ecuadorian president, Abdalá 
Bucaram, requested the Peruvian government not to give in to the terrorists’ demands, 
and stated that he fully supported President Fujimori’s hard stance.   
On 15 January 1997, the MRTA terrorists accept a proposal by the Peruvian 
government to create the Guarantor Commission for the peaceful resolution to the crisis.  
MRTA requests a representative from Guatemala and another from Europe to be a part of 
the commission.  The next day negotiations come to a stop between MRTA and Palermo 
due to unresolved differences. 
The mother of Yolanda Vila Placencia, one of the MRTA terrorists inside the 
residence, asks her to quit the MRTA and get out of the residence.  There are still 
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seventy-three hostages inside the residence.  The following morning, two Japanese 
hostages  are  seen  on  the  rooftop  placing  new  signs  by  the  MRTA, r equesting  the  
liberation of their prisoners.  Later during the day, the Second Secretary to the Japanese 
residence was seen outside on the residence grounds, charging radio batteries for the 
terrorists. 
On 21 January 1997, Michel Minnig arranges for a house near the residence 
(Tomas Alva Edison Avenue #257), to be used by spokesperson Palermo for negotiations 
with the MRTA.  The following diagram describes the procedures used during each 
negotiations session between the Guarantor Commission and the MRTA representative 









The IRC gives “El Arabe” 






Figure 10.   Author’s Representation of the Negotiations House 
 
The following day, President Fujimori states that there will be no dialogue with 
the terrorists if they insist on the liberation of their prisoners.  Also on that day and for 
security reasons, the International Red Cross is restricted to the number of visits to the 
residence.  In a show of force to harass the terrorists, a PNP helicopter flies over the 
residence and explosives disposal units show up around the security perimeter.  The 
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terrorists in an aggravated response shoot their AKM rifles into the air through the 
windows of the residence. 
On 23 January 1997, President Fujimori travels to Bolivia and pays a surprise 
visit to the Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, to talk about the hostage 
crisis.  The next day Fujimori meets with 150 Japanese tourists and talks to them about a 
peaceful resolution to the hostage crisis.  That afternoon the PNP informs that the MRTA 
is firing automatic weapons aimed at the PNP in retaliation for another of their 
demonstrations.   
Thanks to a petition by Monsignor Cipriani, PNP General José Rivas Rodríguez is 
released due to his critical state of health at 0054 hours on 26 January 1997.  He was the 
last hostage to be released until 22 April 1997, with Operation CHAVIN DE 
HUANTAR.  At 1712 hours, the MRTA fires four shots at the PNP security cordon.  
Before sunrise on the following morning, 12 loudspeakers are installed at the main 
entrance of the residence, and loud music and patriotic hymns are played all throughout 
the day in what became a psychological operations battle between the PNP and the 
terrorists for the next several weeks.  At 1530 hours, PNP officers began maneuvers 
around the perimeter of the residence.  At 1715 hours, an MRTA terrorist fired his 
weapon at a PNP officer inside his vehicle. 
On 28 January 1997, the MRTA terrorists and PNP officials continue the 
propaganda battle with music and different noises playing back and forth.  The main 
purpose of the PNP loudspeakers was to muffle the noises made by the miners digging 
the underground tunnels under the residence.  The hostages cannot sleep and become 
increasingly nervous and stressed out with the loud music and noises.   
We asked ourselves, why in the world would they [PNP] play such loud 
music every day? The MRTA terrorists would just put earplugs in and we 
would just sit there and suffer.  It was deafening, all day and night!  
(Personal Interview with Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri on 22 September 
2003).    
At 0600 hours on 29 January, the first military march was heard for the next 20 
minutes, and again at 1800 hours.  At 1315 hours, a group of medics from the Arzobispo 
Loayza Hospital enters the residence and provides aid to several distressed hostages 
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because of the loud music and noise propaganda.  PNP sources believe that MRTA 
terrorists have five or six informants outside of the residence, informing them of every 
action taken by the police and military forces.  It is believed that the leader of this 
informant group is Hugo Avellaneda Valdez.  It is also believed by the hostages that 
several news agencies are providing information to the terrorists via radio 
communications.   
On 30 January 1997, President Fujimori meets with 43 wives of the hostages and 
other family members, to talk about the crisis and request their support in keeping calm.  
A small hospital is established inside the residence grounds next to its main building.  
This area was the new negotiations site for all upcoming meetings between the MRTA 
and the negotiating team.  Four medics and a nurse remain there to work and treat 
hostages as well as terrorists.  The next day, members of the SUAT conduct a live fire 
exercise demonstration on hostage recovery operations at their unit compound in front of 
Japanese news cameras as a show of force for the MRTA.   
On 1 February 1997, President Fujimori and Hashimoto send a message to the 
terrorists agreeing to have a direct dialogue with them; they name Terusuke Tarada as a 
new member of the Guarantor Commission.  Later that day, President Fujimori travels to 
Canada where he meets with Prime Minister of Japan, Ryutaro Hashimoto, and signs the 
Joint Declaration of Toronto.  This declaration reaffirms the intentions on both sides 
(Peru and Japan) to end the crisis peacefully, with priority given to saving human lives 
(Chávez López, 1998, p. 122).  The following day, President Fujimori travels to 
Washington and meets with President Clinton.  He revealed that MRTA terrorists are not 
demanding the release of their prisoners anymore, and that they were willing to begin 
dialogue once again.  President Clinton praises Fujimori’s efforts and hard stance.  On 4 
February, President Fujimori travels to the Dominican Republic and meets with President 
Leonel Fernández.  President Fernández stands by President Fujimori and encourages a 
quick and peaceful resolution to the crisis.  Back at the Japanese residence, six shots are 
fired during the night by MRTA terrorists.  When asked to explain the spontaneous 
shooting, Cerpa replied that it was to commemorate the death of Hermigidio Huerta and 
the five labor workers from the Cromotex textile plant that had died almost 20 years ago 
in a hostile takeover led by Cerpa.  
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On 6 February 1997, at 1030 hours, Monsignor Cipriani and Michel Minnig begin 
negotiations once again with the MRTA terrorists.  The next day, between 1030 hours to 
1700 hours, all hostages are given a medical examination.  The following day, President 
Fujimori travels to London and meets with Prime Minister John Major.  The Prime 
Minister fully supports Fujimori’s intentions and advises that the negotiations process 
continue. 
On 9 February 1997, Monsignor Cipriani says a mass inside the residence and 
hears the confessions from dozens of hostages.  The following day, the MRTA terrorists 
throw a grenade at PNP officials in a nearby house in response to provocations made by 
the police.  For the next three days, Domingo Palermo has official talks with Rolly Rojas 
(MRTA #2 man also known as “El Arabe”).  Also that day, Tsuyoshi Hitomi, the 
Japanese reporter that fooled security forces and infiltrated the residence, enters the 
residence again and introduces radio equipment for the terrorists to use during interviews.  
He claims the equipment is so he can maintain contact with the hostages and their 
captors.        
On 20 February 1997, Palermo has talks with Rolly Rojas for the fourth time.  
During these negotiations, Néstor Cerpa attends for the first time.  Rafael Merino, a 
S.I.N. member, is infiltrated as part of the negotiations team and gathers valuable 
intelligence.  Four days later, Cerpa Cartolini comes out of the residence and wants to 
talk to the Peruvian government’s representative, Palermo.  Cerpa announces that more 
hostages would be released in the upcoming days.  The fifth set of talks is conducted with 
no real progress on that same day. 
On 25 and 27 February 1997, Palermo has talks with MRTA for the sixth time 
and seventh time with no real progress once again.  Late at night on 1 March 1997, 
MRTA terrorists hang new signs from the windows, responding to Fujimori’s messages 
and his non-negotiating stance.  Two MRTA terrorists were seen at night patrolling the 
rooftop of the residence in full combat gear, carrying their weapons, ammunition, and 
grenades.  The next day, President Fujimori makes a surprise visit to the Dominican 
Republic to meet with President Leonel Fernández and requests asylum for the MRTA 
terrorists.  On 3 March, President Fujimori travels to Cuba and meets with President Fidel 
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Castro to request asylum for the 14 MRTA terrorists.  Castro states in writing that he 
does not condone the MRTA actions, but he is willing to receive them in his country.   
Between 4-5 March 1997, the ninth and tenth rounds of negotiations are held 
between Palermo and the MRTA.  For Palermo, it is evident that the MRTA is not 
prepared to negotiate any of their original demands, nor did they expect the crisis to go 
on for so long.  On 6 March 1997, the MRTA terrorists suspect that a tunnel is being dug 
under the residence; construction noises are heard under the residence and fresh cracks on 
the floor of the living room begin to show.  The PNP General Tomás Castillo Meza 
denies any knowledge of a tunnel when asked by the terrorists to inspect the floor40.  
Negotiations between MRTA and the spokesperson are immediately stopped.  Fujimori 
admits that he is considering all possible military options to solve the crisis, including 
airborne assaults as well as the use of tanks.  Local newspapers release pictures of 
government vehicles removing dirt from the perimeter site.  These pictures are 
broadcasted over national television for everyone to see, including the MRTA terrorists 
inside the residence. 
On 9 March 1997, the MRTA is willing to begin negotiations once again.  From 
the Vatican Pope John Paul II requests that the MRTA release all 72 hostages.  During 
the next several days tensions rise inside the residence and, Bolivian Ambassador Jorge 
Gumucio confronts the MRTA terrorists after being taunted and offended by them with 
insults about Bolivia.  Gumucio’s stance against Cerpa incites all the hostages to begin 
chanting the Peruvian and Bolivian national anthems, until Cerpa walks away from the 
confrontation apologizing.  This confrontation marks a turning point in the hostages’ 
morale and power struggle against their captors (personal interview with Vice Admiral 
(ret.) Giampietri on 22 September 2003).  
On 19 March 1997, the Peruvian Army captures six gangs and 32 members from 
the MRTA’s Juan Santos Atahualpa Front throughout the country.  During the next 
several days, the Japanese vice minister returns to Tokyo and reassures that there will be 
                                                 
40 It is believed that the cracks on the floor and the loud noises throughout this day were from one of 
the underground tunnels collapsing and trapping two miners, and workers using electric machinery to 
rescue the trapped miners.  The mining group responsible for building the tunnels came to be known as 
“Los Topos del Silencio” (trans. “The Silent Moles”), and grew to almost 60 personnel by the end of the 
project (Chávez López, 1998, p. 171).    
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a quick resolution to the crisis soon.  Later in the week, the MRTA announces that they 
will accept asylum in Cuba.  Also during that week, military units discover a shipment of 
arms destined for the MRTA’s Juan Santos Atahualpa Front as it entered the country 
across the Ecuadorian border.  The shipment included AK-47 assault rifles, grenade 
launchers, rockets and machine guns. 
On 28 March 1997, Jesuit priest Juan Julio Wicht conducts a Good Friday service; 
several of the MRTA terrorists attend.  By the next morning, Néstor Cerpa paralyzes all 
negotiations, insisting on the release of MRTA prisoners.  That day Francisco Tudela and 
Morihisa Aoki are briefly seen through one of the windows of the residence.  Once again 
on 30 March,  Pope John Paul II requests that the MRTA release all 72 hostages.  
Fujimori insists that he will not negotiate with the MRTA if they continue to insist on the 
release of the MRTA prisoners. 
On 03 April 1997, an International Red Cross medical team enters the residence 
with a portable MRI machine to check on the condition of several hostages.  Several days 
later, Fujimori visits Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia.   In a 
press conference in Santa Cruz, President Fujimori states that a military operation will be 
the last resort in the resolution of the crisis.  On 14 April, news personnel are told to 
move their perimeter back approximately 10 meters from their original locations.  
President Fujimori later meets with Monsignor Cipriani for 4 hours to discuss the present 
condition of the hostages.   
On 16 April 1997, one of the hostages establishes a conversation with a family 
member by using a megaphone from inside the residence.  Later that day, International 
Red Cross member Jean Pierre Schaerer is kicked out of the country for aiding the 
MRTA terrorists.  The next morning, Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs Roberto 
Robaina, meets with Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in Tokyo and offers 
once again his cooperation.  Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri sends a message stating that 
the hostages are seriously considering an escape plan.  The S.I.N. replied with a message 
to stay calm and not try anything; that the crisis would be over soon.  During the mass 
held by Juan Julio Wicht, the priest calls the MRTA terrorists “…brothers, we are all 
sons of God, we are all Peruvians” (Wicht, 1998, p. 216).   
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On 18 April 1997, in celebration of Juan Julio Wicht’s birthday, the MRTA 
members stand at attention and propose a wine toast for the priest.  Wicht recognizes that 
the terrorists have truly made a connection with him, and he shakes each of their hands 
reassuring them that God will have the final say.  The following morning, the Minister of 
Interior and the PNP chief resign in protest against a military intervention to rescue the 
hostages.   
On 21 April 1997, Domingo Palermo walks out of Congress and insists that the 
negotiations are still ongoing.  Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri is sending out over 80 
messages daily, detailing everything being done by the terrorists.  He informs some of the 
hostages of the impending rescue, telling them to dress in light colored clothing to help 
the rescue force identify them.     
On 22 April 1997 at 1420 hours, 140 commandos from the Peruvian Army and 
Marine force occupied positions in underground tunnels, awaiting orders to commence 
the assault.  Thirteen MRTA terrorists were downstairs starting their daily soccer game.  
One MRTA terrorist was still upstairs as a guard; five were downstairs watching the 
game, while the other eight were playing.  At 1514 hours, Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri 
sent out the code word “Mary está enferma” (trans. “Mary is sick”) through his radio 
transmitter planted inside the guitar case given to him by the International Red Cross, 
signaling that all the pre-conditions had been met and to start the hostage rescue.  Twenty 
sniper commandos assumed their positions along the rooftops surrounding the residence 
waiting for the authority to shoot.  Immediately afterwards, a news agency helicopter 
flies over the residence, almost compromising the whole operation.   
At 1523 hours, three simultaneous charges blow the floor of the living room, 
dining room, and the kitchen of the Japanese residence, killing immediately four terrorists 
who were playing soccer and injuring several others.  The 140 commandos emerged from 
five different tunnels along the residence grounds and stormed the building, killing the 
other 10 terrorists.  Two commandos also die during the rescue:  Colonel Juan Valer and 
Captain Raúl Jiménez.  The operation lasts 35 minutes and is considered a complete 
success and praised worldwide. 
C. ANALYSIS 
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At the time of the hostage crisis there were three military units in Peru trained in 
hostage rescue missions:  the Navy Special Operations Force (FOEs), the Marine Unidad 
Especial de Combate (UEC, trans. Special Combat Unit), and the PNP’s Sub-Unidad de 
Acciones Tácticas (SUAT, trans. Special Tactics Sub-unit).  Most members of these units 
had participated previously in counterterrorist exchange programs with the U.S. and 
Israel, and had combat experience against the Shining Path and during the Ecuador / 
Peru41 conflict.  Individually, these units could not handle a target of such magnitude due 
to shortages of personnel or equipment.  The original idea was to establish a composite 
unit of UEC and FOEs, with the PNP and SUAT acting as cordon security.   It was 
General Hermosa Rios, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Peru, who introduced the 
idea of using the Army commandos to participate in the operation.   Eventually, General 
Hermosa Rios gave the directive to establish a joint unit composed mainly of officers 
from the Army commandos and Marines from the UEC.  The FOES participation was 
limited to logistical support with explosives and assault equipment. 
The U.S., Great Britain, and Israel offered help by sending representatives from 
their respective counterterrorist units as advisors, but this help was quickly turned down 
by President Fujimori.  Holding to his Japanese heritage and beliefs, he asserted that 
humiliation was already bad enough with 14 terrorists holding hostage some of the most 
important Peruvian government officials and dignitaries; asking another country for 
assistance would have just made it a bigger embarrassment for Peru.  Eventually, the 
advisors were allowed to stay in country to provide technical and tactical assistance in an 
advisory role.         
                                                 
41 A longstanding territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru erupted in fighting on January 26, 
1995, in the remote, rugged jungle mountains of the Cordillera del Condor, where a stretch of border had 
never been clearly marked and where deposits of gold, uranium, and oil supposedly lay. Peru claimed that 
the approximately 1,000-mile border between the two countries had been set by the 1942 Rio de Janeiro 
Protocol, which had confirmed its victory over Ecuador in a 10-day war in 1941 over territory. But Ecuador 
declared the protocol null in 1960, before the last 48 miles of the border had been marked. Vowing to 
enforce Peru's claim to the 48-mile stretch, President Alberto Fujimori (1938-) sent troops and warplanes 
into the region (between the Santiago and Zamora rivers); then Ecuador's president Sixto Duran Ballen 
(1922-) attempted to negotiate a peace. Each side accused the other of being the aggressor and deployed 
naval ships along their coasts. Finally, a cease-fire and truce took effect on March 1, 1995, after tense peace 
talks, calling for demilitarization of the disputed jungle border. Peru reported losing several warplanes and 
almost 50 soldiers; Ecuador's official toll was about 30 dead and 300 wounded, but the casualties on both 
sides most likely were greater. On October 26, 1998, the two countries signed a peace treaty defining the 
48-mile stretch of border, creating a committee to resolve boundary issues peacefully, and setting down 
terms for bilateral trade and navigation rights” (Information retrieved from 
http://www.onwar.com/aced/nation/pat/peru/ fecuadorperu1995.htm on 2 Nov 03). 
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1. Phase I:  Planning, Preparation, and Rehearsals 
In Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR, the rescue force had 126 days to prepare, 
and they used this time to the fullest.  Immediately following the takeover, the PNP 
developed an emergency assault plan in conjunction with the SUAT, and remained on 
site with this task for several days, until the designated unit was properly assembled and 
given the designation of “rescue force”.  The following two weeks were chaotic for all 
military and police units responsible for the security of the residence; the shortage of 
personnel, equipment, and intelligence delayed the proper assignment of duties and 
responsibilities for the rescue forces.  In the meantime, the PNP and SUAT forces 
scrambled to acquire whatever resources they had to maintain an emergency rescue 
capability.  Some frustrated PNP commanders that impatiently wanted to end the crisis, 
developed a myriad of hastily assembled rescue plans that included rocket propelled 
grenades, explosives, and less-than-lethal ammunition.  Eventually order was established 
with Gen. Hermosa Ríos as the task force commander, Vladimiro Montesinos in charge 
of all intelligence operations, and President Fujimori as the commander in chief of all 
forces. 
Immediately after we found out that our parents were inside, we parked 
our vehicle in front of the residency and slept there for the next two 
weeks.  Initially we were very worried because we thought the police 
would go in any minute and massacre everyone because of their lack of 
expertise in these types of situations.  They wanted to go in with bazookas 
and blow everything up.  Little by little, we managed to persuade them 
against an emergency assault (Personal interview with LCDR Sergio 
Giampietri, Peruvian Navy, on 20 March 2004). 
Preparations to construct a replica of the residence began in early January.  Forty 
civilian workers were contracted to begin construction of a full size mock up at the 
Peruvian Army’s Commando School in El Chorrillo.  Initially, the site was meant to 
replicate only the first floor of the residence, and it was to be made of bricks.  As the 
siege was prolonged, a mock up of the second story of the residence was built side by 
side to the first floor mock up site.  As time went on, the construction continued with a 
second floor added on top of this latest mock up of the second floor layout, turning this  
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location into a two-story site.  Eventually, tunnels were built underneath the site, allowing 
for the realistic and full-blown live fire rehearsals for the assault force and the breaching 
parties.   
The initial and only blueprints available for the Japanese residence did not 
coincide with the actual construction of the residence; structural modifications had been 
made from its original construction.  Eventually, a set of updated sketches was sent via 
fax from Japan, enabling the mockup construction to be identical to the actual residence. 
The master breacher for the operation, UEC CDR Carlos Tello, conducted 
numerous tests and rehearsals with different types of explosive charges in order to perfect 
the type of charge to be used during the initial entry into the residence.  The main concern 
was to have enough force to make a hole through the floor of the residency and kill as 
many terrorists as possible, without having the second story collapse, bringing the whole 
structure to the ground and killing or injuring the hostages42.  He had to improvise and 
devise a series of shape charges made out of plastic explosives and shrapnel inside 
buckets, which were then attached upside down from inside the tunnels to the ground 
floor of the residence.   
I knew the advisors were there from other countries ready to give us the 
appropriate explosives I needed to make the explosions work.  I was not 
allowed to ask for any materials; it was so frustrating, knowing I had to 
improvise with what I had instead of using the right charges (Personal 
interview with CDR Carlos Tello, Peruvian Marines, on 24 September 
2003). 
At one point during testing, CDR Tello complained to President Fujimori about 
the amount of smoke that remained inside the structure after each shot because of the 
type of explosives he was using, trying to sway the President to request help from U.S. 
advisors.  President Fujimori simply told CDR Tello to do the best he could with what he 
                                                 
42 Using too large an explosive charge will harm hostages as was the case when Egypt's Force 777 
attempted to storm Egyptair flight 648, a Boeing 737, which was hijacked to Malta. Force 777 decided to 
blow a hole in the roof to gain entry into the aircraft. They also decided that the charge should be large 
enough to stun the terrorists. However, the explosion was so huge that six rows of seats were ripped loose 
and nearly twenty passengers were killed. This mistake, in addition to numerous others, ultimately led to 
the deaths of 57 hostages (Information retrieved from specwarnet.net/world/ct.htm, on 20 January 2004).  
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had, that this operation was a problem for Peru to solve without any outside help.  The 
morning of the operation, President Fujimori requested CDR Tello to double the charge 
to ensure all members of the MRTA would be neutralized from the initial explosion, but 
CDR Tello adamantly refused explaining that if he did, the whole residence would 
collapse (Personal interview with CDR Carlos Tello, Peruvian Marines, on 24 September 
2003).    
2. Phase II:  Approach and Assault 
One of the most fascinating aspects of Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR was 
the ingenious approach to the target site.  The MRTA terrorists never imagined that they 
would be overtaken from underground.  Throughout the four months of planning and 
preparation, nine tunnels were dug underneath the residence in an astonishing feat of 
engineering; the tunnels started from rented government homes across from the main 
street of the residence, under the streets, under the perimeter wall, through the garden 
area, and underneath the actual residence.  These tunnels not only provided an excellent 
way of infiltrating the target area undetected, but also provided secured areas to conduct 
surveillance, reconnaissance, and last minute planning.  Two persons could fit abreast 
inside the tunnels; they were well ventilated, had proper lighting, and padded floors to 
eliminate noise.  The tunnels were connected by three tactical operating centers, with 
communications equipment, planning tables and charts, and a unique alarm system based 
on red lights that would light up signaling that all pre-conditions on the target were met.   
On execution day, all 140 members of the assault force were ordered to enter the 
tunnels and assume their respective positions.  They proceeded to do this three times until 
all the pre-established conditions were met to conduct the assault, the main one being at 
least 13 MRTA members downstairs in one location, preferably in the dining area, so as 
to kill as many of them as possible with an explosive charge. 
Once 13 of the MRTA terrorists were located on the first floor, Vice Admiral 
(ret.) Giampietri gave the code signal and opened the entrance door latch to the upstairs 
courtyard.  At that time, Gen. Hermosa Rios called Vladimiro Montesinos and informed 
him that the assault force was ready.  Montesinos called Fujimori over the phone and in 
turn informed him of the status on the target.  Fujimori proceeded to give the go ahead.  
At 1521 hours, the assault force began a five-second countdown that would signal the 
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detonation of three explosive charges underneath the residence.  Immediately following 
the explosions, the area was flooded by Army commandos and UEC Marines from all 
directions; special teams with specific areas of responsibilities divided the target into nine 
areas according to their respective breaching and coordination points.   
Within minutes, the Japanese residence was under the control of 140 commandos 
from the rescue force.  A lone terrorist that had barricaded himself on the second story 
held his position and fought off Army commandos for another 30 minutes or so until two 
commandos came down from the rooftop with a roof demolitions charge and finally 
neutralized him.  A sniper-observer team from across the street informed the two 
commandos where to place the charge via radio communications in order to kill this last 
remaining MRTA terrorist.  Once the target was secured, 25 members of the rescue force 
lay injured, two of them had been killed, and one hostage (Carlos Giusti) had died from a 
heart attack because of blood loss from a bullet wound that severed the femoral artery on 
his right leg. 
3. Phase III:  Post Assault 
President Fujimori immediately took charge of the situation by conducting a walk 
through the target area as soon as the assault was over and during the following days for a 
live television audience.  He praised the Peruvian armed forces publicly by singing the 
Peruvian national anthem with them on the residence’s grounds immediately after the 
rescue.  Nevertheless, serious political repercussions have continued to occur several 
years after the rescue mainly because of investigations conducted by a through a 
Comisión de la Verdad (trans. Truth Commission) responding to allegations of 
assassinations inside the target.  Some of these allegations have been instigated by leftist 
movements within Peru, in an effort to extradite President Fujimori and bring him to trial 
for his relation with intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, and alleged ties to drug 
trafficking, extortion, money laundering, and bribery of government officials.  The Truth 
Commission’s main charge is that President Fujimori ordered the armed forces to enter 
and assassinate all MRTA terrorists.  These accusations have only weakened the Peruvian 
military and the prestige of its special operations forces after this textbook rescue.  Most 
members of the assault force have been taken to trial, facing charges of assassination and 
premeditated murder.  Obviously, the commission does not recognize the in-extremis 
66 
nature of these types of operations43.  This is why it is imperative to contain the crisis 
area from any outside intervention until the rescue force has done its job, to include 
positive control of all evidence retrieved from the area by government authorities.   
In a hostage rescue operation, you must let the professionals do what they do 
best—to rescue the hostages.  If you stop to search and handcuff a terrorist, 30 hostages 
will die.  The Truth Commission has gone as far as uncovering the forensic analysis on 
the MRTA corpses, to study the bullet locations and the number of rounds fired into each 
body, to try to prove the MRTA terrorists were assassinated.  They argue that since the 
bodies have well placed shot groups in the chest and forehead areas, that the terrorists 
must have been assassinated.  Their conclusions only prove the excellent marksmanship 
and firing discipline of the Peruvian Special Forces. 
D. PRINCIPLES FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
1. Intelligence 
The most critical factor for the success of Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR 
was the intelligence gathering operations.  This operation is unique in that there was a 
hostage inside providing real time information through two-way communications.  From 
the very early stages of mission development, the rescue force and their planning cells 
had the upper hand on the terrorists.  Army Commander Roberto Fernández had kept his 
beeper from the MRTA terrorists during their initial shakedown, and immediately linked 
up with Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri to try to send out his beeper number to the PNP 
forces.  They began speaking into every artifact that came in to the residence from the 
International Red Cross, in hopes that some would be “bugged” with listening devices.  
Once the S.I.N. had registered the beeper’s number, they signaled Giampietri by playing 
“La Cucaracha”44 during the early morning loudspeaker propaganda.  From that point on, 
Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri provided daily intelligence updates all the way up to hit 
                                                 
43 Some of the members I spoke to while in Lima have been released from the military and cannot get 
a job anywhere in Peru due to the outcomes from the Truth Commission’s investigations. 
44 This was the prearranged signal between Vice Admiral Giampietri and the S.I.N.  For two days, 
Vice Admiral Giampietri went around the residence talking into every item that had been brought in into 
the residence from the International Red Cross, in hopes that someone would be listening and could 
establish communications with the hostages.  “I would say the number of the beeper and then I would 
mention that if they [S.I.N.] were listening and had copied the number to respond by playing “La 
Cucaracha” after the Peruvian National Anthem the following morning through the loud speakers” 
(Personnel Interview with Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri, 23 September 2003).    
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time, allowing the rescue element to have complete details of the intelligence picture.  
This unprecedented open line of communication also provided a lifeline to the hostages 
that kept their morale and spirits up throughout the crisis, by knowing that a rescue plan 
was being developed.  In addition to the electronic communications, the hostages 
established a back up plan to communicate with the rescue force through a system of 
signals with a towel through a bathroom window.  They would receive a message through 
the beeper and respond with a towel and a thumbs up or down for yes or no (Personal 
Interview with Vice Admiral (ret.) Giampietri, 23 September 2003).   
The S.I.N. (National Intelligence Service) utilized HUMINT (Human 
Intelligence) assets and deployed these in and around the residence in order to look for 
the MRTA members or collaborators.  They also created electronic interference 
throughout a three-mile radius around the residence, preventing cellular phone 
communications in the area or in and out of the residence.  Four 2-men sniper-observer 
teams were immediately dispatched from the SUAT and these were eventually 
augmented with personnel from the UEC.  These teams provided constant monitoring of 
the site as well as surgical fires.  The Peruvian Army rented five homes along the 
southern sector of the residence, which were used for command and control, 
reconnaissance and surveillance, and as troop holding areas during the last days of the 
siege.  “We knew it was indispensable to know what the terrorists were thinking and at 
the same time to hide our intentions” (Hermosa Ríos, 1997, p.144).  On multiple 
occasions, intelligence personnel used periscopes and listening devices from inside the 
tunnels, to gather critical intelligence on the terrorists, the mines and booby traps used in 
and around the residence, possible breach points, and escape routes for after the assault. 
2 Surprise  
The MRTA terrorists never expected an assault in broad daylight hours, much less 
coming from underground.  The only possible way they thought a rescue operation could 
be mounted was by using helicopters.  They had mined and booby-trapped the 
surrounding grounds of the residence, so they were confident that any rescue attempt 
would have to come from the air.   The explosive entry into the residence gave the assault 
force maximum surprise.  The time of the day, the ongoing negotiations, the covert nature 
of the approach, and the real time intelligence being fed to the rescue force, all 
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contributed to the total success of the surprise factor.  Thirteen terrorists were in the 
dining area of the residence during the detonation of the explosive charges.  It is believed 
that only four terrorists died because of the initial blast.  But this is due to the fact that a 
helicopter from a news agency was flying over the target area approximately 20 seconds 
before the blast; when the terrorists heard the helicopter, they stopped playing soccer and 
moved to the windows to look, thinking a rescue attempt was on its way.  Otherwise, 
many more terrorists would have died during the initial explosion. 
The shock effect of the initial breach gave the assault force the precious seconds 
needed for a quick entry into the target area, taking advantage of the shock and chaos 
induced by the explosions.  The principle of surprise allowed the assault force to enter the 
target quickly, dominating all vulnerable points and neutralizing the threat discriminately.   
In a special operations mission, the concept of speed is simple. Get to your 
objective as fast as possible. Any delay will expand your area of 
vulnerability and decrease your opportunity to achieve relative superiority 
(McRaven, 1995, p.19). 
Immediately after the explosion, personnel in the tunnels removed the boards that 
were holding the remaining soil covering the openings of the tunnels, and ran outside into 
their respective entry sites.  One team could not pull all the boards out and had to back 
out of the tunnel and use a different tunnel.  The soldier tasked with opening the top soil, 
frantically scraped the dirt, roots, and boards, with his bare hands in a desperate attempt 
to remove the dirt covering his opening.  Unable to break out of his tunnel, he had to 
backtrack with his whole team to another tunnel.  This had been rehearsed during the 
contingency planning portion of the rehearsals, so the operator and his element adjusted 
quickly to the alternate entry point (from personal interview with Captain Alex Segura 
Figueroa, assault force member, Peruvian Special Forces, 24 September 2003). 
3 Operator’s Skills 
The 140 men assault force rehearsed the operation hundreds of times, conducting 
live fires at the mock up site; at the same time they where kept in total isolation from the 
public, their families, and their loved ones.  Each member of the assault force knew 
exactly how many steps he had to take in each room and at each different situation:   
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We got so good at it, and we did it so many times, that I could walk the 
entire house, room by room, with my eyes closed, calling out where each 
hostage was located (personal interview with Captain Alex Segura 
Figueroa, assault force member, Peruvian Special Forces, 24 September 
2003). 
A critical factor for the planned contingencies was the use of pre-planned support 
teams, not usually attached to a rescue force.  Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR had 
specific teams that went in as part of the assault to provide support during the rescue:  
firefighters, medics, and reserve teams, all entered immediately behind the rescue force, 
and they were all needed and used during the assault.  These teams provided critical 
support that it is not usually planned for as part of the assault force organization.  The 
contingency plans to call these special teams were rehearsed as part of the mission 
execution and given specific code names for each special situation.  Each contingency 
was timed during rehearsals, to ensure actual time on target did not exceed one hour.  
4. Deception  
Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR was also a textbook example of a well-
coordinated deception plan at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  President 
Fujimori deceived the MRTA to buy time, by leading them through an astute bargaining 
process with no end in site.  The deception operations used by the S.I.N. and the armed 
services were established specifically to increase the surprise factor.  Surprise was a 
direct result of the successful use of deception operations throughout the 126 days of the 
siege.  The use of loudspeakers to hide the noise from the tunnel digging, the propaganda 
and demonstrations by the PNP and the Army, the over flights and use of undercover 
news personnel, all contributed to a complex and well planned deception strategy.  It 
allowed the assault force to move into position under the residence over 30 hours prior to 
the operation.  The Peruvian government dominated the operational security of the whole 
operation, to include the control of the media and the international community throughout 
a long and drawn out process, all while mounting the assault.   
The MRTA terrorists were deceived into believing that they had the upper hand 
throughout all the negotiations.  They were led to believe that the use of force would not 
be  considered,  especially   with  President  Fujimori’s  son  still  inside  the  residence.   
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President Fujimori led the MRTA to believe that he would eventually concede to their 
demands, drawing out the negotiations process, tiring the terrorists and causing them to 
make critical mistakes.    
E. CONCLUSION 
It is important to understand the uniqueness of this case and some of the other 
surrounding factors that contributed to the success of the operation.  Working in friendly 
territory, the ability and time to dig the underground tunnels, the terrorists’ skill level and 
lack of discipline, and the willingness of other countries such as Cuba to offer asylum to 
the terrorists, all were contributing factors for the success of the rescue.  We must 
consider these factors and understand that the same tactics, techniques, and procedures 
used for Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR might not work in every hostage rescue 
operation.  Drawing out the negotiations process can also lead to a dangerous situation 
inside the crisis site for the hostages; if the terrorists think they are not making any 
progress throughout a protracted negotiations process, tensions will rise jeopardizing the 
security of the operation and of the hostages.   
Nevertheless, Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR proved to be a textbook 
example of a hostage rescue operation utilizing the four principles for a successful rescue.  
Furthermore, it shows the benefits of having patience with the terrorists and waiting to 
conduct the rescue once the terrorists have reached their culmination point, exploiting 
their tactical mistakes.  The Lima operation is a perfect illustration of the advantage of 
drawing out the negotiations process to buy time, in order to tire the terrorists and 
develop the best possible rescue plan to be executed at the right time. 
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F. BIORHYTHM OF OPERATION CHAVIN DE HUANTAR   
Intelligence, Surprise + Deception, Operator’s Skill for Hostage Taker
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IV. TRUST AND INFLUENCE DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS 
Trust and influence45 involve commitment and risk.  This chapter examines the 
types of trust commitments and the risks of trusting when expectations are not fulfilled as 
well as targets of trust during the hostage rescue in Lima, Peru.  This chapter also 
explores the nature of influence, focusing on the role of networks in influence during the 
hostage crisis.   
A. TRUST AND INFLUENCE DURING OPERATION CHAVIN DE 
HUANTAR 
Throughout the 126 days of the crisis, there were 10 certified negotiations 
sessions between the MRTA terrorists and an officially designated Guarantor 
Commission.  The Guarantor Commission was established on 15 January 1997, and it 
was composed of five members:  Anthony Vincent, Monsignor Cipriani, Domingo 
Palermo, Michel Minnig, and Terusuke Terada, a designated observer from the Japanese 
government.   
B. NETWORK PLAYERS 
During the course of the hostage crisis, five main players emerged that had a 
direct impact throughout the negotiations process with the MRTA and the outcome of the 
operation:  the government of Peru; the Guarantor Commission designated by President 
Fujimori; the government of Japan; the international community; and finally the 
International Red Cross.  The government of Peru, represented by President Fujimori and 
his spokesperson Domingo Palermo, had the primary responsibility of the safe return of 
all hostages.  The Guarantor Commission’s primary responsibility was the direct 
negotiations link between the MRTA and every other entity outside of the Japanese 
residence.  The government of Japan’s responsibility was to assist the government of 
Peru in the safe return of all hostages (a large majority of the hostages were Japanese 
citizens).  The international community’s primary responsibility was to provide support 
to the government of Peru in the safe resolution to the crisis.  The International Red 
                                                 
45 Webster’s dictionary defines trust as reliance on the integrity, strength, ability, surety, etc. of a 
person or thing; confidence.  It also defines influence as the capacity or power of persons or things to 
produce effects on others by intangible or indirect means; the action or process of producing such effects; a 
person or thing that exerts influence; the power to persuade or obtain advantages resulting from one’s 
status, wealth, position, etc.  (Dr. Dorothy Denning, Trust-Influence-Networks Course, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2003). 
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Cross’ role was to provide humanitarian aid throughout the crisis, while remaining an 
unbiased third party.  The MRTA, as described above, was the terrorist organization that 
sought demands from the Peruvian government in exchange for the safe return of the 
hostages in the residence.  The relationships and networks that evolved between these 
players over the 126-day crisis led to its successful conclusion.  The following diagram 














Figure 12.   Author’s Representation of the Networks in Operation CHAVIN DE 
HUANTAR 
By using Piotr Sztompka’s trust and influence model and conducting a process 
trace, I will explain the links of the relationships between the players within the case 
study.  Examining the details of the negotiations throughout the crisis (see case study 
Chapter III), I will establish that trust and influence played a critical role in the outcome.  
Specifically, I will investigate the three types of commitment Stompka says invoke the 
trust of others within a network:  anticipatory, responsive, and evocative trust; and 
evaluate their effects on Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR networks. The following 
diagram illustrates the components of the trust/influence model:  
75 





























• LL I I
“B” ACTS OUTCOME
TRUST / INFLUENCE MODEL
 
Figure 13.   Author’s Representation of Sztompka’s Trust / Influence Model 
 
The model can be used as a tool to extract the trust factors that were at work in the 
case study. We can look at the trust and influence model from the terrorists’ perspective, 
utilizing the following variables:  “A” is the MRTA terrorists; “B” is Peru and the 
international community, and “X” is the action of carrying out the MRTA requests and 
demands.  In order for “A” to trust “B” there must be some sort of commitment by “B”; 
commitment involves future exercise of power by a trusted entity.  This commitment can 
take the form of anticipatory, responsive or evocative trust or any combination of the 
three.  Each commitment made by “B” contains inherent risk/reward consequences.  
These consequences must be actively managed by “B” in order to successfully deliver 
“X”.  The strength of the commitment is proportional to the level of risk incurred.  Also 
in conjunction with the commitment of “B” is the expectation that “A” has of “B’s” 
actions.  These expectations can be instrumental (capability-based) or axiological 
(morally based).  If expectations are not met, outcomes are affected and failure may 
result.  
After “A” has decided to trust “B” to do “X”, “B’s” ability to act is predicated on 
the power he exerts over the situation.  As the model indicates, he can pull this power 
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from several sources including traits, knowledge/skills, property/money, and/or network 
position.  Does “B” have a requisite amount of these to accomplish “X”? If it is perceived 
that he does, then the chances of achieving the desired outcome are increased from the 
perspective of “A”. 
1. Anticipatory Trust 
Anticipatory trust is defined as a routine, default behavior with no clear obligation 
for trusted entity.  “When I act toward others because I believe that, the actions that they 
carry out anyway will be favorable to my interests, needs, and expectations” (Denning, 
2004, SO-4106)  Examples of this kind of trust are the trust an individual puts in an 
airline to bring him/her home safely or the trust put in a computer firm because of its 
reliability.  From the case study chronology (see Chapter III), the MRTA placed 
anticipatory trust on Michel Minnig, the senior International Red Cross representative 
(and a hostage), because of his position with the International Red Cross.  The MRTA 
had axiological expectations that Minnig would morally base intentions and not choose 
sides in the crisis.  Because of this, the MRTA thought they could manage the risk and 
perhaps reap rewards for their early concessions.  Minnig’s traits as an experienced Red 
Cross worker and his senior position in the organization gave him both the credibility and 
expertise to manage a crisis.  Consequently, Minnig immediately began to negotiate the 
release of all the women and elderly people in the first two hours of the crisis. By his 
actions he not only got hostages released to government (reduce risk), but he reduced the 
number of hostages the MRTA had to control (a reward).      
2. Responsive Trust 
Responsive trust is defined as “the act of entrusting some valuable object to 
someone else with his or her consent…” (Stompka, 1999, p. 27).  An example of this 
kind of trust is entrusting someone with the care of your child for a period of time.  From 
the case study chronology, the Uruguayan government released two MRTA terrorists 
from one of their prisons in exchange for Uruguay’s ambassador to Peru.  The MRTA 
had instrumental expectations of the Uruguayan government to be capable of releasing 
the prisoners.  The MRTA effectively managed the risk to themselves by holding on to 
the ambassador until the prisoners were released in Uruguay.  Once the MRTA was 
convinced to trust Uruguay to release the prisoners, the Uruguayan government used their 
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position as sovereign head to make the release of the prisoners happen.  This type of trust 
was issued back and forth many times throughout the negotiations process.  
3. Evocative Trust 
Evocative trust is defined as a reciprocation of trust, “…act on the belief that the 
other person will reciprocate with trust towards ourselves” (Stompka, 1999, p. 28). An 
example of this trust is a mother allowing her daughter to stay out late in the hope that 
she will return her trust responsibly.  From the case study chronology, there are two good 
examples of this type of trust between both the terrorists and the Japanese ambassador, 
and between Fujimori and the international community.  The Japanese ambassador 
publicly apologized for the situation blaming himself for the crisis.  This followed 
Japanese trust culture that avoids confrontation and readily accepts moral obligations. 
The MRTA had axiological expectations that all the Japanese would behave this way in 
the crisis consistent with their culture, and the ambassador’s actions reinforced that. 
Because of his position and cultural traits, the ambassador exercised the power to invoke 
this type of trust from the MRTA and make them believe they would be successful in 
their endeavor.  
The other example involved two of the players outside of MRTA.  Fujimori 
managed to gain the trust of the U.S., Russian, Japanese and Canadian governments.  In 
addition, he secured asylum for the terrorists in Cuba from Fidel Castro in the event the 
crisis got to that point.  The international community had instrumental expectations of 
Fujimori that he would successfully conclude the crisis with the assets/plan of action he 
had in place.   
Over the course of the crisis, Fujimori’s team managed to infiltrate listening 
devices, surveillance equipment, and even intelligence agents disguised as reporters, to 
evaluate the situation thoroughly, as if they were in the residence the whole time. This 
level of technological expertise put his team in a very advantageous position to bargain 
(or in this case, not to bargain) with the MRTA.  Given the array of international support 
and the ongoing rescue planning/preparation, Fujimori wielded more than enough power 
to garner this trust from various international states.  Throughout the crisis, Fujimori 
earned this type of trust from others by his personal meetings with family members, 
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Japanese tourists, and other international delegations. At no time did he solicit for the 
military intervention of another country, further showing his total control of the situation.  
C. CONCLUSION 
President Fujimori never negotiated with the terrorists. He never gave them the 
idea that he would release the prisoners they requested. Up until the day before the 
assault, the MRTA believed they had the upper hand when Fujimori held all the cards all 
along. In this case study, Fujimori manipulated trust to such an extent that he gambled 
everything on the success of the assault.  History may show him as a genius for the 
successful resolution to the crisis, but a more thorough study of events may show his 
adversary as too trusting.  Perhaps President Fujimori knew it all along. 
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V. DETERRENCE, COERCION, AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS 
Deterrence is concerned with persuading a potential enemy that he should 
in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity.  There is an important 
difference between the intellectual skills required for carrying out a 
military mission and for using potential military capability to pursue a 
nation’s objectives.  A theory of deterrence would be, in effect, a theory of 
the skillful nonuse of military forces, and for this purpose deterrence 
requires something broader than military skills (Shelling, 1968, p. 9). 
A. THEORY AND TERMS 
Hostage crises are unique in that they involve the effective manipulation of three 
key elements—deterrence, coercion, and effective crisis management.  This chapter 
explains the theory and techniques behind each, and their importance during a hostage 
crisis resolution.  An understanding of this theory is critical to tackle the issue of effective 
bargaining and manipulation covered in depth in the following two chapters.   
The most recent National Security Strategy document focuses on the question of 
deterring terrorists; it implies that we cannot continue to treat terrorists with the same 
deterrence model we have been using since the Cold War.  In order to deter future acts of 
hostage taking and the states that sponsor them, we must devise and engage in a new 
overarching deterrence strategy that encompasses strategic, operational, and tactical goals 
other than our current deterrence options.  This strategy must clearly send the message 
out to terrorists and their sponsors that the costs and risks of engaging in such actions far 
outweigh the benefits.  It must be a credible strategy making the terrorists believe that the 
U.S. will use force, and it must make it clear to them that we can use that force by having 
the capability.  In order for this strategy to work properly, it must target terrorist 
organizations, states that sponsor terrorists, non-state actors that support these 
organizations and individuals that are considering becoming a terrorist or supporter of 
terrorist activities.  
The challenge facing policy-makers lies in using the available instruments 
to support deterrence in an integrated and synergistic way (Powers, 2001, 
p. 23). 
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The growing spate of hostage takings in Iraq is a desperate effort by terrorists and 
insurgents to gain bargaining power and sway global public opinion on the current war.  
This wave of terrorism is meant to test the will of the international community as well as 
the coalition in Iraq, and it is working in favor of the kidnappers because of the lack of 
resolve of most players in the coalition.  The Iraqi kidnappers are not motivated by 
money, but by politics and the ideology of jihad (Holy War).  Their intent is to shock and 
weaken the national will, and little by little, deter the international community from 
participating in the coalition.  As long as private firms continue to deal with hostage 
takers behind the scenes, paying ransoms against our national policies, and as long as 
countries give in to the terrorist’s demands (as in the most recent case of the Philippines 
withdrawing their 500 troops from Iraq), the kidnappings will continue and the insurgents 
will gain power.           
It is possible to deter terrorists or potential terrorists and their sponsors from 
pursuing hostage taking as a strategy; however, deterrence will not work every time.  The 
Cold War model of deterrence is hard to apply in unconventional warfare (UW) and 
against terrorism; the current model should focus on threatening and targeting terrorists 
and their supporters where it hurts them the most and against what they hold dear, while 
at the same time devaluing the hostage as a bargaining tool.  We must make it so hard for 
terrorists to become terrorists, or to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or the 
materials to engage in terrorist acts, that they will eventually figure out that it is not in 
their best interest to continue this line of work.   
Terrorists are hard to deter because they have very little to lose and have very 
little that they value; the odds are always in their favor.  Terrorism provides “positives”—
notably status, power, recruits, and psychological rewards (Davis and Jenkins, 2001, p. 
5).  Terrorists are usually motivated by religion or other ideology, and if they die 
pursuing their cause, they become martyrs and heaven waits with 72 virgins and such.  
Other terrorists are motivated by their organization’s long-term goals, as in the case of 
the guerrilla terrorist (see Chapter 7 for distinctions between guerrilla and fanatic 
terrorists).     
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In order to develop a new strategy of deterring future acts of hostage taking, we 
must reorganize and fuse our military and intelligence communities to work in 
synchronization.  Quick reaction forces must be staged forward closer to target areas or 
areas of operation outside the continental U.S., across all regions of the world in order to 
act and react upon real time intelligence and provide the most up to date operational 
preparation of the battlefield (OPB).  At the same time, we also need to strengthen the 
capability to deter future adversaries from aggression and coercion, by increasing the 
capability of our forward-deployed forces and global striking power to respond rapidly to 
threats. 
This forward presence will represent a deterrence denial force that can strike at 
terrorist leadership cells, command and control (C2) networks, supply and financial 
centers, sanctuaries / safe havens, and operations cells, all at a moment’s notice.  In going 
after these terrorist centers of gravity46, we will undoubtedly deter other terrorists and 
their sponsor states. This is the focus of the new strategy. 
The threats we face in the 21st Century will be multifaceted—our 
deterrence strategy must be as well. Just as we intend to build ‘layered 
defenses’ to deal with missile threats at different stages, we also need a 
strategy of "layered deterrence" in which we develop a mix of 
capabilities—both offensive and defensive—which can dissuade and deter 
a variety of emerging threats at different stages (Wolfowitz, 2001). 
In order to come up with deterrence options prior to and during a hostage crisis, 
we must first look at two Cold War / Post Cold War models of deterrence, and how these 
can apply to current Global War On Terrorism (GWOT).  First, we will look at the 
Huth’s model for deterrence47, and then we will look at the Watman and Wilkening’s 
model of deterrence48. 
 
 
                                                 
46 Center of gravity (COG) are those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a 
military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.  At the strategic level, a COG 
might include an alliance or coalition, national will or public support, or national leadership’s will to fight.  
An operational COG, on the other hand, is more tangible—for example, a powerful element of the 
adversary’s armed forces.   (Joint Pup 5-01, 2002, p. II-8).  
47 Huth, Paul K. (1988).  From his book Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War.   
48 Watman, Keneth & Wilkening, Dean (1994).  From their book U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies 
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B. HUTH MODEL OF DETERRENCE 
Deterrence is a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the 
threat of military retaliation, that the costs of using military force to 
resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits (Huth, 1988, p. 15). 
The first aspect critical in the dynamics of a hostage siege is the ability to 
effectively deter an opponent. The Huth model breaks down deterrence strategy as having 
two crucial instruments:  it must be credible and stable:   
A credible deterrent depends upon whether the defender appears to 
possess both the military capabilities to inflict substantial costs on an 
attacker and the will to use those capabilities if necessary.  A stable 
deterrent avoids both increasing the potential attacker’s fears of 
preemptive strike and engaging the bargaining reputation of the potential 
attacker to such an extent that negotiations become deadlocked in 
stalemate (pp. 33-34). 
This credibility must have capability and intention, and the stability of the 
attacker must be sensible to threats and to challenges of the attacker’s reputation.  The 
defender has three diplomatic options in this model:  conciliatory, firm but flexible, and 
bullying.  The defender also has three military options available:  caution, tit for tat, and 
strength.      
The Huth model defines and must have three distinct players:  an attacker (the big 
bully), a defender (the big country with interests in the protégé), and the protégé (little 
victim).  In the model, Huth defines four different types of deterrence: direct general, 
direct immediate, extended general (as in the case of Taiwan / U.S. vs. China since 1949, 
where long-term deterrence is based upon a non-specific potential of hostility against the 
protégé), and extended immediate.   The latter being the most important because as Huth 
mentions, if it works here, then it works everywhere (and this is the most likely case in 
the future). 
Decades of experience in deterrence study against the attacker give information 
and understanding of the attacker’s ways; this is important because this increases 
predictability and knowledge, since we never know or understand enough information 
about the attacker.  However, in immediate cases with limited experience, both attackers 
and defenders can make gross miscalculations if they do not understand one another.  
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There are four main assumptions with Huth’s model.  First, the attacker at some point 
must choose between using force or negotiations.  Second, this decision is based upon a 
thorough analysis of costs and benefits, (rational actor49).  Third, the attacker searches for 
greater information on military and diplomacy mechanisms.  Fourth, the attacker has 
defensive and offensive aims as minimal and maximal objectives, respectively.  If he 
does not have a minimal objective, then give him one. 
C. WATMAN AND WILKENING MODEL OF DETERRENCE 
Watman & Wilkening (W & W) define deterrence as:  
A larger set of strategies for influencing a country’s behavior.  In general, 
one can dissuade an opponent from acting against one’s interests by 
offering rewards or inducements if the opponent acts according to one’s 
wishes, or by threatening sanctions or retaliation if the opponent does not 
(Watman & Wilkening, p. 13).   
The basis for deterrence to work, according to the Watman & Wilkening (W & 
W’s) model, rests solely on credibility.  This credibility is subdivided into two categories 
or dimensions—intent and capability.  The adversary must believe the intent of the 
aggressor in order for the strategy to work; also, the adversary must believe that the 
aggressor has the capability to follow through with the threat effectively.  Intent has two 
specific areas:  interests and reputation.  Interests a state has in another state must be 
demonstrated by political and economical relationships, formal defense arrangements, 
and military-to-military exchanges.  Reputation is the state’s record of past behavior (p. 
58).  For example, the U.S. has a reputation of being very sensitive about the number of 
casualties in combat, especially after the disaster in Somalia during the battle of 
Mogadishu.    
The W & W model assumes the rational choice theory on decision making of 
individuals, organizations, or states, provided the actor behaves in an instrumental 
manner, i.e., chooses the option that maximizes the actor’s expected utility. 
                                                 
49 The rational actor theory implies that people make decisions based upon what is important to them; 
people act in order to achieve their preferences.  Three things are needed to be a rational actor making 
rational decisions:  know alternatives, evaluate consequences, and judge probability, where the most 
frequent error in calculation resides.  Decisions are made based upon limitations in these 3 steps (how well 
do we know all alternatives or how well do we evaluate consequences); this is also known as bounded 
rationality.  A person with limited insight, information, or vision, like Saddam Hussein, exists in greater 
bounded rationality than others. 
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Deterrence by denial attempts to dissuade an adversary from attacking by 
convincing him that he cannot accomplish his political and military 
objectives with the use of force or that the probability of accomplishing 
his political and military objectives at an acceptable cost is very low…. 
Deterrence by punishment attempts to dissuade an opponent from 
attacking by threatening to destroy or otherwise take away that which the 
opponent values (p. 16). 
However, because individuals act in their own perceived interest through cost-
benefit analysis, they can be deterred.  If the status quo is negative, then gain-seeking, 
risk prone and aggressive behavior is likely.  If the status quo is positive, then risk-
adverse less aggressive behavior is likely.  Both of these models have applicability in 
fighting terrorists, specifically those that deal with hostage taking.  It is imperative that 
we take a new look at our intentions and capabilities and redefine the deterrence strategy 
for the GWOT when it comes to hostage sieges.  
D. DETERRING TERRORISTS  
We will direct every resource at our command—every means of 
diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of 
war—to the disruption and defeat of the global terror network (George W. 
Bush, September 20, 2001). 
The single most important factor in a deterrence model for fighting the GWOT is 
to understand the will of the enemy as well as our own.  This has always been the crux in 
all military operations failures involving guerrilla tactics or unconventional warfare.  
Kidnappers are trying to level the playing field by using unconventional techniques of 
terror and carrying out their threats, unable to take on U.S. forces in a conventional battle.  
Our resolve towards these types of situations must be steadfast.         
There are three basic instruments of deterrence that we can take away from the 
previous Cold War models—nuclear weapons capability, understanding of each side’s 
capability and intention in using force, and the ability to communicate with one another.  
The previous models work for U.S.-Soviet style conflict, but do not work against an 
asymmetric threat, or one that has a relentless will and drive motivated by fanaticism, 
religious ideology, or martyrdom.  For example, when dealing with hostage takers, we 
must make perfectly clear that this action will ultimately incur painful costs, far more 
painful than the damage caused by their actions.  It is almost impossible to apprehend 
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would be hostage takers.  Nevertheless, once an organization has adopted this strategy as 
a means of terror, it must be hunted down and destroyed, just as the Peruvian government 
did with the MRTA. 
The strategy for deterrence must overlap with new preemptive strategies across 
the full spectrum of operations in the strategic, operational and tactical environments in 
order to be effective in the GWOT.  It must combine an aggressive defensive posture 
(such as the government of Peru—a committed and firm offensive posture with the 
capability to react quickly on time-sensitive intelligence), and a comprehensive 
communications and information plan that can prepare everyone before, during, and after 
a terrorist act.  Only then can we successfully integrate a deterrence strategy capable of 
targeting most terrorists and their sponsors.  An example of these overlapping strategies 
is shown in the following diagram: 
 
Figure 14.   Overlapping Strategies, (National War College, 2002, p. 69) 
In looking at deterring would-be hostage takers, an S-2 (intelligence officer) war-
game strategy must be undertaken, in other words analyzing the threat and devising a 
technique to hurt the terrorist where it would hurt the most.  This strategy must focus on 
action / reaction / counter-reaction, just as an intelligence officer maps out the enemy 
activities in relation to friendly forces, and the strategy must revolve around all those 




Figure 15.    Targeted Audiences, (National War College, 2002, p. 40) 
 
It is clear now, especially after 9/11, that in order to ensure security in the U.S., 
we must go after terrorists and those who support them abroad.  
If deterrence cannot be relied upon to prevent attacks, then we must 
increase our efforts to detect threats, reduce our vulnerability to them, 
minimize the danger they pose and increase our ability to recover from 
any attacks that might occur (Tucker, 2002, p. 2). 
For example, in the case of Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear (CBRN) 
weapons, the objective of deterrence strategy should not only be deterring the use of the 
weapon, but it should also focus on deterring the terrorist from acquiring or preparing to 
use CBRN weapons (Powers, 2001, p. 7).  This is the counterinsurgency principle of 
counter-measures with counter-resources.  In the current war against drugs, one of the 
main strategies currently in use is the targeting and confiscation of drug precursors, such 
as kerosene, benzene, cement, and lime, which can be used in the production of illicit 
narcotics.  The same strategy should be applied to precursors for CBRN weapons.  
The potential terrorist must be convinced that the costs of taking the action 
are unacceptably higher that the benefits, or that the benefits are 
unacceptably low.  The key to deterrence is shaping the target’s perception 
of costs, benefits, and risks associated with acting before the action occurs 
(p. 9).   
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Davis and Jenkins base deterrence strategy on influence and divide terrorists in 
two groups:  internalists and externalists or Type A and Type B.  Type A terrorists are the 
self-driven seekers of action, causes, or religious commitment that claim political goals 
but are insatiable.  This group must typically be eradicated, deflected, or isolated.  Type 
B terrorists are those with pragmatic, political world goals; they will cease their terrorist 
activities when they are no longer needed.  They must be suppressed.  Inducements are 
needed, or terrorism will regenerate (Davis & Jenkins, 2001, p. 11).   
Davis and Jenkins give four key attributes for a counterterrorism strategy; these 
are necessary for the U.S. but do not work universally as in the case of the Israelis who 
have applied all of these and yet have not been successful.  First, manifest strength and, 
perhaps even more important, manifest purpose and determination.  Second, the 
relentlessness and effectiveness of actions.  Third, the consistency with American values 
and moral validity apparent to others.  Fourth, the balanced mid- and long-term strategy 
that includes both coercive measures and inducements (p. 25).   
The current GWOT faces an ever-changing threat that focuses on retro tactics 
against new age technologies.  The terrorist acts against the U.S. during the past 20 years 
should key us into creating a new deterrence strategy that can be used against all forms of 
terrorist actors.  Strategists and military planners involved with planning and directing 
hostage rescue operations against terrorist organizations must have a thorough 
understanding of deterrence and coercion in order to know how to prolong the 
negotiations process to buy time for a rescue attempt. 
E. COERCION STRATEGY 
The second aspect critical in the dynamics of a hostage siege is the ability to 
coerce an opponent.  In his book Bombing to Win, Robert A. Pape argues that a denial 
strategy is the strategy most likely to succeed when trying to coerce an opponent.  This 
strategy must be directed towards military and not civilian vulnerabilities.  In hostage 
rescue terms, the strategy must be directed and focused on the terrorist organization as 
opposed to the state that sponsors the act.  He argues that governments are often willing 
to tolerate considerable civilian punishment to achieve important territorial aims; 
therefore, coercion based on punishing civilians will not succeed.  He considers that the 
key to success in conventional coercion is not punishment but denial, which he describes 
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as the ability to thwart the target state’s military strategy for controlling the objectives in 
dispute, or in other words, the threat of military failure (Pape, 1996, p. 10).  Denial 
provides the critical leverage in conventional coercion and not the threat to civilians, 
which he calls punishment (p. 10).     
1. Coercion by Denial Strategy 
This is the  most likely to succeed because it targets the opponent’s military 
ability to achieve its territorial or other political objectives, thereby compelling 
concessions in order to avoid futile expenditures of further resources.  Denial campaigns 
focus on the target state’s military strategy (p. 19).  Coercion by denial operates by using 
military means to prevent the target from attaining its political objectives or territorial 
gains (p. 13).  The object is to wear down the opposition government’s political authority 
gradually, and thus its ability to field military forces, rather than to destroy their forces in 
battle (p. 29).  Denial may require stopping the opponent from either gaining or holding 
territory, depending on whether the threatening assailant’s goal is to prevent an attack, 
stop an ongoing attack, or force territorial concessions (p. 10).  The government of 
Colombia fought Pablo Escobar and his drug cartel head to head for over 20 years 
without any progress.  Eventually the government switched strategies and commenced a 
full scale denial campaign against Pablo Escobar and his supporters, going after everyone 
and everything that had any ties to the cartel.  In 1993, Pablo Escobar got sloppy and 
came out of hiding making a cell phone call from an apartment building in Medellin. The 
Colombian secret police stormed the building and shot Escobar dead within moments.   
According to Pape, the key to the success of denial strategies rests in the 
interactions of the two sides’ military strategies.  The U.S. attempts to coerce North 
Vietnam by interdicting supply lines failed from 1965-1968 because of the North 
Vietnamese guerrilla war strategy; in 1972, a similar air campaign did coerce Hanoi 
because the North had shifted to a conventional war strategy.  Coercion succeeded 
against the North only when they changed their strategy from guerrilla (invulnerable to 
air power), to conventional offensive operations (vulnerable to air power).     
2. Coercion by Punishment Strategy 
Robert A. Pape says that punishment operates by raising costs or risks to civilian 
population.  It is not limited to hitting civilians in population centers (p. 13).  Pape 
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considers surrender long before complete military defeat as an outstanding coercive 
success.  Coercion fails when the coercer stops his coercive military actions prior to 
concessions by the target, or when the coercer imposes his demands only after complete 
defeat of the target.  This is why punishment rarely works (p. 15).  Punishment generates 
more public anger against the attacker than against the government.  Heavy punishment 
does not produce disruptive behavior; it induces political apathy.  Light punishment 
equals popular anger toward the attacker and demands reprisals (p. 25). Punishment 
strategies attempt to raise the costs of continued resistance.  They inflict suffering on 
civilians by damaging the target state’s economy.  Blockades are indiscriminate 
instruments because they affect the target’s economy as a whole (p. 44), as in the case of 
the 40-year economic blockade on Cuba.   
In coercion by nuclear punishment, Pape says that governments are often willing 
to take civilian punishment to achieve important territorial aims and that no state can 
stand up under nuclear punishment (p. 10).  Pape also says that nuclear punishment 
would earn the coercer a reputation of unparalleled barbarism and that its destructiveness 
overwhelms any possible resistance (pp. 20-21).  However, in a hostage crisis scenario 
the terrorists might be holding thousands of hostages or a whole city block with a WMD.  
In this type of situation, nuclear punishment might be a serious consideration for an 
option in the form of a low yield nuclear device against the state that sponsors the 
terrorist organization, or against what that specific group holds dear.      
3. Coercion by Risk Strategy  
This is like punishment strategy; it inflicts suffering on civilians and raises the 
probability of suffering costs.  It is the same as punishment, but gradual (p. 18).  The 
coercer puts at risk essentially the same targets as in punishment strategies, but the key to 
risk strategy is to inflict civilian costs at a gradually increasing rate rather than destroying 
the entire target (kill the hostage concept).  Operations are slowly escalated in intensity in 
order to convince the opponent that much more severe damage will follow if concessions 
are not made (p. 19).  Punishment or risk strategies fail because outcomes of conventional 




4. Coercion by Decapitation Strategy 
This strategy strikes at key leadership and telecommunications facilities.  It is 
partly punishment and partly denial; it is punishment if the attacker’s intent is to destroy 
coercive control so that the effect of punishment (coup, rebellion) can work better.  It is 
denial if it is part of an effort to produce strategic paralysis.  There are three types of 
decapitation:  leadership, political and military.  Leadership decapitation is attacking 
specific leaders on the assumption that they are keeping the war going.  This will not 
work because it is very hard to find and kill key individuals.  In addition, because 
idiosyncratic wars are rare, it is not just one group of leaders who are the cause.  Finally, 
succession is very hard to predict.  This argument applies in a situation similar to Cuba 
with Fidel Castro; if he is ever removed from power, there will always be more like him 
waiting to take charge.  On the other hand, some might argue that decapitation strategy 
can work against insurgent groups; it seems to be the case with Peru’s Shining Path, after 
the arrest of its leader Abigail Guzman.  After his capture and public mockery on national 
television, the organization disintegrated and most of its leadership turned itself in to the 
Peruvian authorities.  
According to Pape, Political decapitation is attacking the regime’s instruments of 
internal control, so that punishment can work, resulting in successful coup or rebellion.  
There are several reasons why this will not work:  conflict generates loyalty to the 
regime; internal monitoring of the people by a regime is hard to stop; and finally, the 
Army is usually the key and conflict increases its loyalty to the regime.  In military 
decapitation, you are attacking national command and control to induce strategic 
paralysis.  This does not work because military operations do not require lots of 
command and control (C2); C2 cannot be disrupted for too long.  Pre-delegation of 
command makes strategic paralysis difficult (pp. 80-85).   
F. MAJOR OBSTACLES IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
1. Cognitive Approach 
The third aspect critical in the dynamics of a hostage siege is the ability to coerce 
an opponent.  Lebow describes in Cognitive Closure and Crisis Politics, how decision-
making differs considerably from the rational process.  He explains how poor judgment 
during the decision-making process is a direct result of perceptual distortions.  He uses 
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the psychological perspective on decision-making because of the insights it offers into the 
causes and effects of misperception.  The two main psychological approaches he uses are 
cognitive and motivational.  By understanding these, we can overcome or diminish major 
obstacles in crisis management, specifically with the decision-making process.   
The first school of psychology Lebow uses is the cognitive approach, which 
emphasizes the ways in which human cognitive limitations distort decision-making.  
People generally try to keep their beliefs, feelings, actions, and cognitions mutually 
consistent (p. 102).  In other words, people see what they expect to see.  Robert Jervis 
contends that it is impossible to explain crucial foreign policy decisions without reference 
to policy-makers’ beliefs about the world and the motives of other actors in it.  These 
beliefs, organized as “images”, shape the way in which policy-makers respond to external 
stimuli.  Jervis describes this cognitive consistency as “rational and irrational” 
consistency.  Rational helps us make sense of new information as it draws upon our 
accumulated experiences.  It also provides continuity to our behavior.  Cognitive 
consistency becomes irrational when it closes our minds to new information or different 
points of view.  During irrational consistency, an expectation or belief is reinforced by 
new information that supports it; information that challenges this expectation or belief is 
ignored (pp. 104-105).  
To the extent that a policy-maker is confident in his expectations, he is also likely 
to make a decision before sufficient information has been collected or evaluated.  Jervis 
calls this premature cognitive closure.  This leads to the masking effect, where in the 
same way that information compatible with an established belief is interpreted in terms of 
this belief, the development of alternative beliefs that the information might also support 
are inhibited.   
Another way in which irrational consistency influences decision-making is by 
desensitizing policy-makers to the need to make value trade-offs.  Finally, irrational 
consistency is manifested in the form of post-decisional rationalization.  People seek 
strong justification for their behavior and rearrange their beliefs in order to lend support 
to their actions.  Post decisional rationalization therefore makes policy-makers less 
responsible to the import of critical information (pp. 106-107). 
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2. Motivational Approach 
The second school of psychology used by Lebow deals with the importance of 
motivation as a source of perceptual distortion.  Janis and Mann say that decision-makers 
are emotional beings, not rational calculators (p. 107).  In their conflict model, Janis and 
Mann consider a pattern of incrementalism, when original policy is only marginally 
changed in response to threatening information and then changed again when more 
trouble is encountered.  This occurs when a policy-maker is deeply committed to his prior 
course of action (COA) and fears that if he deviates from it, he will fail (p. 107).  If he 
perceives serious risks in his current policy, he will experience psychological stress.  If he 
cannot find a better strategy, it will result in a pattern of defensive avoidance, 
characterized by efforts to avoid fear-arousing warnings50.   
Defensive avoidance can be subdivided into procrastination, shifting 
responsibility for the decision, and bolstering.  In bolstering, the policy-maker has lost 
hope of finding a satisfactory policy option and he is unable to postpone a decision or 
shift the responsibility to someone else.  If the policy-maker eventually finds an 
alternative to failure, he then looks to see if he has enough time to implement it.  If he 
cannot find the time, his response will be one of hypervigilance.  Hypervigilance is 
characterized by indiscriminate openness to all information and a corresponding failure to 
determine whether that information is relevant, reliable, or supportive.  A decision maker 
under hypervigilance will likely be influenced by the will and opinions of others (p. 110).  
All these patterns are means of coping with psychological stress, and lead to poor 
decision-making, as they all have some kind of cognitive distortion.        
Possible solutions to these barriers or obstacles would be to establish well-
coordinated COA teams or red teams that can aggressively war-game every possible 
situation, ensuring the decision maker remains unbiased by the psychological factors of 
cognition and motivation.  This is the job of a dedicated and well-coordinated staff, 
                                                 
50 A good example of this situation occurred with Egypt’s Force 777—Egypt’s counterterrorist 
national level unit, during a botched rescue attempt in Cyprus in 1978 against the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).  The Egyptian Ministry of Defense (MOD) neglected to inform the Cyprus 
authorities of his plan and that Force 777 was coming.  During Force 777’s approach to the hijacked 
airplane, local police opened fire on them assuming they were reinforcements for the terrorists.  After an 80 
minute gun battle, fifteen Force 777 operators and Cyprus police officers lay dead on the tarmac.  The 
Egyptian MOD was a victim of incrementalism and defensive avoidance in wanting to believe his original 
plan would work and by not informing local authorities of his intent.  
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creating as many filters as possible, cross checking every possible outcome through 
multiple “murder boards” and “sanity checks”.  However, even with a good staff that 
provides filters to all these psychological barriers you can encounter bureaucratic 
politics, as in the case of Colonel (retired) Beckwith overpowering his staff with his 
persuasive demeanor, while developing the Iran rescue plan.  Domestic politics will also 
influence and drive the decision-making in skewed ways such as President Carter under 
tremendous stress during the months leading up to DESERT ONE and the political, 
civilian, and military pressures to resolve the situation. 
3. Guidelines for Success in Crisis Management 
Alexander George’s Guidelines for Success in Crisis Management is a seven-step 
checklist for crisis management of war-threatening crises.  Understanding these 
guidelines, mainly the absolute need for synchronized military/civil relationships and 
their constant coordination with all decision and policy makers during hostage crisis 
management, helps us overcome obstacles or at least diminish them: 
a. Political Control of Military Options 
George argues that when the military has taken control or is a big part of 
the crisis COA, the military leadership tends to steer or divert the COA as the plan 
develops.  Inadvertently, the plan changes and decisions are made, based on the military 
plan and its restrictions and limitations.  It is important to maintain military options as 
flexible as possible to eliminate these biases.   
b. Slow Military Developments to Allow Diplomacy to Work 
By giving the military free rein, and not slowing them down, we send 
them into harm’s way, and they will act when given the opportunity (“trigger happy”); it 
is best to hold forces back until the last resort or until all the options have been weighed.  
Once committed to the crisis site, they will most likely push for an engagement (TF 
Ranger in Somalia). 
c. Coordinate Movement of Military Forces with Diplomatic 
Actions 
Military movements and intervention must move in parallel steps with the 
civil-diplomatic strategies and plans of actions.  In the invasion of Haiti, former President 
Carter was conducting diplomatic talks while Ranger forces waited on a carrier off the 
coast of Haiti and the 82nd Airborne Division was flying overhead, ready to conduct a 
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combat parachute jump into the country.  Rumors of U.S. counterterrorist units deploying 
to Peru for a possible rescue attempt during the early days of the crisis, prompted MRTA 
members to release 225 hostages, to include all AMCITS.  
d. Coordinate Diplomatic Actions and Signaling with Military 
Forces 
Again, synchronization is the key.  This must be done through CMO 
(civil-military operations), non-governmental agencies (NGO’s), or other governmental 
agencies (OGA’s) such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as in 
the case of Hurricane Andrew in Homestead, Florida. 
e. Do Not Threaten War 
War should be the last resort.  If you go in threatening war, you are not 
giving the defender an option or a way out.  The belligerent attitude must be toned down.  
In a hostage rescue crisis, the tactical option should be the last resort.  
f. Diplomatic and Military Options Should Signal a Preference for 
Negotiated Solutions 
Negotiations should always be the tone of the mediators.  This should be 
the main effort, just as a negotiator is the “on scene commander” at a hostage crisis site.  
When negotiations fail, then you send in the assault force as a last resort. 
g. Diplomatic Proposals and Military Actions Should Leave the 
Opponent a Way Out 
There must be solutions afforded by military and diplomatic means, 
allowing the defender a way out.  If you box him in, then what is the use in negotiating 
when he knows it will be a loss?  He must see a way out in order for the crisis to dissolve. 
G. CONCLUSION 
It is critical to understand how the policy maker’s image of the opponent and the 
policy maker’s general beliefs about bargaining strategy and the danger of escalation 
influence decisions.   In addition, it is important to understand how crisis-induced stress 
and fatigue have a detrimental effect on the performance of decision makers and their 
advisers.  Effective crisis management, according to Alexander George, requires policy 
makers to develop and employ strategies and tactics that are sensitive to both diplomatic 
and military considerations.  The use of military force in these situations must be 
carefully employed as an instrument of last resort.  The Somalia intervention and the 
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events that culminated with the battle of Mogadishu in which 18 TF Ranger personnel 
died, are perfect examples of how George’s 7 steps were not used properly.  It was 
evident throughout the operation that there was a massive breakdown of information 
between the experts in the Department of State and the civil and military leadership of the 
Department of Defense.  After it was all over, the President and the Secretary of State 
admitted that they had not paid enough attention to what was going on in Somalia.   
The use of SOF and counterterrorist forces should be looked at carefully, 
specifically in the GWOT, so as not to “burn out” these valuable assets on 
“hyperconventional”51 targets of opportunity; these forces are in a critical high demand 
and only constitute only a small percentage of our Armed Forces.  The commitment of 
national level assets to “take down” a target or handle a crisis could have tremendous 
implications for our government and could influence world opinion.  These forces are 
usually tasked with the most critical and sensitive target sets, as in the case of the ill-fated 
Operation EAGLE CLAW (DESERT ONE), or the raids to capture the warlord Aideed 
and his militia leaders in Somalia.  These failures lead to political repercussions and 
blowback that cannot be taken lightly.  Careful crisis management will help prevent 
some.   
We can ill afford to make mistakes as a nation, causing irreparable damage to our 
foreign policy and reputation.  Careful handling of a hostage crisis, weighing every 
possible option, informing all those responsible in the civilian/military leadership is 
crucial.  The crisis manager as well as the Administration should take a hard look at the 
developing crisis before committing SOF or national assets as a quick fix.  The risks vs. 
benefits of committing these forces must be weighed and war-gamed carefully between 
all civilian/military leaders prior to committing the military arm of the DIME 
(instruments of national power). 
                                                 
51 The term hyperconventional is used here to designate conventional targets or missions that would 
normally be assigned to conventional forces, but have been elevated to being executed only by SOF or 
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VI. GAME THEORY AND THE HOSTAGE RESCUE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The science of strategic thinking, known as Game Theory, is the art of outdoing 
an adversary, knowing that the adversary is trying to do the same to you.  The strategic 
thinking of a hostage crisis using game theory analysis through mathematical modeling 
will help us represent the imperatives that are critical for success in the rescue of hostages 
and how these imperatives transform as a function of time.  By having a thorough 
understanding of Game Theory and its applications in hostage rescue operations, we can 
increase the chances of a successful resolution to a crisis.   
In their article Terrorism and Game Theory, authors Sandler and Arce describe 
six intrinsic reasons why Game Theory is an appropriate tool for examining hostage 
rescue operations.  First, game theory captures the strategic interactions between 
terrorists and a targeted government, where actions are interdependent and, thus, cannot 
be analyzed as though one side is passive.  Second, strategic interactions among rational 
actors, who are trying to act according to how they think their counterparts will act and 
react, characterize the interface among terrorists.  Third, in most hostage crises, each side 
issues threats and promises to gain a strategic advantage.  Fourth, terrorists and 
government abide by the underlying rationality assumption of Game Theory, where a 
player maximizes a goal subject to constraints.  Fifth, Game Theoretic notions of 
bargaining are applicable to hostage negotiations and terrorist campaign-induced 
negotiations over demands.  Sixth, uncertainty and learning in a strategic environment are 
relevant to all aspects of terrorism, in which the terrorists, government, or both are not 
completely informed (Sandler & Arce, 2003, pp. 1-2).   
In order to develop an optimal solution to the problem of a hostage crisis, 
different aspects of Game Theory will be applied to the Hostage Dilemma52, to propose  
                                                 
52 This is the author’s title given to the defined problem.  I could not find any official reference to such 
dilemma. 
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alternatives and give a theoretical explanation to the best possible outcomes, as well as 
mapping out the best moments in time (windows of opportunity), to launch a rescue force 
to maximize success53.   
1. Problem Defined 
Utilize Game Theory to develop and reinforce my thesis hypothesis of a hostage 
crisis biorhythm, describing the best strategy to resolve the Hostage Dilemma. 
2. Background 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is probably the best-known strategic game.  It was 
originally formulated by mathematician Albert W. Tucker in 1950 and has since become 
the classic example of a "non-zero sum" game in economics, political science, 
evolutionary biology, and of course game theory.  A "zero-sum" game is simply a win-
lose game such as tic-tac-toe; for every winner, there is a loser; if I win, you lose.  Non-
zero sum games allow for cooperation.  There are moves that benefit both players, and 
this is what makes these games interesting.   
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two-person variable-sum game in which each player 
has two strategies, confess or not confess (see Figure 16).  To confess dominates not-
confess for both players, even though the mutual confession outcome, which is the 
unique Nash54 equilibrium in the game, is worse than the mutual no-confession 
(Freeman, 1997, p. 583).  The key strategic factor about this game is that there are 
possibilities of mutual advantage, as well as conflicts of interest.   
If both sides play their dominant strategy (A row, C column), thus maximizing 
their payoff, their outcome will be worse than if both followed the strategy of minimizing 
their payoff (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, pp. 14, 91).  If we assume that both players are 
"rational", then we can assume they both want the minimum time in jail; each prisoner 
will choose his dominant strategy.  During simultaneous moves, the rational decision for 
                                                 
53 The project format followed was taken from A First Course in Mathematical Modeling 3rd Edition 
course textbook, as per Chapter 2.1 (pp. 54-59), following the guidance of Professor Frank R. Giordano, 2nd 
Reader for my thesis project. 
54 John F. Nash (1928-  ) of Princeton University, an American mathematician who did path breaking 
work in both noncooperative game theory (the “Nash equilibrium” is named after him) and cooperative 
game theory, especially on bargaining, in which axioms or assumptions are specified and a unique solution 
that satisfies these axioms is derived.  Nash obtained his results in the early 1950’s, when he was only in 
his 20’s, after which he became mentally ill and was unable to work.  Fortunately, he has made a 
remarkable recovery and has now resumed research (FAPP, pp. 586-587). 
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Prisoner #1 would be to confess (hoping for 0 years in prison payoff), and for Prisoner #2 
to confess (looking also at a 0 years in prison payoff).  However, if Prisoner #1 elects to 
confess (10 or 0 years payoff), then Prisoner #2 could get either 10 or 20 years in prison.  
If Prisoner #1 elects not to confess (20 or 1 years payoff), then Prisoner #2 could get 
either 0 or 1 year in prison. 











Figure 16.   Author’s Representation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
Now, if both prisoners act "irrationally" and do not confess, each would get only 1 
year in prison.  This we assume to be the irrational choice since it is a worse payoff than 
0 years in prison, and could possibly assure 20 years in prison for either prisoner.  The 
two prisoners have fallen into what is known as the dominant strategy equilibrium.  To 
confess is the dominant strategy in the Prisoner’s Dilemma; when both prisoners confess, 
they have fallen into the dominant strategy equilibrium.  This case illustrates how 
individuals rationally pursuing their own best interests end at an outcome, which is 
unfortunate for both of them (Straffin, 1993, p. 73).  Confessing dominates not 
confessing for both players, even though not cooperating, which is the Nash equilibrium 
of the game, is worse for both players than the cooperative outcome (row B, column D).   
Another example of two-person game of partial conflict is the Game of Chicken 
(see Figure 17), which leads to worse outcomes than those desired.  In the Game of 
Chicken, each player has two strategies:  to swerve to avoid collision or not to swerve 
and cause a collision.  Neither player has a dominant strategy.  The compromise outcome, 
(both players swerve) and disaster outcome (neither player swerves) are not Nash 
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Equilibria; the other two outcomes (one player swerves and the other does not) are Nash 
Equilibria. 










1 is Worst  
Figure 17.   Author’s Representation of the Game of Chicken 
 
How does the Game of Chicken differ from the Prisoner’s Dilemma? Not 
confessing in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (the crash when both players drive straight) is the 
worst outcome in Chicken; it is the best outcome in the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  In the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, not confessing while the other player does confess is the worst 
outcome for a single player.  In Chicken, one player wants to drive straight while the 
other one swerves; neither side has a dominant strategy.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma has one 
Nash equilibrium point while the Game of Chicken has two Nash equilibrium points.  
The cooperative outcome in each dilemma is not a Nash equilibrium point. 
B. CASE STUDY 
For the purpose of this analysis, I will use Operation CHAVIN DE HUANTAR 
covered in Chapter III, from Lima, Peru.  This operation was a complete success, and it 
serves as a great example to present the game theory analysis as well as the strategic 
decision making process for this thesis. 
C. VARIABLES   
If we apply the analysis of a Prisoner’s Dilemma to a hostage rescue crisis, we 
will  find  that  the  dominant  strategy  equilibrium  is  for  the rescue force to conduct an  
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assault and for the terrorists to kill all the hostages!  Now, if cooperation and negotiations 
are involved through arbitration, allowing concessions to be made by both parties, the 
outcome will be much different. 
The two players considered in the Hostage Dilemma game are the terrorists and 
the rescue force.  The following is a list for possible strategic options (legend) to be used 
for the Hostage Dilemma:   
From the terrorists’ point of view, they have two possible moves: 
 A :  Do Not Kill the Hostages (hostages are safe).  This implies that the threats 
were not carried out, and that the hostages were safely released, either by the terrorists or 
by the rescue force. 
 B :  Kill the Hostages (hostages die).  This implies successfully carrying out the 
threat, resulting in the death of all the hostages.   
From the rescue force’s point of view, they also have two possible moves: 
 C :  Meet the Demands (terrorists safe).  This move implies giving in to the 
terrorists’ demands, without conducting the rescue. 
 D :  Conduct Assault (terrorists are killed).  This move implies successfully 






















At the start of the crisis, the initial tendency for both players is to negotiate 
because governments with or without a rescue force usually tend to want to play it safe, 
while the terrorists want to make their demands and hopefully have them met (Tay & 
Meng, 2003, p. 3).  As the situation develops, the equilibrium will depend on each 
player’s initial credibility and reputation in carrying out threats or promises.  The 
following explains how the payoffs were assigned to each player, listed from best to 
worse (4 to 1):  
1. Rescue Force 
 4 :  Don’t Kill the Hostages, Conduct Assault (AD):  The hostages are rescued, 
the terrorists are dead, and the government did not give in to any of the terrorists’ 
demands, thus discouraging future acts of hostage taking.  
 3 :  Don’t Kill the Hostages, Meet Demands (AC):  The hostages are safe, the 
terrorists’ demands are fulfilled, and the government gave in to the terrorists’ demands, 
thereby encouraging future hostage takings.  
 2 :  Kill the Hostages, Conduct Assault (BD):  The hostages are dead, the 
terrorists die at the hands of the rescue force, but the government did not give in to the 
terrorists’ demands and thus discouraging future hostage takings.   
 1 :  Kill the Hostages, Meet Demands (BC):  The hostages are dead, the 
terrorists’ demands are fulfilled, and the government gave in to the terrorists’ demands, 
thereby encouraging future hostage takings. 
2. Terrorists 
 4 :  Don’t Kill the Hostages, Meet Demands (AC):  The terrorists’ demands are  
fulfilled, the hostages are safe, and the terrorists live to carry out future acts of terrorism. 
 3 :  Kill the Hostages, Meet Demands (BC):  The terrorists’ demands are 
fulfilled, the hostages are dead, and the terrorists have established credibility for their 
organization.  The terrorists will also die at the hands of the rescue force for not keeping 
their promise.     
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 2 :  Kill the Hostages, Conduct Assault (BD):  The terrorists’ demands are not 
fulfilled, the hostages are dead, and the terrorists die at the hands of the rescue force. 
 1 :  Don’t Kill the Hostages, Conduct Assault (AD):  The terrorists’ demands are 
not fulfilled, the hostages are safe, and the terrorists die at the hands of the rescue force.   
For the terrorists, their best possible payoff comes by not killing the hostages 
while still getting their demands met (4, 3).  They do not have a dominant strategy.  The 
rescue force on the other hand, has a dominant strategy at “D” by conducting the assault 
and hoping that the hostages come out alive (AD or BD).  This is demonstrated by doing 
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Figure 20.   Author’s Representation of the Nash Equilibrium and Dominant Strategy 
 
In this situation, if we assume that the country with the crisis at hand has a known 
“non-negotiations” policy towards terrorists (Peru), the terrorists have no other choice but 
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to kill the hostages.  The rescue force will be better off by choosing to conduct an assault 
regardless of the terrorists’ decision; the terrorists will make a decision based on this 
knowledge.  The Nash Equilibrium point is (2, 2), or “conduct the assault” and “kill the 
hostages”.  This solution represents a serious problem with the idea of an equilibrium 
point as a solution concept for non-zero sum games.  Furthermore, this is a dangerous 
stance to assume; during multiple runs of the same scenario, it is better to cooperate in 
the end than to cheat.  However, most governments believe, as in the case of Peru, that by 
adopting this no-negotiations stance toward terrorists, they can limit the game model to a 
“single game model”.   In other words, this hard stance, coupled with a first-time 
successful rescue attempt, will be sufficient to deter future terrorists from taking 
hostages.  By never having a follow up or second game, the terrorists can never “punish” 
the government or the rescue force.   
In order to achieve an outcome that is better than (2, 2), or that the terrorists do 
not kill the hostages, the government and its rescue force must “cheat” the system and 
deceive the terrorists by making them believe that their demands will be met (see Figure 
20, deception move).  This is a delicate balance of an in-depth negotiations strategy, 
which will buy time for the rescue force to achieve maximum Surprise, Intelligence, 
Operator’s Skills, and Deception.  Assuming negotiations will take place with the 
terrorists, we must then look at the problem and analyze a better outcome than the one 
presently available without communications.  For this, we move to the Nash Arbitration 
Scheme to maximize the best possible outcome for both players. 
E. ANALYSIS 
The challenge is to find a method of arbitrating games, which does not involve 
illegitimate manipulation of utilities, does take into account strategic inequalities, and has 
a claim to fairness.  In Game Theory and Strategy, Straffin tells us that this reasonable 
arbitrated solution to a non-zero-sum game should be first, Pareto Optimal—there should 
not be another outcome that is better for both players, or better for one and equally good 
for the other—and second, at or above the security level for both players. 
The set of pure or mixed outcomes that satisfy these two conditions is called the 
negotiation set of the game (Straffin, 1993, p. 104).  If we plot the outcomes for the 
Hostage Dilemma in a coordinate plane, where the horizontal coordinate is the terrorist’s 
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payoff and the vertical coordinate the rescue force’s payoff we can see that we have a 
Pareto Optimal55 dashed line between the AC and AD outcomes (Figure 21).  After we 
have plotted the points representing the pure-strategy outcomes, mixed strategy outcomes 
are represented by points in the convex polygon enclosing the pure-strategy points.  This 
polygon is called the payoff polygon for the game.  The Pareto Optimal outcomes for a 























Figure 21.   Author’s Representation of the AD to AC is Pareto Optimal Line 
In a non-zero sum game, the terrorists’ optimal strategy in the terrorists’ game is 
called the terrorists’ prudential strategy.  The value of their game is called their security 
level.  This value represents the minimal outcome the terrorists can guarantee to 
themselves if the rescue force turns hostile and conducts the assault.  The position (2, 2) 
                                                 
55 About 1900 the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto proposed that we should not accept an economic 
system if there is another available system that would make everyone better off (Straffin, 1993, p 67).  To 
be acceptable as a solution to a game, an outcome should be Pareto optimal.  An outcome is non-Pareto 
optimal (Pareto inferior), which would give both players a higher outcome (move Northeast on the graph), 
or give one player the same payoff but the other player a higher payoff (move North or move East).  An 
outcome is Pareto optimal if no such other outcome exists (cannot move Northeast, North, or East from a 
Pareto optimal outcome).   
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in this situation becomes the Status Quo Point, or the intersection between the terrorist’s 
and the rescue force’s security levels; neither party can do any better than (2, 2).  In a 
non-zero sum game, a player’s counter-prudential strategy is his optimal response to his 
opponent’s prudential strategy.        
F. STRATEGIC MOVES IN THE HOSTAGE DILEMMA 
There are essentially four strategic moves to be considered that could possibly 
improve one player’s outcome:  moving first (or allowing the other player to move first), 
making a threat, making a promise, and a combination of a threat and a promise.  In the 
Game of Chicken (Figure 17), if a player moves first, he seizes the initiative, and the 
other player will be forced to swerve off the road.  The player with the first move has the 
most desired outcome.  If the players cannot decide who moves first, they can achieve the 
same effect by making a credible commitment; the problem is how to make that 
commitment credible to the other player.  If there were a way for Truck #1 to make a 
commitment and then cutoff all communications with Truck #2, then Truck #2 would be 
forced to assume the commitment was credible and swerve off the road.   
Communication can allow other attempts to make commitments besides those on 
the first move.  By making a threat, a player can convince another player not to take his 
best possible payoff.  However, in order to make the threat work, it must be harmful in 
some kind of way to both players to make it believable.  There are games where threats 
will not work such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma; neither player has a threat, what is needed 
is a promise.  In order for a promise to work, it must be harmful in some kind of way to 
the player making the promise, and beneficial to the opposite player.  Other games 
involve a combination of threats and promises to change the outcome.  For all the 
strategic moves such as commitments, threats, promises, or combination of both, the 
major problem is making them credible.  In addition, when a game is played several 
times, the players who can communicate can use the repeated play to try to establish 
credibility of their commitments, threats or promises.  Repeated play also gives players 
who cannot communicate a chance to make implicit strategic moves (Straffin, 1993, p. 
89).  The most important factor to note is that it can be an advantage in a game to be able 
to lower some of your payoffs to achieve the best possible outcome. 
107 
1. Sensitivity Analysis of the Hostage Dilemma 
The first step in doing a sensitivity analysis for the Hostage Dilemma is to look at 
all the possible moves for both players as follows: 
We know the Nash Equilibrium point to be BD (2, 2).  This game has one 
Dominant Strategy at the rescue force’s “D”.  The desired strategy for the rescue force is 
for the terrorists to move to “A”. 
• If the terrorists move to “A”, then the rescue force will move to “D”. 
• If the terrorists move to “B”, then the rescue force will move to “D”.  
• If the rescue force moves to “C”, then the terrorists will move to “A”.  
This is also considered a good first move for the game, allowing the rescue 
force to secure a better payoff than the Nash Equilibrium point of BD.  
• If the rescue force moves to “D”, then the terrorists will move to “B”. 
Next, we look at the possible threats and promises from the rescue force’s point 
of view for this game: 
a. Threat 
The rescue force wants the terrorists to move to “A”.  A threat would have 
the following form:  if the terrorists move to “B”, then the rescue force will move to “C”.  
This does not satisfy the definition of a threat—the rescue force has no threat position.   
b. Promise 
A promise would have the following form:  if the terrorists move to “A”, 
then the rescue force moves to “C”.  This satisfies the definition of a promise, and it will 
work if the terrorists can assure in some way that they will not kill the hostages once their 
demands are met.  


















Figure 22.   Author’s Representation of the Terrorist Security Level 
 















Figure 23.   Author’s Representation of the Rescue Force Security Level 
 
We can see that the Status Quo remains at (2, 2), both players’ security 
level.  The game has a saddle-point at 2; the value of the game is 2 as expected.  Now we 
move to the geometric method to find the Nash Arbitration Point.  On the coordinate 
plane, we draw horizontal and vertical lines from the Status Quo Point, intersecting the 
Pareto Optimal Boundary forming a triangle.  A triangle is formed by a vertical line A, a 
horizontal line B, and the Pareto Optimal Boundary line C.  From the midpoint of side A, 
we draw a horizontal line that intersects side C.  The point defined on side C  is the Nash 
Point.  In the case that this point lays on an extension of the Pareto Optimal Boundary, 
the nearest point on the Boundary itself is the Nash Point.  From the coordinate plot in 
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the Hostage Dilemma (Figure 24), we can observe that the Nash Point is the coordinate 
(4, 3) AC. 
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Figure 24.   Author’s Representation of the Nash Arbitration Geometric Method 
 
We can confirm our data by doing the same procedure algebraically.  We 
know that the line segment AD to AC is the Pareto Optimal line for the Hostage 
Dilemma.  We can find out the equation of this line ( y mx b= + ), by using the two 
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Now that we have the equation of the line AD to AC, we can use the 
coordinate plane to find the Negotiation Set or those points on the Pareto Optimal 
Boundary that are above the security level for both players.   We consider the vertical line 
that represents the Terrorist’s Security Level.  We find the intersection of the terrorist’s 
security level line with the line just found by substituting the “x” value of the Status Quo 
Point.  We then go to the midpoint between the status quo point and the point just found.  
The y-coordinate is the y-coordinate of the Nash Point.  We the find the x-coordinate of 
the Nash Point by substituting the Nash y-coordinate just found in the equation of a 
line, y mx b= + . 
To find the intersection point on the segment C, we use the coordinates for 
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To find the midpoint to the vertical line segment we first need the length 
of segment A:   
(3.67 2) 1.67A = − =  




We add this distance to the y value of 2, to get the midpoint of 2.83.  Now 
we have the new coordinates for the midpoint of segment A (2, 2.83).  To find out the 
coordinates on the intersection for the Pareto Optimal Boundary, we follow the same 
procedure to find the x value: 
1 13
3 3
y x= − +  
1 132.83 ( )
3 3
x= − +  
11.50 ( )
3
x− = −  
4.5x =  
Now we have the new coordinates for the intersection on the segment C 
(4.51, 2.83).  Again, this point lies on an extension of the Pareto Optimal Boundary; the 
nearest point on the boundary itself is the Nash Point, or AC (4, 3). 
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Figure 25.   Author’s  Representation of the Nash Arbitration Algebraic Method 
 
Knowing that the best possible outcome during the Hostage Dilemma is 
not to kill the hostages and meet the demands, the negotiator is faced with the job of 
trying to lower the payoffs of the terrorist force (4), at the same time as he tries to raise 
the payoffs of the rescue force (3).  It will be the only way for the best possible outcome, 
AC (4, 3), to be attractive for the rescue force while still satisfying almost all of the 
terrorists’ demands. 
2. Interpretations 
Does this mean that by cheating now, the government of Peru will be punished for 
their decision in the long run?  Apparently not.  The Peruvian government has adopted a 
hard stance towards acts of terrorism, and it is in a way trying to change this infinitely 
repeated game model into a single game model.  The belief is that by denying any 
success to hostage takers on their first try, the terrorists will be deterred from ever 
attempting another act of terrorism in that country, knowing that the government of Peru 
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will not negotiate with terrorists.  The government of Peru did not worry about cheating 
the terrorists nor being punished in the future because they hope that there will never be 
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VII. THE HOSTAGE DILEMMA REVISITED 
In the first section of this chapter, we discussed the players’ negotiating 
maneuvers as specific moves in a noncooperative game and the rationality assumptions 
were expressed using the Nash Equilibrium.  We then explored the implications of 
different strategic moves and the importance of establishing communications 
immediately, in order to proceed with the negotiations process to buy time or deceive the 
terrorists.   
By using the game theory approach to the Hostage Dilemma, we can represent all 
possible strategic moves available to the players involved in order to come up with a 
Pareto Optimal outcome.  This outcome is the best possible outcome for both players; if 
there is an outcome that would lead both players to a better solution, the decision reached 
is not Pareto Optimal.  Stated differently, an agreement is Pareto Optimal if one party 
cannot do better without some other party doing worse.  Consider the following scenario 



























Figure 26.   Author’s Representation of a Pareto Optimal Outcome 
 
Rose and Colin are making plans to go out for dinner together and are considering 
four choices.  Colin’s favorite food is Chinese and cannot eat seafood.  Rose’s favorite is 
seafood and cannot stand Chinese.  They have a several options to decide where to go for 
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dinner.  They could both go for Chinese, or they could both go for seafood.  They both 
like Mexican food occasionally, but both prefer Mediterranean.  The Pareto Optimal 
outcome for this problem can be solved on XY plot; Colin’s preferences for dinner listed 
on the Y-axis, and Rose’s preferences for dinner on the X-axis.  For Colin, Chinese food 
is at the top of his choices, followed by Mediterranean, Mexican and lastly, seafood.  For 
Rose, seafood is at the top of her choices, followed by Mediterranean, Mexican, and 
lastly Chinese.  Both Colin and Rose prefer Mediterranean to Mexican.  The decision to 
go to a Mediterranean restaurant is better than the Mexican restaurant for both Colin and 
Rose.  This choice is Pareto Optimal because the only choice that is better for Colin 
(Chinese) leaves Rose worse off.  Consequently, the only decision better for Rose 
(seafood) leaves Colin worse off (similar example found in Negotiations and Resolving 
Conflicts: An Overview, E. Wertheim, 2004).      
A. EXPANDING UTILITIES; A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH 
It is only appropriate that we revisit the Hostage Dilemma and apply respective 
utilities to the initial model (see Figure 18).  It is time to consider more thoroughly the 
process of assigning numbers to outcomes, for the applicability of game theory to real 
situations rests on the assumption that this can be done in a reasonable way (Straffin, 
1993, p.49).  Assigning utilities only on a 1-4 scale automatically assumes that both 
players have the same interests and each value is directly proportional to its 
corresponding opponent’s value.  This could be the case in a given hostage situation, but 
it will most likely be the exception rather than the norm. 
Each party has a set of objectives they wish to achieve, and a certain number of 
utility points.  These utility points are assigned in order to distinguish the complex and 
different preferences of both players, in a way that will allow us to see the subtle 
differences.     
There are multiple hostage scenarios with different sets of players and variables 
for unusual situations.  For the scope of this work, I have subdivided the players into four 
main categories to address the peculiarities of certain hostage situations and its players:  
Guerrilla Terrorist, Fanatic Terrorist, Competent Rescue Force, and an Incompetent 
Rescue Force.  The following descriptions summarize the four different groups. 
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1. Guerrilla Terrorist 
The guerrilla terrorist defines a group that is fighting for a specific political cause 
with an intended long-term goal in sight.  This group is more concerned about the long-
term effects and ramifications to its organization.     
2. Fanatic Terrorist 
On the other side of the spectrum, we categorize the fanatic terrorist who is more 
concerned about the shock value of the actual incident itself; short-term goals mean more 
than the long-term outcomes.   
3. Competent Rescue Force 
The competent rescue force designates a country with an internal national level 
rescue unit that is highly trained and capable of responding to a hostage crisis at a 
moment’s notice. 
4. Incompetent Rescue Force 
This category designates a country without an internal national level rescue unit 
capable of responding to a hostage crisis, or a country with an ill equipped rescue force 
that cannot respond to a crisis at a moment’s notice; this group is not ready to respond to 
a crisis without outside help from another country’s national level rescue force.   
The following tree diagram shows the possible combinations for each player and 
optimal solution sets using game theory principles for decision-making.  Each player is 
portrayed showing all possible moves and outcomes utilizing the principles of Game 
Theory.  This model helps visualize and describe the rationale behind the decision 
process of meeting the demands of terrorists, sending a rescue force, or buying time to 
develop a deception. 
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Figure 27.   Author’s Representation of the Hostage Crisis Decision Model 
 
B. UTILITY VALUES 
Each player has been assigned a set of utilities for each specific case, ranging 
from 0-10, 10 being the best.  Although the process is somewhat subjective, it forces the 
planner to dig deep into the respective utilities of each player and come up with a more 
accurate representation of the stakes at hand.  For the rescue force as well as the terrorist 
force, there are four sets of utilities addressed respectively.  These components, when 
added, provide the overall utility for that specific move.   
1. Rescue Force Evaluating Criteria 
a. Hostage Outcome 
The hostage outcome criterion represents the outcome of the hostages 
once the crisis has ended. 
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b. Terrorist Endstate 
The endstate for the terrorists represents the final outcome of the terrorists 
once the crisis has ended.  When looked at as a rescue force utility, it represents the 
physical status of the terrorists individually as well as an organization.   
c. Government Reputation 
The government reputation represents the gain or loss of face value for the 
government of that specific country at the end of the crisis.  Did the government violate 
national policy?  Was the government defaced throughout the process?  What kind of 
blowback is the government expected to receive because of its decision? 
d. Risk to Rescue Force 
The risk to the rescue force represents the physical risk to the rescue force 
measured in lives lost.    
2. Terrorist Force Evaluating Criteria 
a. Demands Met or Not 
This criterion represents whether the terrorists original demands where 
met or not at the end of the crisis.  
b. Terrorist Credibility / Reputation 
This criterion represents how well the terrorists held to their original 
threats and promises, and what the implications of their actions are for them and their 
organization during future acts of terrorism. 
c. Risk to Terrorists 
This risk represents the physical risk to the terrorists in lives lost.    
d. Future of Organization 
The future of the organization represents the possibility of growing as an 
organization for future operations.  If the rescue force conducts the assault, terrorists will 
most likely die, reducing the numbers of the terrorist organization for future acts; 
therefore, a Conduct Assault move will earn the terrorists a lower score.  
Scenario “A” (Figure 28) is the basic model used during our previous 
explanation of the Hostage Dilemma.  It is the scenario best described by Operation 
CHAVIN DE HUANTAR in Lima, Peru discussed earlier.  Here the terrorists represent a 
competent force with a thought out agenda in line with their political motives and 
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guerrilla warfare strategy.  Even though Peru did not initially have a very competent 
hostage rescue capability, because of the prolonged duration of the hostage crisis, they 
were able to create a very competent and ready counterterrorist force.  
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G. NEW SOLUTIONS 
The following diagrams are the four scenarios with their respective assigned 
utilities: 
 































Figure 32.   Scenario A and Scenario B with new utilities 
   































Figure 33.   Scenario C and Scenario D with new utilities 
 
H. CONCLUSION 
Conceding to terrorists’ only encourages the proliferation of future hostage 
taking.  Regardless of the difficulties involved in trying to maintain a hard-line against 
terrorists, it is better than to give in to their demands.  From the game matrix in Figure 18 
(the Hostage Dilemma), we see that the dominant strategy for any country with a 
competent rescue force is to conduct the rescue attempt, whether the terrorists decide to 
kill the hostages or not.  This strategy reinforces the “no negotiations” policy of most 
countries towards terrorists.  The terrorists will thus have to make a decision based on 
this knowledge. 
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The Nash Arbitration Method tells us that there is a better solution to the Hostage 
Dilemma than the Status Quo Point.  To achieve this, immediate communications must 
be established between the terrorists and the country’s government where the crisis is 
taking place, in order to prevent a catastrophe.  It is up to the targeted country to decide 
whether to meet the demands of the terrorists, or to cheat the system by deceiving the 
terrorists and conducting an assault.  
Governments should always take a harsh and unyielding stance against terrorists, 
even if it is the riskier move.  Yielding to terrorists’ demands will only encourage 
terrorism.  The best stance a country can take is to make it obvious that it is united 
against acts of terrorism.  The commitment to this cause reduces the infinitely repeated 
game into a single game—one that is unplayable for the terrorists because, unless they 
decide to stop participating in the game, they will always find themselves at the losing 
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VIII. OPERATION EAGLE CLAW56:  DISASTER AT DESERT ONE 
A. BACKGROUND 
No study of hostage rescue operations is complete without looking at the Iran 
hostage rescue attempt of 1980.  The following chapter is an organizational study of Joint 
Task Force 1-79 and its participation in Operation EAGLE CLAW.  Using Henry 
Mintzberg’s Structures in Fives:  Designing Effective Organizations as a base reference 
for organizational theory, the discussion focuses on the organizational structure of the 
joint task force and the design flaws, which ultimately led to the disaster at DESERT 
ONE.  The discussion focuses on how, even though the operational structure and integrity 
of individual elements in this organization remained sound, the myriad of layers and the 
lack of connectivity among these elements led to the catastrophe at DESERT ONE.  
More importantly, this case study will show how a failure to follow the hostage rescue 
principles of intelligence, surprise, operator’s skill, and deception, and how they relate to 
the crisis biorhythm, caused the mission to fail.  It will demonstrate the importance of 
having a sound military strategy that deals with these incidents, focusing on the hostage 
rescue principles and the crisis biorhythm. 
The Iran hostage rescue attempt in April of 1980 is one of the greatest military 
misfortunes of modern warfare, specifically in the hostage rescue arena.  It is a perfect 
example of how highly skilled and trained personnel, placed in an uncertain environment, 
fail at what they are supposed to do best.  Throughout history, counterterrorist forces 
have been sent into high-risk situations in uncertain environments and have often failed 
in the face of uncertainty.  Botched rescue operations by international CT units such as 
the failed rescue of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics of 1972 (see Chapter IX, 
section B), the failed rescue of Egyptair Flight 648 in Malta in 1985 (see Chapter IX, 
                                                 
56 Operation Eagle Claw was the operational name given to the execution phase of the rescue mission; 
the cover name was “Rice Bowl”, “…chosen by General Vaught to avoid a hint of linkage with Iran, 
hostages or rescue” (Lennahan, 1998, p.38).  “The term Eagle Claw was reminiscent of the operational 
nickname (Eagle Pull) given to the earlier emergency evacuation of Phnom Penh, Cambodia” (p. 127).  
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section C), and the most recent disaster at the Moscow theatre57 in 2002, are just some of 
these terrible examples.  Other examples involve U.S. forces in Iran, Grenada58, 
Panama59, and Mogadishu60, all with highly skilled and well-trained personnel facing 
catastrophic consequences due to factors beyond their control.  Why do highly skilled and 
well-trained personnel fail to do what they are perfectly capable of doing when they are 
placed in a high risk and complex environment?  The answer to this question rests in a 
lack of understanding at the strategic and operational levels, of the hostage rescue 
principles—intelligence, surprise, operator’s skill, and deception.     
While the complexity of such operations is in part to blame for these misfortunes, 
other common denominators can be found among all of these cases.  Combining Lucien 
Vandenbroucke’s list of recurrent problems for SOF operations with Cohen and Gooch’s 
theory of failure, and looking at the common trends found throughout these operations, 
we can find some common patterns that cause these misfortunes and reinforce the 
hypothesis for a hostage rescue model.  
In Perilous Options, Lucien Vandenbroucke describes four factors as recurrent 
problems for SOF operations:  faulty intelligence, poor interagency and inter-service 
cooperation and coordination, inadequate information and advice to decision makers 
                                                 
57 On 26 October 2002, Russian special forces stormed the Palace of Culture theatre in the heart of 
Moscow, to rescue over  900 hostages from 50 Chechen terrorists holding them captive.   Before assaulting 
the theatre, the soldiers pump fentanyl through the air ducts (a heroin-like chemical 100 times more potent 
than morphine), to put everyone to sleep (the SF soldiers had all been treated with the antidote to the gas).  
Over 112 hostages died from the effects of the gas and 700 more were injured.  All the terrorists were 
killed. 
58 Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada - Salinas Airfield Recon/Beacon Emplacement where four 
SEALs drowned during a paradrop jump into the ocean.  The failure of the teams to complete the mission 
was a blow to SEAL Team SIX, which was facing its first major test in an armed conflict. The Rangers 
completed their jump without the CCT acting as air controllers, but the lack of intelligence did not give the 
planners and operators the confidence often sought prior to an operation. Further, the operation had the 
effect of pushing back H hour - first to 0400 hours then to 0500 hours on 25 Oct 1983. The new H hour had 
far reaching consequences, because the remaining special operations were to be conducted now in daylight, 
instead of the customary comfort of darkness. To break this basic tenant of special operations warfare was a 
decision, which cost numerous U.S. lives, and was probably the biggest mishap of the Grenada invasion  
(Information retrieved from http://www.navyseals.com/ops/salinas.html; last accessed on 16 August 2004 ). 
59 Panama:  Operation JUST CAUSE - Paitilla Airfield:  A planned 5-hour mission to destroy General 
Noriega’s private plane turned into a 37-hour operation. Four SEALs died and eight others were wounded 
after Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) surprised the SEALs with a well-planned ambush.  (Information 
retrieved from http://www.specialoperations.com/Operations/Just_Cause/Operation_Profile3.htm, last 
accessed on 16 August 2004). 
60 Task Force Ranger operation in downtown Mogadishu to apprehend General Aideed and several of 
his lieutenants.  The operation against a mediocre enemy resulted in 18 U.S. soldiers dead and many others 
wounded.   
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(wishful thinking), and excessive control of mission execution from afar.  In Military 
Misfortunes, Cohen and Gooch present their version of a model for failure for these types 
of operations, as a direct result of a combination of four circumstances.  First, an 
overestimation of abilities, also known as overconfidence and/or wishful thinking.  
Second, a lack of contingency planning and preparation.  Third, an internal drive and 
pressure to excel at all cost.  Fourth, a critical need for the mission to be accomplished 
during a limited window of opportunity.  Taking into consideration both models of 
failure, we can superimpose our model for the principles of hostage rescue operations, 
and see the criticality of each principle.   
As we look at military hostage rescue failures involving SOF units, we can 
identify the same common denominators in all of them.  In the case of the Iran hostage 
rescue attempt, numerous factors caused the disaster—the faulty intelligence, the failure 
to have the appropriate mix of operator skills, a complete lack of a deception plan, and 
the loss of the element of surprise.  These factors coupled with the failure of not 
monitoring the best windows of opportunity through the crisis’ biorhythm, were a recipe 
for disaster.     
B. CASE STUDY 
On 4 November 1979, a mob of Iranian Islamic militants, using a crowd of 
student protesters as a deception screen, overran the American Embassy in downtown 
Teheran.  More than 100 people were taken hostage, including many Americans.  On 25 
April 1980, after five months of tense negotiations to release the American hostages had 
failed, President Jimmy Carter sent a military rescue mission into Iran, composed of 
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, to rescue the American hostages.  The rescue 
mission was aborted61 after three RH-53D helicopters broke down en route to Dasht-e-
Kavir, the remote desert site known as DESERT ONE.  During exfiltration procedures 
from DESERT ONE, two aircraft collided while attempting to reposition during 
refueling; eight crewmembers, five from the U.S. Air Force and three U.S. Marines, died 
as a result of the engulfing fires from the crash.  The mission was a complete failure, and 
                                                 
61 The tragic sequence that occurred during helicopter refueling at DESERT ONE was subsequent to 
the mission abort decision, but is often misinterpreted as the cause of mission abort (Buck, 2002, p. 47). 
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even though a new rescue plan was developed, no other rescue attempts were made to 
free the hostages. 
 
Figure 34.   Concept and Mission Plan (Information retrieved from 
http://www.1sos.com/desertone.html, last accessed on 28 Jul 04) 
 
C-130s were to fly the rescue force from Masirah to DESERT ONE. 
Helicopters, flown from the USS Nimitz, would carry the rescuers to a 
hideout near Tehran. The next night, the commandos were to drive to the 
embassy to release the hostages. The helicopters then were to carry the 
rescuers and hostages to the abandoned Manzariyeh air base, where C-
141s would fly them to Egypt.  (Kreisher, 1998, p.1) (Information and 
illustration retrieved from http://www.1sos.com/desertone.html, last 
accessed on 28 Jul 04). 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. Organization of JTF 1-79     
Five days after the siege Teheran, President Carter directed the formulation of 
military option plans for a possible rescue attempt.  On 12 November 1979, the rescue 
force was officially organized as a Joint Task Force under the designation of JTF 1-79.  It 
was  established  specifically for resolving the hostage situation in Iran.  At this point in  
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time, there was no formal Counter-Terrorism Joint Task Force in the United States.  At 
the end of the hostage ordeal, JTF 1-79 would become the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC)62. 
The JTF was initially composed of 32 personnel from the Army, Air Force, Navy, 
and Marines.  Two liaison officers from the CIA, who coordinated JTF interface with 
both the CIA and the State Department, supported it.  On mission execution day, the 
combined number of military personnel directly involved in the rescue mission exceeded 
1,000 (389 who entered Iran and 569 that provided direct support, plus another 100 or 
more intelligence, cartographic and communications personnel that supported off 
stage)(Lennahan, 1998, p. 114).   




Chairman of Joint Chiefs
of Staff (CJCS)
Commander Joint Task 
Force (COMJTF)














Commander Air Force 













•Mobile Fuels Det / TAC
•C-141S / MAC
•CCT / MAC
•KC-135s / SAC •Airdrop Riggers / 
•Army Airborne
 
Figure 35.   Author’s Representation of JTF 1-79 Task Organization (Kyle, 1995, 
p.68) 
The structure of the assault party was highly fractured.  The rescue element 
consisted of approximately 13 separate sub-elements, without a single unifying factor that 
could join them as one element (Flynt III, 1995, p. 11).  The critical element in this task 
                                                 
62 The transfer of mission responsibility from JTF 1-79 to the new Joint Special Operations Command 
(JSOC) began in mid-December and was concluded on 22 December 1980.  On that date, JTF 1-79 was 
formally deactivated, and JSOC assumed responsibility for rescue planning and command (Lennahan, 
1998, p. 184). 
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organization was the assaulter or ground raiding force (Delta).  This would be the center 
of gravity for the organization, headed by  Colonel Charles A. “Charlie” Beckwith.  A 
Special Forces officer, Colonel Beckwith had been officially tasked two years prior to the 
hostage situation to create a counterterrorist (CT) capable force.  Beckwith had been 
advocating the creation of such a unit, similar to the British Special Air Service (SAS) 
since the early 1960’s.  His concept was a low-visibility CT night action by a relatively 
small, specially trained force equipped with unique weapons and equipment (Lennahan, 
1998, p. 9).   
This organization (Delta) was structured using the squadron structure for task 
organization (after the British SAS model).  A squadron was formed of several units, 
each composed of sixteen men; each unit was then divided into smaller groups of four 
men or two teams of eight men each.  By July of 1978 the first squadron of Delta Force 
was formed.  Its real test would come in the events to follow at DESERT ONE, barely a 
few hours after Delta’s final certification exercise in November of 1979.  For Operation 
EAGLE CLAW, Colonel Beckwith organized his force into three 16 men elements:  a 
Red team, a White team, and a Blue team.  In order to support the personnel 
requirements, Colonel Beckwith had to use everyone in his unit; instructors, staff 
personnel, and other support personnel. 
a. Vertical or Horizontal Differentiation 
Organization differentiation is the differences in cognitive and emotional 
orientations among managers in different functional departments, and the 
difference in formal structure among these departments (Daft, 1998, p. 
93).   
Each unit planned, trained, and rehearsed at their designated home station, 
with the intent of coming together at some point for a mass dress rehearsal in the end, 
which never occurred. “The larger the organization, the more elaborate its structure – that 
is, the more specialized its tasks, the more differentiated its units, and the more developed 
its administrative component” (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 124).  Vertical differentiation for the 
JTF as well as the raiding force was very minimal.  There was great horizontal 
differentiation among the multiple elements at the tactical level.  As time went by and the 
hostage situation developed, the organization grew bigger and more specialized tasks 
surfaced.  This created more differentiation in all the sub-elements.   
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When external environment is complex and rapidly changing, 
organizational departments become highly specialized to handle the 
uncertainty in their external sector (p. 93).   
The need to refuel more and more aircraft, the addition of fighter jets and 
AC-130’s  for combat air support, the addition of another 12 men element from Germany, 
all had a major impact in the connectivity of elements and the overlapping of layers in the 
JTF. 
b. Departmentation 
The unique mission that the JTF was faced with required a unique type of  
organizational structure, one that was non-existent.  There was no template to handle a 
CT scenario of this type.  The intent for the organization of JTF 1-79 and the raiding 
force can be best characterized as a matrix.   
By using a matrix structure, the organization avoids choosing one basis of 
grouping over another; instead, it chooses both….As a result, matrix 
structure sacrifices the principle of unity of command (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 
86).   
The unity of command concept for JTF 1-79 was non-existent throughout 
the operation.  During the events at DESERT ONE, nobody knew who had the authority 
or the final decision.  General Vaught did not want to relinquish authority of command to 
any specific individual on the ground, resulting in four component commanders trying to 
make decisions in an unstable and complex environment.  
Vertical decentralization is the dispersal of formal power down the chain 
of command.  Horizontal decentralization refers to the extent to which non-managers 
control decision processes (p. 99).  It brings the technostructure, the support staff, and the 
operating core into the power system (p. 118).  An organization that is vertically 
decentralized will coordinate its decision-making largely by mutual adjustment (p. 102).  
In horizontal decentralization, formal power rests with the operators who are empowered 
to elect managers of the strategic apex. 
Each element within the JTF was organized to work as a machine 
bureaucracy, with total control of its own sub-elements.  The original design of the 
organization to work as a matrix did not work due to the operational restrictions imposed.  
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The JTF had no proper unity of command and did not understand how to organize the 
various units to work effectively.  General Vaught figured that since each element was 
made up of professionals, experts in their own field, that the whole group would 
automatically come together once on the ground. 
c. Centralized-Decentralization 
A structure for an organization is centralized when all the power for 
decision-making rests at a single point in the organization, in the hands of one person.  A 
structure is decentralized when that same power is dispersed among many people.  
Organizations go to a decentralized structure when all the decisions cannot be understood 
or handled by one person.  A decentralized organization allows for quick responses to 
local conditions.  It also stimulates motivation (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 97).  The more 
complex the environment, the more decentralized the structure.  Within the 
organizational structure of the raiding force, each element was centralized, but within 
each one of those elements, it was completely decentralized.  Here, the layers between 
the JTF elements are separated and lead to the disaster at the refueling site.  Each small 
element knew exactly what to do; they knew their respective chain of command and 
could act completely decentralized within that one element.  The layers got confused 
between each of the elements horizontally and vertically. 
DESERT ONE became a scene from hell itself.  None of the principles on 
the scene…was wearing any distinctive clothing or markings, and Kyle 
kept dashing from one plane to another and then among the 
helicopters….We lost unity of command, a paramount principle of war.  
Since I had at least some radio contact with every pilot on the landing 
zone, I should have strongly urged that Kyle stay in one place, a 
command-and-control point or tactical operations center where we could 
relay his questions and instructions through my combat controllers on our 
short-range intrateam radios or even by messenger on our motor bikes” 
(Carney and Schemmer, 2002, p. 91).   
This unclear chain of command prevented a coordinated effort among 
elements.  The designated leadership had no central location people could go to and ask 
questions, nor did the leadership have any specific uniform markings to identify them 
from the other operators. Absolute chaos resulted in the complete breakdown of 
communication within the elements on the ground as well as in the air:  the blocking 
force element (Rangers), the Assault Forces (Delta), the C-130’s on the airstrip, the 
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helicopters on the airstrip being refueled, the AC-130’s in the air, and the commanders of 
each element in their own little world at the JTF and on the ground.       
d. Standardization and Formalization 
Standardization is the extent to which similar work activities are 
performed in a uniform manner. …Formalization pertains to the amount of 
written documentation in the organization.  Documentation includes 
procedures, job descriptions, regulations, and policy manuals.  These 
written documents describe behavior and activities (Daft, 1998, pp. 15-
16).  
The older an organization, the more formalized its behavior (Mintzberg, 
1993, p. 123).  They adopt a “we have seen it all” attitude.  This might have been the case 
with several members of the JTF during the initial planning stages, but that atmosphere 
quickly dissipated as the operation grew more complicated and the uncertainty increased.  
For most of the raiding force, this was the first time to conduct an operation of this type 
and magnitude, specifically Delta Force.  Only a few members of the JTF had been 
involved with the Son Tay raid ten years prior.  Others were part of a temporary 
organization named “Blue Light63” which had been created from members of the 5th 
Special Forces Group (Airborne) to fill in the role of counter terrorist force while Delta 
was being formed. 
Standardization of work processes grows over an extended period, 
moreover, on this instance, the JTF and the raiding force had approximately 6 months to 
become standardized.  Some of the procedures and daily activities within separate 
elements became standardized, but due to the organizational design set up by General 
Vaught and the OPSEC restrictions, intermediate layers between elements became walls 
restricting the progress and cross-fertilization preventing standardization.   
e. Mechanistic or Organic 
Machine organizations are highly standardized.  In an organic 
organization, there is an absence of standardization.  The organization for the JTF and the 
raiding force was designed as a mechanistic organization, but it resulted in a highly 
organic organization with mechanistic sub-components that evolved into organic because 
                                                 
63 Blue Light was the interim counter terrorist force created to fill the gap, until Delta Force got 
certified in November of 1979, several hours prior to the US Embassy takedown.  The force was composed 
of specially selected personnel from the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and it was disbanded upon 
Delta’s approval by the NCA. 
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of the environmental factors, maybe too organic for such a set of tasks.  Too much 
leeway was given to each specific unit in conducting its own preparations and rehearsals; 
not enough attention was paid to a final dress rehearsal for everyone to come together.  
Because of the complex nature of each separate element’s mission and responsibility, the 
organization within each element was also highly organic. 
Communications between the air component elements were confusing and 
disjointed.  With the amount of aircraft involved in the operation, the JTF did not 
disseminate its communications plan between elements, causing one element to be 
completely unaware of what the other was doing.  This was one of the main reasons for 
the disaster:  if the pilots from the C-130’s could have communicated with the 
helicopters, they could have told them to fly at a different altitude in order to get out of 
the sandstorms.        
f. Fit Between Structure and Environment 
Mintzberg describes the fit between structure and environment with two 
hypotheses: (1) the congruence hypothesis, which states that effective structuring requires 
a close fit between the situational factors and the design parameters, and (2) the 
configuration hypothesis, which states that effective structuring requires an internal 
consistency among the design parameters (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 122).  Due to the complex 
environment that the raiding force was operating in, the organization was divided into 
multiple layers and sub-elements, without clear connectivity or unity of command.  The 
ignorance of the environmental factors by the leadership and the operators drove the 
operation into a catastrophic disaster.  The organization was put together with some 
resemblance of being mechanistic in nature, but it was left to become organic due to the 
nature of the operation and the uncertainty of the environment.  The multiple layers of 
JTF 1-79 and the loss of control and connectivity between elements prevented a proper fit 
for the structure within its environment (Figure 36).  We can observe how the 
environment clashed with the structure of the JTF and the raiding force.  The structure of 
the organization did not allow for a fit with the unstable environment. 
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Figure 36.   Author’s Representation of Elements and Compartmentalization of JTF 1-
79 at DESERT ONE 
 
g. Diversity of JTF 1-79 
The diversity of an organization refers to the number of markets it has to 
satisfy, that is, how many different types of products or services the organization 
provides.  
The organization faced with a single integrated market simply cannot split 
itself into autonomous divisions; the one with distinct markets, however, 
has an incentive to create a unit to deal with each (Mintzberg, 1993, p. 
225).  
Joint Task Force 1-79 was primarily designed to satisfy one specific 
market.  In other words, it had one mission:  to develop a hostage rescue plan that could 
be executed successfully at a moment’s notice to save the lives of the hostages.  JTF 1-79 
had a single purpose and mission—prepare a plan and train a force to rescue the 
American citizens illegally held in Iran, and be prepared to execute it on order 
(Lennahan, R., 1998, p. 39). 
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The overall goal for an organization is often called the mission—the 
organization’s reason for existence.  The mission describes the 
organization’s vision, its shared values and beliefs, and its reason for 
being (Daft, 1998, p.48) 
The military option to rescue the hostages was a last resort for the Carter 
Administration.  All diplomatic efforts had been attempted with no positive outcome; the 
Iranian oil embargo, the freezing of Iranian assets in American banks, and multiple 
negotiations between governments had all failed.  While the diversity for missions for 
JTF 1-79 was very low, the diversity of the supporting tasks to accomplish this mission 
was very complex and high.  Each element of the raiding force had a specific essential 
task within the operation in support of the overall mission.  Critical to the organization 
and the success of these tasks throughout the phases of the operation was the 
synchronization of all elements within the JTF, coming together at a specific place and 
time in Tehran 600 miles away from their staging areas.  The high diversity of tasks, the 
complexity of technology, and the high levels of uncertainty caused by the 
interdependence of elements in the raiding force, made synchronization impossible.  It is 
amazing that the whole force (minus two helicopters) still managed to assemble at 
DESERT ONE.  This high diversity of supporting tasks to accomplish the main mission 
can best be understood by looking at the core technology of the JTF. 
h. Core Technology of JTF 1-79 
The core technology of an organization refers to how the organization 
accomplishes its assigned tasks with the technical systems they have in place.  The 
development of the mission order for JTF 1-79 followed a similar process to the one 
described in the Joint Publication 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Plans and Policy: 
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Figure 37.   Task Architecture of JTF 1-79 (Joint Pub 5-00.2, 1999, p. IX-15) 
 
2. Phase I:  Planning, Preparation, and Rehearsals 
The complexities of planning a rescue, the scale of which had never before been 
undertaken, were huge.  Tactically conducting a rescue in a twenty-seven acre compound 
consisting of more than sixteen buildings holding upwards of 67 possible hostages at five 
different locations guarded by a force numbering more than 150, which in turn was 
supported by bands of armed zealot irregulars, was daunting.  Coupled with the above 
were a hostile (or at least questionable) government status and an unpredictable civilian 
population that was in the throes of a social revolution.  Compounding the problem was 
the fact that the rescue objective was located in a congested urban center more than 1,600 
miles from the nearest American military base.  The American Embassy was located 
almost dead center in the capital city, which held the potential to be very nasty hornet’s 
nest, once disturbed. 
In a nutshell, the situation was more challenging than any exercise, or 
series of “what if’s” problem-solving intellectual excursions ever 
conducted by REDCOM, Blue Light or Delta, or faced by the Israeli 
Defense Forces or the German CT-unit GSFG-9 (Lennahan, 1998, pp. 30-
31). 
To set up a rescue force that could accomplish the mission, the JTF conducted 
mission analysis processes in order to produce the operations order (OPORD).  The core 
technology within the JTF was simple in order to develop and produce the output of the 
order.  Once this master plan was approved, it was modified and improved as new 
intelligence surfaced throughout the hostage ordeal. 
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Once the master operations order (OPORD) was approved by the NCA, the JTF 
would wait for their “on order” execution call to conduct the operation.  In the meantime, 
the plan continued to be refined and modified by developing detailed mission essential 
tasks list (METL) and joint METL responsible for focusing the specific elements within 
the organization.  The METL and JMETL would serve a critical element in the core 
technology of the organization, providing a frame of reference for mission focus and 
success criteria.  Without these lists of tasks to focus the organization, the mission could 
not succeed. 
The orders process for JTF 1-79 followed the standard mission analysis format for 
the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP).  The following diagram describes the 
sequential nature for the planning process. 


































Figure 38.   Author’s  Representation of the MDMP Process(FM 101-5, 1997, p. 5-2) 
 
During the mission analysis phase of the operation, several mission-planning cells 
were developed to come up with different courses of action (COAs) on how to infiltrate 
the raiding force into Tehran and into the U.S. Embassy undetected.  These COA 
working cells or “option teams” were compartmentalized into different buildings adjacent 
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to the JTF; they were isolated from one another in order to keep one plan from being 
influenced by the ideas of another planning group.   
The option teams worked imaginatively and aggressively from 13 through 18 
November.  The courses of action examined included overland approaches from each of 
the neighboring countries.  Helicopter launches from each, maritime infiltration via the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, and both air-land and parachute entries were 
considered.  The teams included a person familiar with the logistic nuances of the 
possible options and launch environments, plus officers familiar with the mobility and 
operational needs of the strike force (Lennahan, R., 1998, p. 40). 
The complexity and uniqueness of command and control (C2) for this operation 
required a robust and highly reliable and secure communications network, from the NCA 
all the way down to the operators on the ground.  “Communications had reached a new 
high in technical achievement with the satellite radio systems” (Kyle, 1995, p. 225).   
Rod Lennahan describes in his book Crippled Eagle, four communication networks that 
were established prior to the operation.  Command Net Alpha provided the link from the 
NCA/CJCS in Washington to JTF Headquarters at Wadi Kena and to the alternate 
location at Masirah.  This was the primary net that connected all the moving pieces.  It 
included satellite, UHF and HF frequencies, plus telephone connectivity back to 
Washington.  Command Net Bravo provided command and control from JTF 
Headquarters to the various force elements, regardless of where they were.  This was the 
NSA network, which ran from Fort Meade through landline to the JTF, to the JTF 
headquarters in Wadi Kena.  This net also provided information on all early warning 
SIGINT hits from Iran, and forwarded information to the elements on the ground.  
Command Net Charlie provided intra-theater command and control, and served as a key 
link between those force elements not possessing the UHF satellite capability.  The CIA 
operated this network; it fed inputs from their regional headquarters in Virginia, to the 
JTF headquarters in Wadi Kena.  Finally, Command Net Delta provided the basic 
redundant capability and could serve as a primary path when desired.  This was the 
emergency net to fill in for any of the first three that went down (Lennahan, 1998, pp. 
120-122).  In addition, operators carried portable HF radios.  The overall communications 
platform relied on UHF satellites as the principle means. 
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Even though this highly technical communications system and network was in 
place, the operational restrictions and OPSEC requirements impeded the proper use of 
this designed network.  Communicators on the ground at DESERT ONE and aviators in 
flight could not effectively communicate with any of these nets.  The redundancy in 
networks was there, but it did not allow room for the connectivity between elements.  
Other examples of the technical systems critical to the operation were the tactical light 
beacons being used for the first time by the USAF Combat Control Teams to light up the 
airfield; motorcycles for speed during emplacement; the use of NVGs by the pilots as 
well as the assaulters; the use of minesweeping helicopters with internal fuel blivets for 
their lift capability and range; the use of new Forward Area Refueling Points (FARP) 
systems out of tanker aircraft into helicopters, and the use of special cutting tools and 
demolition charges for entry access into the embassy grounds by Delta operators. 
Overall, in this first phase of the operation the JTF had to establish a raiding force 
capable of assaulting the objective successfully, something that had never been done 
before by a U.S. counterterrorist force.  It also had to create and assemble an air 
component composed of fixed wing and helicopter aircraft to support the operation.  
They had to be able to fly long range, at night through mountainous high-risk 
environment and arrive on target with surgical precision.  They had to be able to conduct 
refueling operations from KC-130 and C-130 tanker aircrafts, and they had to be heavy-
lift type aircraft in order to support the fuel and personnel load requirements.  In addition, 
they had to be capable of landing and taking off from clandestine airstrips under blackout 
conditions and conduct refueling operations with helicopters.  Intelligence requirements 
generated the need for two survey teams to conduct clandestine reconnaissance; two 
teams had to be assembled and infiltrated undetected into Iran to conduct reconnaissance 
prior to the operation.  A combat search and rescue element had to be formed to provide 
coverage throughout the operations, including the reconnaissance missions.  In addition, 
the Ranger security force had their set of collective tasks regarding the airfield seizure 
and blocking positions along the roads at DESERT ONE. 
3. Phase II:  Approach and Assault 
The following diagrams for Operation EAGLE CLAW show the flight routes for 
day one and day two respectively, and the accident at DESERT ONE:  
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Figure 39.   Day 1 Night (Kyle, 1995, p. 204); Day 2 Routes (Kyle, 1995, p. 206) 
 
 
Figure 40.   Disaster Strikes (Kyle, 1995, p. 340) 
The rescue operation called for six MC-130’s to transport the assault into Iran to a 
remote desert landing strip named DESERT ONE, located 265 nautical miles from 
Tehran.  Simultaneously, eight RH-53 helicopters, with Marine pilots, would launch from 
an aircraft carrier in the Arabian Sea and rendezvous with the other elements at DESERT 
ONE (Mis, 1998, p. 3).  At DESERT ONE, the assault force would transload into the 
helicopters, while the helicopters refueled.  Afterward, the helicopters would transport the 
assault element to a remote mountain location fifty miles from Tehran, where they would 
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remain concealed until darkness fell again the following night.  The intent was to 
infiltrate the target area by vehicles64 under the cover of darkness and storm the embassy.  
During the post assault phase, the RH-53 helicopters were scheduled to fly to the 
embassy and recover the hostages and the rescue element.  From there, they would fly to 
another airstrip at Masirah, thirty-five miles to the south, already secured by a Ranger 
security team.  There, C-141 aircrafts would land, and all personnel would transload for 
their return flight to freedom.  One of the contingency plans known as PYTHON FORCE 
consisted of 90 Force Recon Marines led by Major Oliver North; they were prepositioned 
in the eastern sector of Turkey as a backup extraction element, ready to intervene if any 
of the helicopters or the assault element became trapped (Bolger, 1988, p. 126).      
4. Phase III:  Post Assault 
The operation never made it past DESERT ONE.  All remaining personnel were 
transloaded into the remaining C-141 aircrafts to return to their home stations, without 
ever attempting a follow up rescue.  Planning for a second rescue continued for the 
remaining part of the year, but no follow on rescue was ever attempted.  Eventually, all 
hostages were released minutes after President Reagan was inaugurated into office in 
1980.  The total duration for the hostage siege was 444 days. 
D. PRINCIPLES FOR HOSTAGE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
1. Intelligence 
Extreme OPSEC measures were detrimental to the overall execution of the 
operation.  None of the operational elements was allowed to speak to one another or to 
take notes and keep written products during the planning process.  OPSEC measures were 
completely violated at DESERT ONE, by abandoning mission capable aircraft with 
classified intelligence documents and communications cryptology still inside, without 
destroying any of it prior to exfiltration.  
The complexity of this operation required a high degree of intelligence assets and 
personnel to process it.  Initially the JTF only had one assigned intelligence officer; later 
three more intelligence officers were added.  Still, the ad-hoc nature of the JTF and the 
lack of coordination with other intelligence agencies coupled with inter-agency rivalries, 
proved to be fatal in coming up with an executable plan.  The lack of intelligence and 
                                                 
64 American operatives inside Tehran (pilot team) had already commandeered these vehicles. 
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HUMINT sources in Iran added to the environmental uncertainty of the JTF.  Two survey 
teams were launched by clandestine means prior to the operation:  one survey team with a 
combat controller from the Air Force to survey the landing strip at DESERT ONE and 
place landing lights, and another survey team to survey the actual grounds in Tehran and 
prepare a welcoming committee with vehicles.  Both of these operations were highly 
dangerous and proved to be very successful, but the intelligence collected during these 
operations was not disseminated. 
The weather conditions were critical in adding uncertainty during the operation, 
specifically for the pilots, increasing the difficulty of flying under such conditions.  The 
uncertainty of the condition in which the hostages were in as well as an increasingly 
hostile attitude by the government of Iran, added to the volatility of the environment, thus 
precipitating the President’s decision to act.  No one really knew the condition of the 
hostages.  The lack of contingency rehearsals added uncertainty during the infiltration 
phase.  The inexperience of the Marine pilots being placed in an uncertain environment 
that was inevitably hostile, and expected to conduct a high-risk, high skill level task with 
little or no preparation, was a recipe for failure. 
2. Surprise 
The element of surprise during EAGLE CLAW was never considered as a 
principle to provide leverage and achieve operational superiority over the enemy.  
Throughout all phases of the planned operation, there was an ever-present feeling of 
wishful thinking, hoping that each stage of the phased infiltration would work and that 
none of the elements would be compromised.   
Surprise was lost as soon as the rescue elements landed on DESERT ONE.  
Immediately upon arrival, the Ranger security element had to open fire on a passenger 
bus, creating large fires and explosions in the middle of the desert; surprise was 
impossible to recover after that one incident.  In addition, a vehicle infiltration into the 
target area, in the middle of Tehran, is considered an emergency deliberate assault.  Even 
if everything had gone as planned, the element of surprise would have been lost 
immediately preventing the assault force to take any advantage of it.   
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The principles of hostage rescue operations are very closely tied together; they 
depend on one another in order for the operation to work.  The proper intelligence was 
not available to provide a good deception plan that would allow the assault force to 
surprise the enemy.  This concept was gravely misunderstood by JTF 1-79.    
3. Operator’s Skills 
One of JTF 1-79’s biggest failures was the inability to match the technical 
systems to the operator’s skills.  In reality, General Vaught misused the robust 
communications package due to the OPSEC restrictions and the inordinate control of 
mission execution.  The new systems for the helicopters and the lack of experience of the 
Marine pilots caused great uncertainty, especially flying with night vision devices 
(NVDs); pilots complained of vertigo and could not see each other through the dust 
clouds.  JTF 1-79 failed to anticipate the proper number of aircraft required to conduct 
the operation by not taking into consideration the failure rates for the helicopter force.  A 
force of 8 helicopters was launched on mission day from the USS Nimitz, in hopes of 
having 6 helicopters arrive at the target site.  By doing a simple probabilistic analysis65 
for the helicopter force, using helicopter data and actual success ratios, we can calculate 
that in order to have 6 operational helicopters at the target site (assuming an optimistic 
80% reliability for each helicopter and a 95% probability of overall success), the JTF 
should have sent at least 10 helicopters.  The JTF also failed to anticipate changes in the 
environment by not having contingency plans to respond to the changing weather and 
aircraft mishaps.   A fatal error for the rescue operation was that no full dress rehearsals 
took place.  “Disparate groups of different units cobbled together in haste attempted to 
synchronize their work literally on the fly” (Carney and Schemmer, 2002, p. 100).  The 
very last rehearsal conducted by anyone in the raiding force had taken place three weeks 
prior to the operation.  Each element conducted its own rehearsal, but the force never got 
together as a whole.  It was assumed that everyone would do his job and get to DESERT 
ONE and to the objective on his own.  Many changes were made during the last three 
weeks prior to the operation, especially with the air movement.  The communications 
plan between elements was completely flawed; the operators and the C-130’s were the 
                                                 
65 Taken from the probabilistic analysis conducted by Captain Wayne Hughes, Jr., USN Department 
of Operations Research, Naval Post Graduate School, 8 September 1981, and discussed with Professor 
Giordano in the SO 3410 course during the Spring of 2003. 
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only elements with secure communications capability.  To make matters worse, there was 
no bump plan in place in case of aircraft failure.   
The very nature of a hostage rescue operation is a highly technical and complex 
endeavor.  It takes specially selected and well-trained individuals who are self-reliant and 
can operate well under pressure.  Special Operators cannot be mass-produced overnight; 
it is a long process of training and dedication to reach the level of professionalism 
required by JTF 1-79 personnel.  Delta Force had been activated only a few hours prior to 
the hostage situation.  Colonel Beckwith was alerted to the hostage situation on his way 
back from Delta’s final culmination and capabilities exercise (CAPEX).  This operation 
would be their validation and the opportunity for Colonel Beckwith to show off his new 
force. Each component of the force conducted a series of rehearsals throughout the 
planning phases of the operation.  Delta Force conducted over 90 rehearsals.  Overall, 
there were only seven combined rehearsals, each involving only a few of the components 
from the rescue force.   
The members of the newly formed Delta Force had just been officially certified 
and had tremendous pressure to excel and prove themselves as the world’s number one 
counter terrorist force.  On the other hand, the helicopter crews lacked the internal drive 
and pressure to excel.  The pilots and crews did not waste any time when it came time to 
abort the operation.  They failed to adapt to a complex environment and continue with the 
operation.  The pilots for the helicopter force received highly specialized training.  Flying 
at night with NVDs still was considered a dangerous operation, one rarely done by any 
aviator.  Pilots had to train extensively flying with NVDs.  The initial group of helicopter 
pilots had come from the Navy; after several rehearsals, the whole group was disbanded 
due to their inability to fly at night.  Col Beckwith and Col Kyle later would recruit 
Marine pilots to replace the Navy pilots.  Some would argue that the Marine pilots were 
given the mission only in order to have representatives from each service within the JTF.   
The Marine pilots had to go through a train up phase to become familiar with the 
new technology as well as with new helicopters.  RH-53D minesweeper helicopters were 
reconfigured and outfitted with fuel blivets for the extended flight to Tehran.  Marine 
pilots had to get used to flying these aircraft for extended periods, while under strict radio 
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silence, limiting their ability to check with one another. The JTF planners overestimated 
the ability of the helicopter pilots in accomplishing the mission.  The pilots had trained 
together as a group for a period of only five months with new equipment and helicopters, 
and it was assumed that this training would be enough.   
Not only did they not take care of them, but also the strange helicopters 
did not belong to them, they actually used them as “hangar queens”—
cannibalizing them for spare parts (Snook, 2000, p. 137).    
Col Beckwith identified this as a critical flaw in the plan in the very early stages 
of the planning phase, but he “wished” the problem away and figured it would eventually 
get resolved.  In addition, the assumption was made that since communications would 
only be conducted during emergencies, critical secure satellite communications 
equipment (SATCOM) was removed to reduce weight inside the aircraft.  The 
contingency plan for this was a series of signals developed by the crew chiefs (flashing 
lights and hand signals), which were useless in low visibility conditions.  The JTF 
overestimated their abilities by not looking back at previous operations and seeing what 
worked then, as in the case of the Son Tay raid ten years prior.  They failed to learn from 
previous experiences. 
The fixed wing pilots also received specialized training.  The refueling operations 
from KC-130 fuel tankers to helicopters in a clandestine airfield had never been done 
before.  Other options were explored, trained for, and tested, as in the case of airborne 
heavy drops with fuel blivets, but these proved too unpredictable.   Landing on a desert 
airstrip that had been surveyed five weeks prior, without knowing what condition the 
airstrip was in at the time of arrival, also had a big impact on the skill set and training for 
the pilots.      
4. Deception 
The deception plan for the operation was non-existent.  Deception for JTF 1-79 
was only seen as a means of survivability, by camouflaging helicopters and utilizing 
minesweeper equipment in order to eliminate their signature and preserve OPSEC.  The 
only resemblance of any deception plan was used by the advance party elements already 
in country, pre-staging the vehicles to be used by the assault force.  Their deception plan 
was based on survivability and not linked to a surprise attack.  With advance 
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reconnaissance elements already operating around the target area, it would have been a 
perfect opportunity to devise a distraction or some sort of a ruse to aid in the covering the 
assault force’s infiltration.  Deception allows operational leverage for the assault force, 
and it gives them the opportunity to surprise the enemy, based on accurate intelligence.  
None of these factors were at play during the operation.      
E. CONCLUSION 
At the conclusion of Operation EAGLE CLAW, and towards the end of 1980, the 
Department of Defense established the Holloway Commission66 in an effort to examine 
what went wrong with the operation and make improvements and recommendations to 
prevent another disaster of this magnitude.  Twenty-three issues were identified and 
investigated as a result of the operation, and eleven of these were categorized as having a 
direct impact on the outcome of the operation.  Colonel James H. Kyle lists four of these 
findings as critical in the failure of the operation.  First, alternate helicopter pilots (USAF 
Special Operations or Rescue Service H-53 pilots) should have been selected to team 
with Marines.  Second, helicopter aborts—pilots lacked certain knowledge vital to 
reaching an informed decision whether to abort or to proceed.  Third, enemy radar 
threat—helicopter pilots based low-level tactics on erroneous intelligence reports.  
Fourth, helicopter communications—pilots lacked secure modes of communication to 
receive vital mission information (Kyle, 1995, p. 365).  In the end, the Holloway 
Commission determined that the overriding cause for the mission abort was an 
unexpected helicopter failure rate and low-visibility flight conditions en route to Desert-
One (p. 365). 
While overconfidence in one’s abilities seems to be one of the most 
overwhelming common denominators in most of SOF failures, in the case of DESERT 
ONE it was the lack of confidence of the helicopter pilots that caused the decision to 
abort.  The inexperience of the Marine pilots flying the helicopters, the mechanical 
failures of the helicopters, and the reluctance of the pilots to continue and complete the 
mission, were the root problems of why the operation was called off.  Colonel Beckwith 
                                                 
66 The Holloway Commission, named after its chairman retired Admiral James L. Holloway III, was 
created to examine the organization, planning, coordination, direction, and control of the Iran hostage 
rescue mission with an eye towards recommending improvements in these areas for the future (Kyle, 1995, 
p. 363). 
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did not exhibit overconfidence when it came time to stick to his abort criteria of no less 
than six helicopters, based on labor and the tasks to be accomplished by his operators.  
This is actually the overall theme for Colonel Kyle’s book The Guts to Try67.  At the end 
of the book, he mentions that the mission could have been completed if the helicopter 
pilots had had the guts to try.  
F. BIORHYTHM OF OPERATION EAGLE CLAW 
Intelligence, Surprise + Deception, Operator’s Skill for Hostage Taker
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Figure 41.   Author’s Representation of Operation EAGLE CLAW’s Biorhythm 
 
Operation EAGLE CLAW did not follow the principles proposed in this thesis, 
nor did it track the operational biorhythm for the crisis as it related to intelligence, 
surprise, operator’s skills, and deception; these factors were not understood or tracked by 
anyone in the JTF.  In the end, the failure at DESERT ONE helped expose some critical 
shortcomings in the U.S. Armed Services and its organizations regarding combating 
                                                 
67 “To you all from us all for having the guts to try” was the note left on two cases of beer given to the 
JTF 1-79 personnel by British mercenaries serving in the Omani Air Force, after the disaster. 
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terrorism operations.  The organization of JTF 1-79 gave birth to the concept of Joint 
Operations.  In the fall of 1980, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) was 
created from the recommendations of the Holloway Board.  In 1982, the 1st Special 
Operations Command (SOCOM) was created at Fort Bragg, fielding a third Ranger 
Battalion and a Ranger Regimental headquarters.  In the following two years, TF 160th 
Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the 96th Civil Affairs and the 4th Psychological 
Operations Battalions, as well as other Special Forces Groups and USAF Special 
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IX. SHORT CASE STUDIES 
A. DE PUNT TRAIN HIJACKING; HOLLAND, MAY - JUNE 1977 
1. Background and Case Study 
On 23 May 1977, a group of nine South Moluccan terrorists seized a train 
traveling between Assen and Groningen, in northern Holland, while another four 
occupied a nearby school in Bovensmilde.  Fifty-one people were held hostage on the 
train and 110 inside the school (Harclerode, 2001, p. 280).  The terrorists demanded the 
South Moluccan independence from Indonesia; they also wanted the release of several 
South Moluccans held in Dutch jails as well, and they wanted an airplane.  To emphasize 
their demands, they shot the train driver and dumped his body on the tracks. 
Negotiations lasted almost three weeks, in which time the South Moluccans 
released all but four of the hostages at the school and several hostages at the train.  Dutch 
authorities devised an ingenious plan to gain the children at the school.  They laced the 
food to be delivered to the children with a mild virus, causing an epidemic inside the 
school and giving all the children a terrible case of diarrhea.  With the situation out of 
control, the terrorists were forced to release the children.   
At the train however, the situation had deteriorated terribly.  The terrorists were 
becoming very impatient at the lack of response to their demands.  Meanwhile, members 
of the Dutch Marines of the BBE (Bijzondere Bijstandseenheden – Special Support Unit), 
swam across a canal near the train and placed technical surveillance equipment to 
monitor conversations and pinpoint the exact locations of the terrorists.  They also placed 
explosives in the front of the train to be used as a diversion during the upcoming assault.  
Police officers dressed as Red Cross personnel to deliver food to the train gained further 
intelligence.  Intelligence was also gathered from the released hostages who were 
thoroughly debriefed by the police authorities.  The BBE had a detailed picture on how 
many terrorists there were, what weapons they carried, how many were on guard at a 
given time, and the specifics on the train.   
By 10 June 1977, negotiations were at a stand to, so the decision was made to 
launch a simultaneous assault on the train and at the school.  At 0435 hours, F-104 star 
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fighters from the Royal Netherlands Air Force flew right over the train and kicked 
straight up, using their afterburners to create a distraction for the terrorists while the 
assault force moved in.  The whole train shook from the vibration caused by the jets, and 
the hostages all went for some kind of cover.  Snipers provided covering fires, acquiring 
selected targets as the assault force proceeded to blow the train doors and scale the sides 
of the train.  The diversionary charges placed earlier on the front of the train were set off, 
and the BBE assault element stormed the train.  Seven terrorists were killed and two 
surrendered.  Two hostages were killed in the firefight accidentally when they disobeyed 
orders from the BBE marines to lie down.  The whole assault lasted only minutes and 
was a complete success.  Meanwhile at the Bovensmilde school, another contingent of 
the BBE marines assaulted the building in armored vehicles and successfully rescued all 
four hostages, capturing the four remaining terrorists (p. 282).   
2. Principles for Hostage Rescue Operations 
a. Intelligence 
The BBE marines and the Dutch authorities maximized the use of the 
negotiations process to gain time and gather intelligence.  They successfully debriefed all 
released hostages in depth, gathered special reconnaissance using undercover porters to 
deliver food, and used special teams to infiltrate and get close to the target to emplace 
technical surveillance equipment to pinpoint the terrorists and their intentions.  The BBE 
used their sniper-observer teams effectively well in advance; they provided eyes on the 
target continuously and provided effective cover up to the point of execution, by giving 
last minute intelligence reports over their radios.   
b. Surprise  
The element of surprise was gained through the effective use of a well-
developed deception plan, excellent operator’s skills, and a synergistic approach to 
intelligence.  The use of F-104 aircraft to shake and rattle the train with afterburners 
completely disoriented everyone on the train, causing all the hostages to lie down on the 
floor in fear for their lives.  The use of sniper fires, diversionary demolition charges in the 
front of the aircraft, and a carefully positioned assault force with the right breaching 
charges, all acted in concert to give the assault force the maximum element of surprise. 
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c. Operator’s Skills 
Members of the BBE marines are highly skilled operators who know their 
business.  They constantly train and rehearse these types of high-risk operations, and are 
well versed in the use of a myriad of weapons in close battle.  Once the members of the 
assault force entered the train, they engaged the threat discriminately, selecting targets 
and eliminating seven terrorists.  They did not hesitate in eliminating two hostages when 
they refused to abide by the BBE’s instructions.  The BBE had complete control of the 
situation from start to finish; the assault lasted only several minutes with complete 
success.   
d. Deception 
Deception was achieved during all phases of the operation:  from the 
initial deception with the food poisoning of the school kids, to the use of undercover cops 
to gather intelligence, the explosive charges to create a diversion, to the extraordinary use 
of jets to completely rattle the terrorists.  The deception plan allowed the BBC marines to 
approach the train surreptitiously without being compromised.  It gave the assault force 
the opportunity to exploit absolute surprise over the terrorists during the assault.  Finally, 
the deception plan with the food was directly responsible for the safe release of the 
children at the Bovensmilde School.    
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3. Biorhythm 
Intelligence, Surprise + Deception, Operator’s Skill for Hostage Taker
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Figure 42.   Author’s Representation for the  De Punt Train Rescue Biorhythm 
 
B. MUNICH OLYMPICS MASSACRE, (GERMAN POLICE, SEPTEMBER 
1972) 
1. Background and Case Study 
On 5 September 1972, eight Palestinian terrorists from the Black September 
faction, held nine Israeli athletes hostage in exchange for the release of 232 Arab 
prisoners held by Israel, as well as two known German terrorists.  They stormed the 
Olympic Village in Munich by climbing over one of the perimeter fences during the early 
morning hours and raiding the apartment building that housed the Israeli contingent.  In 
the process, they killed two Israeli athletes (Moshe Weinberger and Yossef Romano) and 
were able to hold hostage nine more. 
The Black September terrorists had been planning the operation for months.  At 
approximately 0400 hours on the morning of the siege, the masked gunmen made their 
way to #31 Connollystrasse at the Olympic Village Apartments.  They successfully 
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entered the apartment, taking five Israeli team members hostage:  track coach Amitzur 
Shapira, fencing master Andrei Spitzer, rifle coach Kehat Shorr, weightlifting judge 
Yacov Springer, and Yossef Gutfreund (Calahan, 1995, p.2).  The terrorists then moved 
around the complex looking for more Israelis, successfully apprehending six more in 
apartment #3.  During the initial struggle, wrestling coach Moshe Weinberger and 
weightlifter Yossef Rommanno were shot with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, killing them 
both. 
Aside from the initial struggles and the shots fired, very few people at the 
Olympic Village noticed what had transpired.  Eventually, two Israeli athletes who had 
escaped the assault, alerted the German authorities to the incident.  During the next hour, 
the Black September terrorists issued their demands and threw the body of Moshe 
Weinberger into the street.  In addition to the release of the Arab and German terrorists, 
they requested an airplane for their escape plan.  Manfred Schreiber, the Munich Police 
Commissioner, became the de-facto command authority over the hostage incident (p. 3).  
The German negotiators successfully extended three deadlines throughout the day.  
Schreiber finally concluded that a rescue attempt was the only solution to the siege.  
Initially, police rescue units dressed as athletes attempted to conduct an emergency-
deliberate plan of action.  Their efforts were quickly aborted when they realized their 
plan had been exposed on the local news, which the terrorists could see on the television 
inside their room.  Schreiber concluded that the best option was to isolate the terrorists at 
the airfield and attempt to intercept them on their way to the aircraft at Germany's 
Furstenfeldbruck Airport.  Israeli Special Forces units from the Sayeret had offered 
assistance in mounting a rescue, but this was denied by the local state officials. 
At the airfield, eight German police officers dressed in Lufthansa flight and cabin 
crew uniforms. However, because of a shortfall, several officers were forced to wear 
Lufthansa shirts with what were obviously standard police-issue trousers. This small 
squad was tasked with securing the aircraft and ambushing the terrorists once inside.  
After discussing the mechanics of their ambush, the officers decided their portion of the 
plan was too dangerous to execute, and decided on their own to abort the suicide mission 
(Reeve, 2000, p. 109).  With the helicopters already inbound, the deputy commander for  
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the Munich police, Georg Wolf, was left with the only option of attacking the terrorists 
with the five men sniper team, while the terrorists made their walk from the helicopters to 
the aircraft.   
Five German snipers who were responsible for initiating the assault were 
prepositioned at the airport.  However, it was not until the helicopters with the terrorists 
and the hostages arrived at the airfield for the transload, that the German authorities 
realized there were eight terrorists and not five as anticipated.  The snipers did not have 
communications equipment and could not relay this information to the rest of the German 
assault force waiting by the air terminal.  In addition, the lighting at the airfield was shut 
off, and the only floodlights used by the Munich police were all pointing at the airplane.  
With very little time to reposition themselves, the sniper element was stuck with very 
poor site selection.  One helicopter landed less than fifty yards away from one of the 
snipers (p. 111).  
As the terrorists moved away from the helicopters to inspect the aircraft, 
Schreiber ordered the snipers to open fire.  The sniper shots missed their intended targets, 
and a firefight ensued at the airfield.  The Israeli hostages were still tied to their seats 
inside the two helicopters, with several of the terrorists keeping guard.  The firefight 
lasted approximately 80 minutes; German police armored vehicles were called on to the 
scene to try to resolve the deadlock at the airfield.  When they arrived at the airfield, the 
terrorists panicked; one terrorist came out of his helicopter and sprayed the Israeli 
athletes inside with his Kalashnikov; he followed this act by throwing a hand grenade 
inside the helicopter, blowing it up in a giant ball of flame, burning the five Israeli 
athletes still bound inside.  German police decided to conduct a full on infantry style 
assault on the terrorists.  As the assault element moved forward, another terrorist came 
out of the second helicopter and opened fire on the remaining four hostages still tied in 
the helicopter.  The firefight continued with the armored vehicles opening fire 
sporadically, seriously injuring two snipers thinking they were terrorists (p. 122).  At 
approximately 0130 hours, the firing ended.  All the hostages, five terrorists and one 
police officer were killed.  The remaining three terrorists survived and were arrested at 
the airfield.   
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2. Principles for Hostage Rescue Operations 
a. Intelligence 
Intelligence operations during the hostage siege at the Olympic Village 
were not employed properly.  Even though the initial negotiations process was stalled 
during three different occasions successfully, no effort was made by the German 
authorities to exploit this advantage and utilize TECHINT or HUMINT assets during the 
standoff.  The German police effectively bought time but did not exploit this advantage.  
They attempted to conduct an emergency-deliberate plan of action without considering 
employing TECHINT means first in order to find out the basic information requirements 
inside the target area.  They did not know until the execution phase of the operation, that 
there were eight terrorists and not five as had been assumed all along.  This was a critical 
failure directly attributed to a lack of intelligence efforts. 
b. Surprise 
 The element of surprise was considered by the German police, but did not 
work effectively because of the lack of intelligence about the terrorists and mediocre 
operator’s skills.  The German authorities understood that surprise was critical for the 
safe release of the hostages; it was considered during the initial emergency assault, during 
the delivery of food to the apartment, and during the planned ambush at the airfield.  No 
HUMINT or TECHINT was employed in the Connollystrasse apartments at the Olympic 
Village to pinpoint how many hostages and terrorists were inside the room.  During the 
negotiations process, Manfred Schreiber, the Munich Police Commissioner, was 
concerned only with ending the siege as fast as possible and not drawing out the process 
to gather intelligence.  The efforts of the German authorities to control the situation 
throughout all the conversations with the terrorists were opportunities not exploited.   
c. Operator’s Skills 
The German authority’s CT capability was in its infancy at the time.  The 
Israeli experts in counterterrorism offered help throughout the crisis, but it was refused 
several times.  The tactics, techniques, and procedures of all personnel within the rescue 
element were completely below the standard of a seasoned CT national level asset.  The 
sniper-observer teams were not properly equipped or trained in target acquisition at 
nighttime, nor did they have communications equipment.  Some of the sniper weapons 
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were not even fitted with telescopic sites, and none had infrared or thermal sites (Reeve, 
2000, p. 116).  They did not have proper firing positions or direct line of sight with the 
terrorists; instead, the pilots and aircrew were in their way.  As the firefight broke out, a 
police officer standing at the base of the air traffic control tower was shot in the head by 
one of the terrorists, as he tried to support the sniper element with a sub machinegun.  
Nevertheless, the worst mistake for this element was having only five snipers for eight 
terrorists.  After several investigations covering the disaster, it was determined that some 
of the Israeli hostages were killed by the Germans’ erratic gunfire.      
The concept of an open-air option to end a hostage siege is a high-risk 
option considered in hostage rescue operations.  For this specific reason, it is considered 
only when the skills of the sniper elements are highly effective, and the unit is very 
comfortable with its standard operating procedures responding to contingencies.  The 
order should never have been given to open fire once it was determined that there were 
eight and not five terrorists holding the Israelis.  The plan should have been aborted and 
another option considered.  To make matters worse, the chaos that ensued during the 
firefight and the mad infantry attack by the assault element show a lack of discipline and 
expertise by all in the assault force.  The safety of the hostages was of secondary 
importance to the German authorities at the time; the focus was to kill the terrorists. 
Six months after the disaster at the airfield, the Germans vowed they 
would not be taken by surprise again and authorized the creation of the 
Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (GSG-9 or Border Protection Group) counterterrorist unit, which 
was deemed operational in April and was responsible for the success of operation FIRE 
MAGIC in 1977 (see case study D).   
d. Deception 
Similar to surprise, the deception principle was considered, but only as a 
quick means to end the siege.  The deception plan was not synchronized with the rest of 
the rescue operation and was not tied into the intelligence collection or tactical assault 
plan.  The first deception effort came with the emergency assault plan, by dressing the 
police officers in athlete’s outfits.  The police chief considered a different approach by 
sending five undercover police officers to deliver meals to the terrorists, in hopes that 
they could storm the terrorists once they came out to pick up the food.  This did not work 
161 
because the terrorists never allowed the officers to come close to the apartment.  At the 
airfield, the airplane used was a dummy aircraft and the personnel dressed as Lufthansa 
crewmembers did not have the complete uniforms to make their plan believable.  When 
the men on the plane decided to abort their portion of the plan, the rest of the operation 
fell to pieces (Reeve, 2000, p. 112).   
There was no diversion planned during the most critical event in the 
operation—the transload from the helicopters to the airplane.  The deception during this 
phase should have been centered in trying to separate the terrorists from the hostages, 
specifically when considering an open-air option.  Overall, some deceptive measures 
were considered but not synchronized properly with the rest of the hostage rescue 
principles and the overall tactical plan.       
3. Biorhythm  
Intelligence, Surprise + Deception, Operator’s Skill for Hostage Taker
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Figure 43.   Author’s Representation of the Munich Olympics Biorhythm 
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C. EGYPT AIR FLIGHT 648 AT MALTA:  EGYPTIAN SPECIAL FORCES 
(FORCE 777, 1978) 
1. Background and Case Study 
The increasing threat within the country of Egypt and from Libyan-backed 
Middle Eastern terrorist groups prompted Egypt to create its own counterterrorist unit.    
Egyptian intelligence was receiving indicators from groups such as the Abu Nidal Faction 
and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine vowing to take violent action against 
Egyptian targets and people (specwarnet.net/world/ct.htm on 20 January 2004).  In 1977, 
a small volunteer group was formed out of the ranks of the Egyptian Army’s As-Saiqa 
special forces; Egypt's predecessor to Force 777 was created (Harclerode, 2001, p. 297). 
Initially, the unit was staffed by three officers, four NCOs, and forty operators.  Their 
first targets were against terrorist training camps along the Libyan border. 
It was not long before the As-Saiqa saw its first hostage rescue crisis.  On 18 
February 1978, two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
shot dead an Egyptian news editor, Yusuf Sebai.  They were protesting a recent peace 
mission to Jerusalem by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (p. 297).  After a short siege 
inside a hotel, the terrorists demanded a plane to fly them to Cyprus, together with 15 
hostages.  Cypriot authorities conceded; after flying around in a DC-8 with nowhere to 
land, the aircraft returned to Cyprus with the 2 terrorists and 15 hostages.  Cypriot 
authorities quickly surrounded the aircraft together with their national guard.   As-Saiqa 
was dispatched to assault the DC-8 and flown to Cyprus. With little experience and short 
on time, As-Saiqa developed an emergency-deliberate plan of action during the one hour 
flight; they were completely unprepared for the operation.  To add to the confusion, the 
Egyptian Ministry of Defense neglected to inform the Cyprus authorities of As-Saiqa’s 
imminent arrival.  When their aircraft landed, the entire assault force, dressed in civilian 
clothes, began their assault towards the DC-8 (p. 298).  The Cypriot authorities assumed 
that As-Saiqa were reinforcements for the PFLP, and engaged them in an 80-minute 
firefight.  Fifteen As-Saiqa died because of the mishap.             
In 1978, Force 777 was created out of the ranks of the now infamous As-Saiqa 
counterterrorist unit.  On 23 November, four members of the Egyptian Liberation 
Organization hijacked an Egyptair Boeing 737, flying from Athens to Cairo (p. 298).  
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Palestine Radicals, angered over Egypt's failure to protect the fleeing Achille Lauro 
terrorists, seized Egyptair flight 648 (ironically, the same airplane that had been used to 
transport the Achille Lauro terrorists out of Egypt) and flew it to Luga International 
Airport in Malta.  This time, Egypt made sure that the foreign government knew Force 
777 was coming (specwarnet.net/world/ct.htm on 20 January 2004).  
By the time Force 777 had arrived at Luga, five hostages had been shot, two 
Israelis and three Americans, and their bodies thrown on the tarmac.  One of the Israelis 
died, but the others survived (Harclerode, 2001, p. 299).  During the short period of 
negotiations with the Maltese authorities, Force 777 failed to perform any surveillance of 
the ground situation or to debrief any of the released hostages.  They had no idea of the 
location of the terrorists, their weapons, or the terrorists’ physical characteristics.  Force 
777 also failed to look at aircraft blueprints or the operational condition of the aircraft.  
When negotiations failed, the commander of Force 777 immediately began deploying his 
snipers and moving his assault force element towards the aircraft.  Without stun grenades 
or other essential equipment for CQB, a six-man element took position under the aircraft, 
while others climbed onto the wings (p. 299).  In order to stun the terrorists and gain time 
for operators to enter through the breach, the explosive charge used was doubled.  The 
charge was so powerful that it destroyed six rows of seats killing approximately twenty 
passengers. Then members from the wing team entered though the doors and for some 
unknown reason began throwing smoke-grenades and firing indiscriminately. Snipers 
positioned on top of rescue vehicles began firing at fleeing civilians.  The terrorists, 
already warned by the noises under the aircraft prior to the explosion, threw grenades 
down in the breach hole and fired their weapons at the assaulters.  During the firefight, 
the rear of the aircraft caught fire suffocating many of the hostages.  In all, the botched 
operation killed 57 hostages.  Three of the terrorists were killed, but the fourth survived 
(p. 300).  
2. Principles for Hostage Rescue Operations (For Flight 648 at Malta) 
a. Intelligence 
Force 777 made some very fundamental mistakes in their plan.  A hostage 
rescue operation on an aircraft is very complicated and requires at minimum specific 
information requirements and peculiarities of the aircraft.  Force 777 did not exploit the 
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time afforded by the Maltese negotiator to look over basic intelligence requirements such 
as blueprints, aircraft status, location of the terrorists, location of the hostages, and what 
sort of weapons the terrorists were carrying.  They did not take advantage of the injured 
hostages thrown on the tarmac for debriefing and gathering valuable information.  Force 
777 deployed their sniper-observer teams at the same time as the assault force element, 
denying themselves the capability of the snipers providing initial intelligence of the target 
area, covering fires for the approach, or last minute intelligence during the approach to 
the target.  Finally, they miscalculated the specific requirements for the breaching charge 
by not studying the blueprints and finding out how many explosives were needed to blow 
the door.     
b. Surprise 
 Force 777 did not exploit the element of surprise to gain precious 
moments during their initial entry.  They erroneously thought that a big explosion and 
smoke would compensate for the lack of stun grenades and that it would be enough to 
disorient the terrorists and give the assault force the surprise advantage.  Once they 
entered the aircraft, Force 777 was surprised to find that six rows of seats had been blown 
up from their breaching charge and that over 20 hostages were dead. 
c. Operator’s Skills 
Force 777 was not ready or capable of conducting an assault of this nature.  
They developed a last minute plan, and it was poorly executed.  Their shooting skills and 
techniques inside the aircraft say little of their knowledge of CQB.  The last thing needed 
inside a target during CQB is smoke, and Force 777 was throwing smoke grenades 
everywhere and shooting at anything that moved.  The sniper force was undisciplined and 
erroneously shot at anyone coming out of the aircraft without first positively identifying 
them.  
d. Deception 
Force 777 never considered a deception plan to cover their movement to 
the aircraft.  Their approach and pre-positioning was noisy; they gave away their position 
by making too much noise opening the latch under the aircraft to emplace the breaching  
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charge.  At a minimum, they could have used some kind of diversionary tactic to the front 
of the aircraft in the form of noise or a fire, to distract attention from the bottom and the 
wings of the aircraft.   
3. Biorhythm 
Intelligence, Surprise + Deception, Operator’s Skill for Hostage Taker
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D. OPERATION FIRE MAGIC, LUFTHANSA FLIGHT 181:  MOGADISHU, 
SOMALIA:  GRENZSCHUTZGRUPPE 9 (GSG 9, OCTOBER 1977 ) 
1. Background and Case Study 
On 13 October 1977, Lufthansa flight LH-181 from Palma in the Balearic Islands 
to Germany, was hijacked by four terrorists of Wadi Haddad’s PFLP-SOG on behalf of 
the Red Army Faction over the French Mediterranean coast (Harclerode, 2001, P. 367).  
On board the aircraft were five aircrew (two pilots and three flight attendants), 86 
passengers, and four terrorists, two of them women.  Two of the terrorists were male—
Zohair Yousif Akache and Wabil Harb.  The other two females were Suhailah Sayeh and 
Hind Alameh, both of whom were armed with grenades and pistols.  The terrorists’ leader 
known as Akache ordered the aircraft captain to fly to several airports looking for fuel.  
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They first landed at Rome’s Leonardo da Vinci airport at 1545 hours.  Their demands 
were the release of eleven members of the Red Army Faction and two Palestinians jailed 
in Turkey and their transportation to South Yemen, Somalia or Vietnam, and U.S. $15 
million (p. 368).  After refueling, the LH-181 takes off again at 2250 hours and lands at 
0152 hours the next morning in Bahrain.  Meanwhile, members of GSG-9 were on alert 
and drafting their initial plans for a rescue option.  Then on Sunday, October 16, the 
airliner suddenly took off, only 40 minutes before the first deadline for blowing it up. 
Initially, the aircraft was refused permission to land in Oman, so they flew for another 
three to four hours and arrived over Aden airport in South Yemen. The airstrips were 
blocked with armored vehicles, so the aircraft was forced to conduct an emergency 
landing in the sandy area between the two runways.  Yemeni troops immediately 
surrounded the aircraft.   
Conditions inside the aircraft were very unpredictable, with Akache having 
sporadic violent rages.  After inspecting for any damage to the aircraft caused by the 
emergency landing, Jurgen Schumann, the pilot, was allowed to leave the plane to request 
fuel.  Akache, fearing the pilot would give intelligence and information to the authorities, 
grew inpatient as the pilot was gone for so long.  Upon the pilot’s return, Akache pointed 
his gun to Jurgen’s head and executed him.  The next morning the co-pilot, Jurgen Vietor, 
took off and flew the airplane to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. There, German 
government spokespersons contacted the hijackers and said they were prepared to release 
11 terrorists held in jail and fly them to Mogadishu; Akache postponed his deadline to 
0145 hours on the morning 18 October. 
Negotiations continued throughout the day, and the crisis almost came to a 
resolution with the Yemenis offering to pay the ransom of U.S. $15 million.  Meanwhile, 
word got back to the GSG-9 command that Jurgen Schumann (the pilot), had been 
executed for no apparent reason.  West Germany immediately took the hard line and 
ordered the GSG-9 leadership to go forward with a rescue operation to free the hostages 
in Aden.     
At midnight, the sniper-observer teams moved into positions and began 
pinpointing the exact location of the terrorists through their thermal optical devices.  At 
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0130 hours, the assault force gathered on the edge of the runway, ready to conduct their 
approach to the aircraft.  During the movement forward towards the aircraft, the assault 
element realized that the lights on the airfield were silhouetting them, but luckily, they 
were not detected.  Another minor inconvenience occurred once they got to the aircraft.  
The ladders they had used during their rehearsals were prepared for use on a Boeing 707 
not a 737.   The ladders were longer than required, so they had to lean them out farther at 
a 45-degree angle, causing them to slip.  The team immediately pulled two members from 
the medical element to help hold the ladder in place (Bloomsbury, 1994, p. 140).  
Meanwhile, negotiations were ongoing in an effort to continue to buy time and maintain 
the terrorists inside the cockpit with the radios.   
At 0205 hours, the order was given to begin the assault.  Just as the plan called 
for, Somali troops lit a diversionary fire approximately 300m in front of the aircraft. The 
two hijackers, Akache and Wabil Harb went to the cockpit to determine what had caused 
the fire, whereupon the tower contracted them by radio and started to discuss the 
conditions of the exchange.  
At 0207 hours, the assault element from the GSG-9 blew the emergency doors 
over the aircraft wings, throwing stun grenades inside.  Other members of the assault 
force threw stun grenades over the cockpit to maintain the diversion and drew attention 
away from the team entering the aircraft.  The terrorists were taken completely by 
surprise.   
Akache was mortally wounded, but he managed to lob two hand grenades before 
his death.  Luckily, both grenades rolled under the first-class seats, which cushioned the 
explosions without injuring anyone.  Akache later died in the hospital and Wabil Harb 
died after being taken out of the aircraft.  The female, Hind Alameh, was killed instantly 
by GSG-9 accurate fires.   The second woman, Suhaileh Sayeh, was wounded and later 
recovered (p. 382).  All passengers were exfiltrated through the rear of the aircraft with 
the sniper-observer elements providing overwatch-covering fires for protection.  Four 
hostages were lightly wounded as well as one GSG-9 operator, but none was killed.  The 
operation was completed in less than five minutes, and it was a total success. 
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2. Principles for Hostage Rescue Operations 
a. Intelligence 
GSG-9 utilized HUMINT and TECHINT means to prepare their assault.  
They determined early in the siege the number of terrorists inside the aircraft through 
signals given by the aircrew, such as numbers of newspapers requested or four cigarettes 
thrown in the trash tied together.  Sniper-observer teams used thermal devices to pinpoint 
activity inside the aircraft, specifically the use of radios by the terrorists.  Intelligence 
sources debriefed the pilot, while he was coordinating to get fuel for the aircraft.  Finally, 
blueprints and a replica of the aircraft were used to prepare for the rescue.    
b. Surprise 
The four terrorists were taken completely by surprise, thanks to a well-
coordinated and simple deception plan backed up by excellent operator’s skills.  The 
surreptitious movement to the aircraft and the silent ladder placement allowed the assault 
team to get in position unbeknownst to the terrorists just feet away.  The explosive breach 
and the use of stun grenades completely disoriented the terrorists, giving the assault team 
the precious seconds required to dominate and eliminate the threat.    
c. Operator’s Skills 
The operators from GSG-9 remained flexible throughout the numerous 
refueling stops and stages involved prior to the aircraft’s final landing at Mogadishu.  
They adapted quickly to every situation, readjusting their plan to fit the scenario.  They 
conducted numerous rehearsals on a similar aircraft, honing their skills in preparation for 
the assault.  They also listened and welcomed the expert advice from two British SAS 
operatives throughout all phases of the operation.  During the assault element’s approach, 
sniper-observer teams properly guided the assault force’s movement into the target area, 
looking for any signs that the terrorists were changing positions, or a possible 
compromise of the assault force.  Finally, the GSG-9’s actions on the objective were 
executed violently and with precision fires, neutralizing the threat before it could engage 
any of the hostages or the rescue personnel.   
d. Deception 
The use of a simple deception plan at the front of the aircraft, in this case a 
fire, provided a critical diversion to cover the final approach to the target.  The 
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combination of radio communications to maintain the threat in the cockpit of the aircraft, 
in combination with the use of stun grenades and the fire, created just enough of a 
diversion to allow the assault team the element of surprise.  
2. Biorhythm 
Intelligence, Surprise + Deception, Operator’s Skill for Hostage Taker
















13 Oct 1977:  Lufthansa fl ight t  f i t
LH-181 hijacked by four i   f
terrorists of PFLPt rr ri t  f --SOG 2
0                1                2                3            4                5                6
Land at Rome’s 
Leonardo da Vinci 




Land a t 0152hrs 
the next morning 
in Bahrain 
16 Oct 77, take off 40 
minutes before the fi rst 
deadline for blowing it up. 





New deadline to 0145 
hours on the morning of 
18 Oct 77 
At 0205hrs Somal i 
troops start 
diversionary fire 
At 0130hrs GSG-9 is 
located on ladders 
ready to assaul t the 
door to the cockpi t
At 0207hrs GSG-9 
assaults aircraft with stun 
grenades and rapid and 
accurate firing At 0212hrs GSG-9 has 
secured the aircraft; all 
hostages are safe, three 
ter rorists are dead and 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
171 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
A. HOSTAGE RESCUE IN GWOT 
During the last thirty years international hostage taking has transformed itself 
from an era of hijackings in the early 1970’s, to the rise of Islamic extremism in the 
1980’s with embassy sieges, to the 1990’s with the advent of narco-terrorism.  Today, 
and during the most recent war in Iraq—Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—radical terrorist 
organizations are using hostage taking as the coercive weapon of choice, trying to level 
the playing field against coalition forces.  Terrorists are kidnapping civilian workers and 
soldiers alike, beheading them for the world to see on national television.  Their demands 
are simple—stop supporting the war and leave Iraq.  Their intent is to persuade countries 
supporting coalition forces to leave Iraq and destroy national will.  In Game Theory 
terms, it is a game of chicken against an opponent that parks his vehicle in the middle of 
the road and walks away.  Only when the hostage taker’s location is known, can we apply 
the waiting game and track the biorhythm model.  Otherwise, it is a race against time to 
try to find the hostage/s before they are executed.  To counter this tactic, counterterrorist 
forces must rely heavily on a robust intelligence network that can provide actionable 
intelligence, pin pointing the exact location of the hostage takers, and destroy them 
immediately.  Simultaneously, diplomatic and informational levels of national power 
should focus on a theme that seems to devalue the hostage, preventing the “theater of 
terror” effect from rising, while at the same time allowing the military arm to pursue 
these terrorists aggressively.  Giving in to terrorist demands encourages more acts of 
terror, strengthens the terrorist’s agenda, and reinforces that their strategy works.          
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Hostage rescue forces should be employed only after the careful implementation 
of the hostage rescue principles and the close monitoring of the hostage crisis biorhythm.  
Maintaining the pulse of the crisis through the biorhythm model will allow commanders 
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to decide the best execution time, 
exploiting the enemy’s culmination points.  This implies having patience in the 
negotiations process and trusting the intelligence apparatus to do its job.   
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Although it might seem that an early attack on a terrorist organization before it 
settles into a routine is the most suitable option, early execution of a rescue operation is 
not often feasible.  Executing the operation early does not allow for the natural 
degradation inside the target—a fundamental aspect to ensure surprise for the rescue 
element (Nordberg, 1999, p. 15).  Waiting permits the situation to develop and it allows 
for the negotiations process to take effect, intelligence to be gathered, and for the rescue 
force to prepare a skillful recovery plan. 
Alert sequences for counterterrorist forces must take into consideration the 
benefits of waiting for later execution.  Timelines that set the battle rhythm for these 
forces must reflect and focus on preserving operator’s skills, and not allow for the natural 
degradation of the force as the siege continues.  Spinning up and alerting CT forces to 
prepare an emergency plan of action en route to the target when the situation has not been 
developed will only tire and degrade the quality of the force.  These forces are already at 
a peak state of readiness; the focus during the initial stages of the siege should be on 
getting the intelligence apparatus into action to exploit the target.  This will lay the 
foundation for a good deception plan, which will in turn give the operators their much-
needed element of surprise.  Only then should the CT force be readied to initiate their 
battle rhythm.          
Prolonging the siege can also set the stage for an explosive confrontation between 
the hostage takers and their victims.  Therefore, the art of solving the crisis rests on the 
skillful manipulation of the negotiations process to buy time, through a synergistic 
approach encompassing all the instruments of national power to influence the siege.  
Simultaneously, the rescue option must be considered immediately following the four 
proposed principles—intelligence, surprise, operator’s skill, and deception.  Unless a 
trigger is met early in the crisis, the rescue must wait.  However, the waiting game must 
focus on finding the best windows of opportunities to send in the rescue force.    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis developed a theory to determine the best execution time to conduct a 
hostage rescue attempt, by explaining the phenomenon of a hostage crisis biorhythm and 
proposing four hostage rescue principles essential for success—surprise, intelligence, 
operator’s skill, and deception.  The analysis conducted in this thesis must be 
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implemented in all counterterrorist organizations, specifically those that deal with 
hostage rescue operations. The findings in this thesis enable decision-makers at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels to better plan and organize hostage rescue forces 
to respond striking at the enemy’s centers of gravity and exploiting culmination points.  
Additionally, this thesis enables decision-makers to comprehend the hostage crisis 
environment by providing a hostage rescue planning model that can be implemented in 
any counterterrorist joint task force to give a clear picture of possible outcomes 
throughout a hostage crisis.   
Strategic special operations such as hostage rescues require the surgical precision 
of an expert counterterrorist unit.  The highest levels of government must maintain the 
pulse throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of such operations.   CT forces 
must be used when the opportunity comes, fully understanding the risks and benefits of 
unleashing such units on the enemy.  The operational art of using a counterterrorist force 
must encompass a thorough understanding of the four principles presented in this thesis.  
In a hostage crisis, engaging a terrorist threat with extreme prejudice whenever 
negotiations fail will send the correct message to the terrorist organization.   
A hostage siege is a dramatic event, highly visible and effective in getting 
international attention; the terrorists will continue to use this tactic to achieve leverage.  
U.S. national policy and commitment to recovering hostages must be steadfast; 
bargaining or yielding to terrorist demands only increases the likelihood of more hostages 
taken.  No matter how much money is spent, or how well trained our hostage rescue 
forces are, we still have innocent people killed because of operations “gone wrong” 
(Pittman, 2003, p. 1).  On the other hand, brilliant operations such as CHAVIN DE 
HUANTAR reinforce the fact that surgical hostage rescue operations do work.  The U.S. 
has the best counterterrorist forces in the world.  We spend billions of dollars outfitting 
and preparing them to do a job nobody wants to take responsibility for, and then expect 
no political blowback.  We must let the professionals do what they do best.  The U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy in the GWOT should encourage the use of CT forces 
aggressively against any hostage taker; a faint-hearted policy based on previous failures 
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APPENDIX: HOSTAGE LIST, OPERATION CHAVIN DE 
HUANTAR 
A. MINISTERS 
1.  Francisco Tudela (Foreign Relations) 
2.  Rodolfo Muñante (Agriculture) 
B. AMBASSADORS 
3.  Morihisa Aoki (Japan) 
4.  Jorge Gumucio (Bolivia) 
C. CONGRESS PERSONNEL 
5.  Samuel Matsuda (Decentralization Commission) 
6.  Eduardo Pando (Mining Commission) 
7.  Carlos Blanco (Budget Commission) 
8.  Luis Chang (Economics Commission) 
9.  Gilberto Siura (Defense and Internal Order Commission) 
D. MAGISTRATES 
10.  Moisés Pantoja, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
11.  Hugo Sivina. 
12.  Alipio Montes de Oca. 
13.  Mario Urrelo. 
14.  Carlos Giusti (Died as result of injuries sustained during the rescue). 
15.  Luis Serpa. 
E. STATE REPRESENTATIVES 
16.  Ricardo Kamiya, General Secretary to the President of the Republic. 
17.  Carlos Tsuboyana, President’s Vice-Minister. 
18.  Juan Mendoza, Mining Vice-Minister. 
19.  Felipe Ramírez, Representative to the President’s Ministry. 
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20.  Salvador Romero, Secretary for the Ministry of Mining and Energy. 
F. POLICE AND MILITARY 
21.  Vice Admiral (ret.) Luis Giampietri, President of the Peruvian Institute of the 
Sea (Instituto del Mar Peruano) (Imarpe). 
22.  General Máximo Rivera, Commander of DINCOTE (National Directorate 
Against Terrorism). 
23.  General Alfonso Villanueva, Commander of the PNP Intelligence 
 Department. 
24.  Guillermo Bobio, Chief of State Security. 
25.  Navy Captain Alberto Heredia. 
26.  Army Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Fernández. 
27.  Army General Arturo López Pardo. 
28.  Air Force Colonel Julio Rivera. 
29.  Air Force Colonel Orlando Denegri. 
30.  PNP General Carlos Domínguez. 
31.  PNP General Hugo Darío Vega. 
32.  General Julio Pinto, PNP Secretary for the Superior Direction. 
33.  General Hugo Vera, PNP Economics Director. 
34.  PNP Colonel Alberto Castillo 
35.  PNP Colonel Jorge Villacorta. 
36.  PNP Colonel Jaime Valencia, Chief of Kidnapping Division 
37.  PNP Colonel, Marco Miyashiro, former CDR of DINCOTE. 
38.  PNP Colonel Rómulo Zevallos. 
39.  PNP Colonel Jorge Negrete. 
40.  PNP Colonel Rowel Rivas. 
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41.  PNP Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Haro. 
42.  PNP Major Oscar Pajares. 
G. VERY IMPORTANT PERSONS 
43.  Pedro Fujimori, President Fujimori’s brother. 
44.  Pedro Haritomi. 
45.  Juan Julio Wicht, Priest and Economics Professor at the Pacific University 
46.  Miguel Takahasi, consultant for the PesaPerú corporation. 
47.  José Ishiki, accountant for the Cogrono food corporation. 
48.  Juan Gibu. 
49.  Tokeshi Gusukuda, investigator for the Center of Growth Promotion. 
50.  Pedro Inomoto. 
51.  Francisco Salinas. 
52.  Alfonso Yamakawua. 
53. Jaime Bisso, general manager for the North Regional Bank Banco (Regional 
del Norte). 
54.  Mauricio Molina. 
H. JAPANESE BUSINESSMEN 
55.  Shiguero Taki, Panasonic General Director. 
56.  Kosabe Shoji, Noys engineer. 
57.  Masao Nakashi. 
58.  Jorge Hasawara, Ajinomoto executive. 
I. EMBASSY PERSONNEL 
59.  Kazumi Ono. 
60.  Sinichi Takeda. 
61.  Shigeru Yamakasi. 
62.  Fumio Sunami, First Secretary. 
178 
63.  Hajime Nakae, First Secretary. 
64.  Shinji Yakamoto, Cultural Attaché. 
65.  Ghiroyuki Kimoto, Ministry Counselor. 
66.  Hirio Nakamura, Second Secretary. 
67.  Nasahiro Nakai, First Secretary. 
68.  Hiroto Morozumi, Second Secretary. 
69.  Hirofumi Sueyoshi, worker. 
70.  Hidekata Ogura, First Secretary. 
71.  Katsumi Itagaki, Second Secretary. 
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